THE

CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA

VOLUME III

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THE CAMPAIGN
OF
SANTIAGO DE CUBA

BY

HERBERT H. SARGENT

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WITH MAPS

IN THREE VOLUMES

VOL. III

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THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA

VOLUME THREE

CHAPTER XIV

THE SIEGE AND THE CAPITULATION OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, AND THE REËMBARKATION OF THE FIFTH CORPS[1]

AT 10 o'clock A.M. on July 3 General Shafter sent into the Spanish lines under a flag of truce the following demand for surrender:

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,
NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA,
July 3, 1898. 8.30 A. M.

TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE SPANISH FORCES,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

SIR, — I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and all women and children, that they should leave the city before ten o'clock to-morrow morning.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,
Major-General U. S. V.

[1] See Map 12.

The following reply was received at 6.30 P.M. that same day:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 3, 1898. 3 P.M.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER.

SIR, — I have the honour to reply to your communication of to-day, written at 8.30 A.M. and received at 1 P.M., demanding the surrender of the city or, in the contrary case, announcing to me that you will bombard this city, and that I advise the foreigners, women, and children, that they must leave the city before ten to-morrow morning.

It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of your message.

Very respectfully,

JOSÉ TORAL,

Commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army Corps.

When the purpose of bombarding the city was made known in Santiago, the British, Portuguese, Chinese, and Norwegian consuls came into the American lines and asked that the non-combatants might occupy the town of El Caney and be supplied with provisions, and begged that the bombardment be delayed until ten o'clock on the morning of the 5th, as there were about fifteen or twenty thousand people who wished to leave the city. Out of deference to the expressed wish of the consuls, General Shafter consented to delay the bombardment until noon of the 5th, and so informed General Toral.

The problem of feeding and sheltering so large a number of people was a very perplexing one. El Caney, where the bulk of the refugees wished to go, was twelve miles from the base of supplies at Siboney and contained only a few houses, and as the roads were already in an almost impassable condition, it was very difficult to bring forward even the necessary supplies for the army.

General Shafter represented these facts to the authorities at Washington, and as he had some doubt whether, under the circumstances, the extreme measures he had threatened were justifiable, he submitted the matter for the consideration of the President, and suggested that perhaps it might be better to lay close siege to the place and starve out the garrison, and let the non-combatants come out when forced to do so by hunger.

This correspondence occurred before positive news of the destruction of Cervera's fleet reached the American lines. When that fact was confirmed, General Shafter again demanded the surrender of the Spanish forces:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA,
July 4, 1898.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL SPANISH FORCES,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA.

SIR, — I was informed officially last night that Admiral Cervera is now a captive on U. S. S. *Gloucester* and is unharmed. He was then in the harbor of Siboney. I

regret also to have to announce to you the death of General [Vara de] Rey at [El] Caney, who with two of his sons was killed in the battle of July 1. His body will be buried this morning with military honors. His brother, Lieutenant-Colonel [Vara de] Rey, is wounded and a prisoner in my hands, together with the following officers: Captain Don Antonio Vara del Rey,[1] aide to the General; Captain Isidore Arias Martinez; Captain Antonio Mansas, post commander; Captain Manuel Romero, volunteer force; who, though severely wounded, will all probably survive.

I have also to announce to you that the entire Spanish fleet, with the exception of one vessel, was destroyed, and that is so vigorously followed that it will be impossible to escape. General Pando [2] is opposed by forces sufficient to hold him in check.

In view of the above, I suggest that, to save needless effusion of blood and the distress of many people, you may reconsider your determination of yesterday. Your men have certainly shown the gallantry which was expected of them.

I am, sir, with great respect,
Your obedient servant,
WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding

[1] This family name was written by General Shafter "Vara del Rey," and it so appears in nearly all American histories of the campaign. The correct spelling, however, is "Vara de Rey." There was no officer in the Spanish army at that time by the name of "Vara del Rey."

[2] Reference is here made to Escario's column. General Shafter had not yet learned of its arrival.

General Shafter also sent General Toral the following communications relative to an exchange of prisoners:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA,
July 4, 1898.

TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
SPANISH FORCES, SANTIAGO.

SIR, — It will give me great pleasure to return to the city of Santiago, at an early hour to-morrow morning, all of the wounded Spanish officers now at El Caney who are able to be carried and who will give their parole not to serve against the United States forces until regularly exchanged. I make this proposition as I am not so situated as to give these officers the care and attention that they can receive at the hands of their military associates and from their own surgeons, though I shall, of course, give them every kind treatment that it is possible to do under such adverse circumstances. Trusting that this will meet with your approbation, and that you will permit me to return to you these persons, I am

Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, Commanding United States Forces.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA,
July 4, 1898.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL, SPANISH FORCES,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA.

SIR, — The fortune of war has thrown into my hands quite a number of officers and private soldiers, whom I am now holding as prisoners of war, and I have the

honor to propose to you that a cartel of exchange be arranged to-day by which the prisoners [Lieutenant Hobson and his men] taken by the forces of Spain from on board the *Merrimac*, and any officers and men of the army who may have fallen into our hands within the past few days, may be returned to their respective governments on the terms usual in such cases, of rank for rank. Trusting that this will meet with your favorable consideration, I remain,

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, Commanding United States Forces.

To these three communications of July 4, General Toral replied:

ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA,
FOURTH CORPS, GENERAL STAFF.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE AMERICAN FORCES.

EXCELLENCY, — I have the honour to reply to the three communications of your excellency, dated to-day, and I am very grateful of the news which you give me in regard to the generals, chiefs, officers, and enlisted men that are your prisoners, and of the good care that you give to the wounded in your possession. With respect to the wounded, I have no objection to receive them in this place, those that your excellency may willingly deliver me, but I am not authorized by the general-in-chief to make any exchange, because he has reserved to himself that authority. Yet I have given him notice of the proposition of your excellency. It is useless for me to tell

you how grateful I am for the interest that your excellency has shown for the prisoners and corpse of General Vara de Rey; accept many thanks for the generous treatment.

The same reason that I explained to you yesterday I have to give again to-day: that this place will not be surrendered.

I am yours with great respect and consideration,

JOSÉ TORAL.

IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 4, 1898.

After sending the second communication demanding the surrender of the Spanish forces, General Shafter learned of the arrival of Escario's column and reported this fact to Washington:

"CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO, CUBA, July 4.

"When am I to expect troops from Tampa? Report just received, Pando [Escario] entered city last night by Cobre road with five thousand from Holguin [Manzanillo]. Garcia was especially charged with blocking that road."

And later the same day he cabled:

"There appears to be no reasonable doubt that General Pando succeeded in entering Santiago last night with his force, said to be about five thousand men.[1] This puts a different aspect upon affairs; and while we can probably maintain ourselves, it would be at the cost of very considerable fighting and loss. General Lawton reports that General Garcia, who was to block entrance of Pando,

[1] The exact number was 3579 officers and men. See Spanish government's statement, Appendix A.

informed him at ten o'clock last night that Pando had passed in on Cobre road. Lawton says cannot compel General Garcia to obey my instructions, and that if they [the Cubans] intend to place themselves in any position where they will have to fight, and that if they [the Americans] intend to reduce Santiago, we [the Americans] will have to depend upon our own troops, and that we will require twice the number we now have. . . . We have got to try and reduce the town, now that the fleet is destroyed, which was stated to be the chief object of the expedition. There must be no delay in getting large bodies of troops here. The town is in a terrible condition as to food, and people are starving, as stated by foreign consuls this morning, but the troops can fight and have large quantities of rice, but no other supplies. There will be nothing done here until noon of the 5th, and I suppose I can put them off a little longer to enable people to get out. Country here is destitute of food or growing crops except mangoes. Men are in good spirits and so far in good health, though it is hard to tell how long the latter will continue. . . ."

The inhabitants of Santiago were hourly expecting that Sampson would force an entrance into the bay, and they were prepared to flee at the first indication of his approach. To prevent his squadron from entering, the Spaniards attempted, on the night of July 4, to sink the *Reina Mercedes*[1] in the channel. This resulted in a terrific bombardment by the American vessels. The inhabitants,

[1] The vessel was sunk, but it failed to close the channel.

believing that an entrance was being forced into the harbour, poured out of the city in great numbers; the road to El Caney was filled with thousands of old men, women, and children. With little shelter and no provisions at El Caney these hungry, starving, sick refugees were in a pitiable and desperate condition.

On the 5th authority was granted General Toral to exchange Lieutenant Hobson and his men, and this was effected on the 6th. The consent of General Toral to receive the wounded prisoners and to exchange Hobson, and the fact that many of the refugees who were still fleeing to El Caney blocked the roads from Santiago, caused the postponement of the bombardment, which was to begin at noon of the 5th.

As early as July 2, General Shafter wrote Admiral Sampson, urging him to force immediately the entrance of the harbour. Sampson replied that it was impossible to force an entrance until the channel could be cleared of mines, and that this could not be done until after the forts at the mouth of the harbour were captured by the American troops. To this Shafter replied:

"It is impossible for me to say when I can take the batteries at entrance to harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those we have been pitted against, it will be some time and at a great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire as well as the army."

In reply to this Sampson wrote the following letter, and arranged by telephone to visit Shafter in person the next morning, July 3, with the object of conferring with him as to a plan of combined attack upon the batteries at the mouth of the harbour.

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate,
Off Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

My dear General, — I have your note of this morning —just received at 11.30. An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning, but I must say in addition to what he told you that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except to seaward. They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of the attempt to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.

It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries, from the rear, would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

If it is your earnest desire that we should force an entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining mines, which I will bring here with as little delay as

possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use, I will enter the harbor.

This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.

It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port.

Very truly,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear-Admiral U. S. N.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
NORTH ATLANTIC STATION.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. R. SHAFTER, U. S. V.

The conference between General Shafter and Admiral Sampson, which was to take place on July 3, was prevented by the naval battle. On the next day Shafter sent Sampson the following despatch:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, July 4.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON, COMMANDING UNITED STATES NAVY FORCES:

Through negligence of our Cuban allies, Pando, with five thousand men, entered the city of Santiago last night. This nearly doubles their [the Spanish] forces. I have demanded their surrender, which they refuse, but I am giving them some wounded prisoners, and delaying operations to let foreign citizens get out, and there will be no action before the 6th, and perhaps the 7th. Now, if you will force your way into the harbor, the town will surrender without any further sacrifice of life. My present position has cost me one thousand men, and I do not wish to lose

any more. With my forces on one side and yours on the other — and they have a great terror of the navy, for they know they cannot hurt you — we shall have them. I ask for an early reply.

Very respectfully,

WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General U. S. V.

In reply to this Admiral Sampson sent word that he would come ashore to discuss the situation with General Shafter. Meanwhile, at about noon of July 5, while the arrangements for the conference were taking place, the President of the United States ordered that General Shafter and Admiral Sampson should confer at once for coöperation in an attack upon Santiago.

The conference was appointed to meet at army headquarters on the morning of July 6, but owing to Admiral Sampson's illness, he sent his Chief of Staff, Captain Chadwick, to represent him. An agreement was made that the army and navy should make a joint attack on Santiago at noon, July 9. The city being within easy range of the large guns on board the war vessels, the navy was to throw 8-inch, 10-inch, and 13-inch shells into the city for twenty-four hours. If this did not prove effective in bringing the enemy to terms, the marines and Cubans were to make an assault upon the Socapa battery, and some of the smaller ships of the squadron were to make an effort to enter the harbour.

Before hostilities were resumed a third demand for the surrender of the Spanish forces was made, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA, July 6, 1898.

TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, SPANISH FORCES,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

SIR, — In view of the events of the 3d instant, I have the honor to lay before your excellency certain propositions to which I trust your excellency will give the consideration which, in my judgment, they deserve.

I enclose a bulletin of the engagement of Sunday morning, which resulted in the complete destruction of Admiral Cervera's fleet, the loss of six hundred of his officers and men, and the capture of the remainder. The Admiral, General Paredes, and all others who escaped alive, are now prisoners on board the *Harvard* and *St. Louis*, and the latter ship in which are the Admiral, General Paredes, and the surviving captains (all except the captain of the *Almirante Oquendo*, who was slain), has already sailed for the United States. If desired by you, this may be confirmed by your excellency sending an officer under a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson, and he can arrange to visit the *Harvard*, which will not sail until to-morrow, and obtain the details from Spanish officers and men aboard that ship.

Our fleet is now perfectly free to act, and I have the honor to state that unless a surrender be arranged by noon on the 9th instant, a bombardment of the city will be begun and continued by the heavy guns of our ships. The city is within easy range of the guns, the 8-inch being capable of firing 9500 yards, the 13-inch of course

much farther. The ships can so lie that with a range of 8000 yards they can reach the centre of the city.

I make this suggestion of a surrender purely in a humanitarian spirit. I do not wish to cause the slaughter of any more men, either of your excellency's forces or my own; the final result under circumstances so disadvantageous to your excellency being a foregone conclusion.

As your excellency may wish to make reference to so momentous a question to your excellency's home government, it is for this purpose that I have placed the time of the resumption of hostilities sufficiently far in the future to allow a reply being received.

I beg an early answer from your excellency.

I have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servant,

WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, Commanding.

The period of truce was employed in strengthening the American lines and in making minor changes in the positions of the troops. General Lawton's division was pushed from day to day farther to the right and closer to the bay. Two light batteries were placed in position on the northeast side of the city and two on the east side. The eight field-mortar batteries were put ashore and placed in position at the north end of San Juan Heights, and the two heavy artillery batteries were ordered from Daiquiri to the front. One of the siege guns was disembarked, but the condition of the roads made it impossible to bring the gun forward.

When General Toral received the third demand for surrender, he immediately requested that the operators of the Submarine Cable Company, who had fled to El Caney on the night of the 4th, be permitted to return, in order that he might communicate with his home government.

The cable operators were sent to the Spanish lines on the morning of the 7th, and on the 8th General Toral submitted the following proposition:

ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, FOURTH CORPS,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 8, 1898. 10 P. M.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, IN CAMP AT THE SAN JUAN.

SIR, — In answer to your letter of the 6th instant, I propose to you, to avoid further damage to the city, useless shedding of blood, and other horrors of war, the evacuation of the division of Santiago de Cuba, to retreat to Holguin with my troops with all their baggage, arms, and munitions, without their being attacked during the march, and should this proposition be accepted, the necessary negotiations to effect it should be made under the usual manner and form.

The loss of the Spanish squadron, as related in the American bulletin, if it is exact, in no way influences the defence of this city, we having been reënforced on the 3d by a column[1] which you doubted could arrive.

Therefore, I have at my disposal sufficient men to resist any attack, well provided with ammunition, water in abundance, notwithstanding the supply pipes were cut, and rations for a reasonably long time. Now, more than ever,

[1] Escario's column.

besides my own supplies, I count on those provided for the inhabitants who have emigrated.

As the troops are placed, with a convenient reserve of rations and plenty of munitions of war, and the city almost entirely deserted, the bombardment will only be felt by the house owners — foreigners, many of them — and many other natives whom the American army came to protect.

The Spanish soldier is fully acclimated; your troops are not, and the losses attendant on the different attacks on Santiago will be greatly added to by the rigours of a bad climate and the sickness of the present season.

I consider that my proposition to evacuate extensive territory will save a most lamentable loss of life on both sides and the honour of the Spanish arms.

. . . . . .

I am with great respect, your most obedient servant,

JOSÉ TORAL,

Commander-in-chief, Fourth Army Corps of the Army of the Island of Cuba.

General Shafter replied that he would refer the proposition to the authorities at Washington, but doubted whether it would be approved. This was done on the morning of the 9th, and as it seemed hardly probable that an answer would be received before noon, — the time set for beginning the bombardment, — instructions were given on both sides that the truce would continue until further orders.

On the afternoon of the 9th General Shafter telegraphed the Secretary of War:

"I forwarded General Toral's proposition to evacuate the town this morning without consulting any one. Since then I have seen the general officers commanding divisions, who agree with me that it should be accepted.

"First, it releases at once the harbor.

"Second, it permits the return of thousands of women, children, and old men, who have left the town fearing bombardment and are now suffering fearfully where they are, though I am doing my best to supply them with food.

"Third, it saves the great destruction of property which a bombardment would entail, most of which belongs to Cubans and foreign residents.

"Fourth, it at once releases this command, while it is in good health for operations elsewhere. There are now three cases of yellow fever at Siboney in a Michigan regiment, and if it gets started no one knows where it will stop.

"We lose by this simply some prisoners we do not want and the arms they carry. I believe many of them will desert and return to our lines. I was told by a sentinel who deserted last night that two hundred men wanted to come, but were afraid our men would fire upon them."

This letter brought the following reply:

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 9, 1898.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER, PLAYA, CUBA.

In reply to your telegram recommending terms of evacuation as proposed by the Spanish commander, after careful consideration by the President and Secretary of War, I am directed to say, that you have been repeatedly advised that you would not be expected to make an

assault upon the enemy at Santiago until you were prepared to do the work thoroughly. When you are ready, this will be done. Your telegram of this morning said your position was impregnable, and that you believed the enemy would yet surrender unconditionally. You have also assured us that you could force their surrender by cutting off their supplies. Under these circumstances your message recommending that Spanish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed without molestation to Holguin is a great surprise and is not approved. The responsibility for the destruction and distress to the inhabitants rests entirely with the Spanish commander. The Secretary of War orders that when you are strong enough to destroy the enemy and take Santiago, you do it. If you have not force enough, it will be despatched to you at the earliest possible moment. Reënforcements are already on the way of which you have been apprised. In the meantime, nothing is lost by holding the position you now have, and which you regard as impregnable. Acknowledge receipt.

By order of the Secretary of War.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

Immediately upon the receipt of this despatch General Toral was notified that his proposition to evacuate Santiago was not favourably considered at Washington, and the demand for his unconditional surrender was again repeated. An answer was requested by 3 P. M. of the 10th, and he was informed that unless a favourable reply should be

received, active hostilities would be resumed at 4 P. M. July 10.

Toral declined to surrender, and the firing on both sides began at about 4 P. M. Shafter's purpose was, if possible, to drive the enemy out of his works and into the town by means of artillery and rifle fire. The American artillery was effective in silencing nearly all the enemy's guns, but the infantry kept well under cover of their intrenchments as no assault upon the Spanish position was intended. The navy threw 8-inch and 10-inch shells into the city, and continued their firing on the 11th until a second truce began. The shells could be seen falling in the city, but as the houses were built solidly of stone, no effect was produced except the starting of a few fires, which were quickly extinguished. The action was continued on the 11th in a desultory manner until about noon, when the last shot of the Santiago campaign was fired. The losses resulting from the two days' bombardment were small.

In spite of General Toral's assertions to the contrary, it was known that the food supplies of the city were almost exhausted; and it was therefore believed that he must either be meditating escape, or that he had information that reënforcements would soon reach him. In fact, there were daily reports reaching General Shafter's headquarters, through the Cuban allies, that Spanish reënforcements were marching to the relief of Santiago

from Manzanillo, Holguin, or San Luis. It was necessary, therefore, to extend and strengthen the right of the American line; for it was evident that if the Spanish forces attempted to escape, or reënforcements attempted to enter the city, they would make the effort on the side guarded by Garcia's troops.

Accordingly, on the 10th and 11th, Lawton's division was pushed farther to the right. The Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry were detached from Kent's division and ordered to report to Lawton; and the First Illinois Volunteers and the First District of Columbia Volunteers, which had arrived at Siboney on the 9th and 10th, were ordered to the front and placed in position to the right of Wheeler's division.

By 5 o'clock on the afternoon of July 11 the American lines extended all the way down to the bay on the northwest side of Santiago, and the investment of the city was complete. Garcia's forces were now withdrawn to the rear of Lawton's division, and were given instructions to act as a reserve and to send out scouting parties along the roads, and to picket the country for many miles inland in order to give timely warning of the approach of any reënforcements.

In the meantime Brigadier-General W. F. Randolph, who had arrived at Siboney on the 9th with six batteries of artillery, was ordered to disembark and send them to the front as quickly as possible;

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future date.

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but as the roads were in an almost impassable condition, he was unable to get more than two batteries in position by the 14th.

"The situation in regard to supplies for the American troops," says Lieutenant Miley, one of General Shafter's aides, "was now at its worst. The rains had been unusually heavy, and not only were the roads practically impassable for wagons, but the streams were so swollen that at times they were unfordable by pack-trains. A limited amount of food had, up to this time, been carried to the refugees, but on the 11th and 12th the supplies were entirely cut off from El Caney, and the refugees were urged to go to Firmeza in the neighborhood of the mines, a few miles north of Siboney. Prior to this time the commanding officer at Siboney had been ordered not to permit the Cuban refugees to enter that place, and again he was directed that this order must be fully complied with, and that all Cubans in his immediate vicinity must at once be sent to the iron mines, as food could be taken to them at that point by rail. However, there were thousands in El Caney who could not walk to this place, which was ten miles distant, and the suffering of these people was acute. The Red Cross Society, as well as the army, had provisions at Siboney in great profusion, but to get them to these people at El Caney was an impossibility."

Yellow fever had already made its appearance at Siboney. At first an attempt was made to keep

the knowledge of the fact from the soldiers; but this, of course, was impossible for any length of time. By the 11th the entire army was aware that it would have to fight a foe more to be feared than the Spaniards — a foe that could not be driven from his position by the bravest troops in the world.

At noon on the 11th the fifth demand was made for the surrender of the Spanish forces:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA, July 11, 1898.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE SPANISH FORCES, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

SIR, — With the largely increased forces which have come to me, and the fact that I have your line of retreat securely within my hands, the time seems fitting that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of Santiago and of your excellency's army. I am authorized to state that should your excellency so desire, the government of the United States will transport the entire command of your excellency to Spain.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, Commanding.

General Toral's reply was as follows:

ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, FOURTH CORPS,
July 11, 1898.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE FORCES
OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE CAMP OF THE SAN JUAN.

ESTEEMED SIR, — I have the honour to advise your eminence that your communication of this date is received,

and in reply desire to confirm that which I said in my former communication; also to advise you that I communicated your proposition to the General-in-Chief.

Reiterating my sentiments, I am

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSÉ TORAL,

Commander-in-chief of the Fourth Corps, and Military Governor of Santiago.

Many thought that General Toral was trying to gain time, and advised General Shafter to break off negotiations and assault the city, but he, believing that General Toral would soon surrender, was anxious to avoid further fighting; for he knew that in an attack upon the Spanish trenches, protected as they were in front by barbed wire entanglements, the Americans would be compelled to halt for a time under a deadly fire, which would result in a frightful sacrifice of life.

On the 11th, following the bombardment of the city by the navy with 8-inch and 10-inch shells, Shafter telegraphed Sampson:

"My lines are now complete to the bay north of Santiago. Your shots can be observed from there perfectly, — at least those that fall in the town. Flames followed several shots fired to-day, but seemed to be quickly extinguished. A number of the shots fell in the bay close to a small gunboat lying near the shore. At present they [the Spaniards] are considering a demand for unconditional surrender. I will notify you of the result. I think it

advisable to put in some heavy shots, say 10 to 13-inch, to-morrow, and see if we cannot start a fire. Be careful not to shoot beyond the town, as my troops are within a mile and a half of it, and you will be firing directly towards us."

Upon receipt of this Sampson ordered the *Massachusetts* and the *Oregon* to Santiago for one day's bombardment of the city with 13-inch shells, and sent on the 12th the following reply through Commodore Watson:

"Admiral Sampson proposes to begin bombardment to-morrow morning with 13-inch shell, unless there are reasons for not doing so. Will General Shafter please inform him of the distance of the fall of the shot from the cathedral, using the cathedral as a point of reference. And he would like particularly to know if any shell fall in the water."

On the evening of the 12th Sampson was informed of the truce, and that it would most probably continue during the next day.

On the morning of the 13th he sent Shafter the following despatch:

"I am now prepared to shell the city of Santiago with three of my largest ironclads, with 13-inch projectiles; can commence at short notice. Will await your signal."

To which Shafter replied:

"Message about being ready to open with 13-inch guns received. Thanks. I believe they will surrender before noon to-morrow. If not, I will want you to open fire. I will notify you."

General Shafter was still of the opinion that the navy should have made an effort to force the entrance of the harbour immediately following the bombardment of the 10th and 11th. Late on the afternoon of the 12th he telegraphed the Secretary of War:

"So far, no attempt to enter the harbor by the navy. They should be required to make a determined effort at once. The slight bombardment has apparently had no effect on the town."

Upon the receipt of this despatch the Secretary of War communicated with the Secretary of the Navy, who at once sent the following telegram to Admiral Sampson:

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1898.

The Commanding General of the army urges, and Secretary of War urgently requests, that navy force harbor. Confer with commander of army. Wishing to do all that is reasonably possible to insure the surrender of the enemy, I leave the matter to your discretion, except that the United States armoured vessels must not be risked.

LONG.

General Toral, as well as General Linares, who had relinquished the command upon being wounded, believed that the time had come to surrender; but according to the Spanish law a commanding general cannot surrender without the authority of his home government. With the object of influencing the home government, General Linares, on July 12,

in a cable to Captain-General Blanco in Havana, and to the Minister of War at Madrid, thus graphically described the condition of the garrison at Santiago:

To the Commander-in-chief and the Minister of War:

Though confined to my bed by great weakness and sharp pains, I am so much worried over the situation of these long-suffering troops that I deem it my duty to address your excellency and the Minister of War for the purpose of setting forth the true state of affairs.

Hostile positions very close to precinct of city, favoured by nature of ground; ours spread out over fourteen kilometers (14,210 yds.); troops attenuated; large numbers sick; not sent to hospitals because necessary to retain them in trenches. Horses and mules without food and shelter; rain has been pouring into the trenches incessantly for twenty hours. Soldiers without permanent shelter; rice the only food; cannot change or wash clothes. Many casualties; chiefs and officers killed; forces without proper command in critical moments. Under these circumstances impossible to open passage, because one-third of the men of our contingent would be unable to go out; enemy would reduce forces still further; result would be great disaster without accomplishing the salvation of eleven much-thinned battalions, as desired by your excellency. In order to go out under protection of Holguin division, it would be necessary for the latter to break through the hostile line, and then with combined forces to break through another part of the same line. This would mean an eight days' journey for Holguin division, bringing with them a number of rations which

they are unable to transport. The situation is fatal; surrender is inevitable; we are only prolonging the agony; the sacrifice is useless; the enemy knows it, fully realizing our situation. Their circle being well-established, they will exhaust our forces without exposing theirs, as they did yesterday, bombarding on land by elevation without our being able to see their batteries, and from the sea by the fleet which has full advices, and is bombarding the city in sections with mathematical accuracy.

Santiago de Cuba is not Gerona, a city enclosed by walls, on the soil of the mother country, defended inch by inch by her own sons, by old men, women, and children without distinction, who encouraged and assisted the combatants and exposed their lives, impelled by the sacred idea of independence, while awaiting aid which they received. Here solitude, the total emigration of the population, insular as well as peninsular, including public officials, with a few exceptions. Only the clergy remain, and they intend to leave to-day, headed by their prelate.

These defenders are not just beginning a campaign, full of enthusiasm and energy; they have been fighting for three years with the climate, privations, and fatigue; and now that the most critical time has arrived their courage and physical strength are exhausted, and there are no means for building them up again. The ideal is lacking; they are defending the property of people who have abandoned it in their very presence, and of their own foes, the allies of the American forces.

There is a limit to the honour of arms, and I appeal to the judgment of the government and the whole nation; for these long-suffering troops have saved that

honour many times since the 18th day of May, when they sustained the first bombardment.

If it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons which I ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the responsibility of the *dénouement* anticipated and announced by me in several cablegrams, I offer myself loyally on the altar of my country for the one purpose or the other, and I will take it upon myself to perform the act of signing the surrender, for my humble reputation is worth very little when it comes to a question of national interests. LINARES.

On the 12th of July, the day following the receipt of the letter of General Toral stating that the proposition for surrender had been submitted to the home government, General Shafter arranged with General Toral for a personal interview. At the hour appointed, nine o'clock on the morning of July 13, Generals Toral and Shafter, with a number of interpreters, met between the lines and discussed the matter of surrender. General Shafter was accompanied by the Commanding General of the United States Army, Major-General Nelson A. Miles, who had arrived at Siboney on the 11th and reached Shafter's headquarters on the following day. The result of the interview is best described by quoting from a despatch sent by General Shafter to the Adjutant-General at Washington, immediately after the conference:

"I had an interview of an hour and a half with General Toral, and have extended the truce until noon to-morrow.

I told him that his unconditional surrender only would be considered, and that he was without hope of escape and had no right to continue the fight. I think it made a strong impression on him, and hope for surrender. If he refuses, I will open on him at twelve o'clock, noon, to-morrow, with every gun I have, and have the assistance of the navy, who are ready to bombard the city with 13-inch shells. There is a good deal of nervousness throughout the army on account of yellow fever, which is among us certainly."

During the conference it was agreed that General Shafter should meet General Toral the next day at eleven o'clock to receive a final answer; but before the time appointed for the meeting arrived General Toral wrote General Shafter a letter, saying that on the evening of the 13th he had received the following despatch from Captain-General Blanco at Havana:

"Believing that business of such importance as the capitulation of Santiago should be known and decided upon by the government of his Majesty, I give you notice that I have sent the conditions of your telegram asking an immediate answer. You may show this to the general of the American army, to see if he will agree to await the answer of the government, which cannot arrive before the expiration of the time he has set, for the reason that communication by the way of Bermuda is much slower than by way of Key West. In the mean-time, your honour and the general of the American army may agree upon the terms of capitulation upon the basis of repatriation."

"In sending this telegram to General Shafter," says Lieutenant Miley, "General Toral remarked that he hoped the contents would be satisfactory, and that General Shafter would be pleased to designate commissioners to meet commissioners appointed by him, who might agree, in advance of the decision of the Spanish government, upon the terms of capitulation. At the meeting a little later General Toral insisted that he was certain the Spanish government would approve of the capitulation of the place, but without this approval he would not surrender. General Shafter insisted that he surrender unconditionally at the time and without any further waiting. The discussion of the matter between the two lasted for some time, carried on by means of interpreters, who in some way conveyed to both General Shafter and General Miles, who was also present, that General Toral finally did agree to an unconditional surrender, and both of the generals returned to the American lines confident that General Toral had unqualifiedly surrendered without waiting for any approval beyond that of General Blanco."

In his letter that morning General Toral had designated as his commissioners, Brigadier-General Don Federico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel Don Ventura Fontan, and Mr. Robert Mason, the British Vice-Consul. General Shafter, immediately upon his return from the conference, designated as his commissioners, Major-General Wheeler, United

States Volunteers, Major-General Henry W. Lawton, United States Volunteers, and First Lieutenant John D. Miley, Second United States Artillery, Aide-de-camp.

With the meeting of these commissioners the siege of Santiago de Cuba came to an end.

The Capitulation

At 2.30 P. M. on July 14, the commissioners appointed by Generals Shafter and Toral assembled to formulate the terms of surrender. The meeting took place midway between the lines, under a large ceiba tree, which has since been known as "El Arbol de la Paz." Believing that the surrender had been fully decided upon, the American commissioners had already drawn up an agreement which covered most of the points previously referred to by Generals Miles, Shafter, and Toral. At the meeting of the commissioners the several points were thoroughly discussed by both sides, and in deference to the wishes of the Spaniards a few slight changes were made in the wording of the agreement. Among these changes was the substitution throughout the document of the word "capitulation" for "surrender."

The Spanish commissioners then proposed three concessions, which they desired to have incorporated into the agreement. They were that the Spaniards should be permitted to carry back to Spain the military records and documents of the

Spanish forces in eastern Cuba; that the volunteers, mobilized troops, and guerillas, recruited from the native population of Spanish sympathizers, who might wish to remain in the island, should be allowed to do so; and that the Spaniards should be permitted to retain their arms and carry them back to Spain.

The American commissioners agreed to the first two concessions, but insisted that as the Spanish troops would be prisoners of war they must be disarmed. The Spanish commissioners felt keenly on this point, for it was their earnest desire to lessen as much as possible the mortification resulting from defeat. Appreciating this fact, the American commissioners finally consented to add to the agreement a clause in which they recommended to their government the return of the Spanish arms to Spain. The wording of this clause was afterwards changed so as to permit the Spanish troops to march out of Santiago to a point agreed upon, where they were to deposit their arms, and the American commissioners were to recommend in a separate paper the return of the arms to Spain. While this disposition of the point in question in no way bound the American government, it had the effect of satisfying the Spanish commissioners.

The agreement was now ready for signature, but to the surprise of the American commissioners the Spanish commissioners were unwilling to sign. This unexpected turn of affairs caused a delay in

the negotiations, the story of which, as told by Lieutenant Miley, one of the commissioners, is as follows:

"The agreement embracing all the points proposed was drawn up in terms so as to make the instrument a final one, and the Spanish commissioners having been asked if they were ready to sign, replied that they must first return with a copy to consult General Toral. An adjournment until 6 P. M. was taken, to afford them time to go to the city and return, while the American commissioners remained at the place of meeting. . . .

"On the return of the Spanish commissioners, shortly after six o'clock, it was fully expected that nothing remained for the commissioners to do except sign the agreement after copies were made. For that reason it was suggested that the Spanish troops be drawn at once from the fortifications and from the trenches in front of the city; also that the work of removing the obstructions from the mouth of the harbor, that our supply ships might enter, would begin immediately.

"Nothing definite on these points could be arrived at, and the Spanish commissioners stated that they would like to adjourn until the following day, in order to consult General Linares about certain things before signing. This appeared to the American commissioners a remarkable request, as they had just returned from consulting General Toral, and now to ask for time to consult General Linares, who, as it was well known, was not in command on account of wounds received on July 1, was hardly to be expected. The American commissioners had come with full powers to settle all disputed points, and presumed that the Spanish

commissioners had come empowered likewise. Something seemed to be wrong, and the commissioners on the two sides were working at cross purposes. The American commissioners were determined not to adjourn, but to press the negotiations to an end that night. It began to appear that the Spanish commissioners were playing for time, or that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of General Shafter at the meeting with General Toral at noon. The situation was serious, for if an amicable understanding could not be speedily reached the only alternative was to break off negotiations. General Escario suggested that he return to the city and fetch General Toral, who could clear up the matter. For fear that General Linares would have to be sent for, even after the arrival of General Toral, the American commissioners offered, if there was no objection, to go into Santiago and continue the negotiations there, in order that the matter might be concluded the more speedily. This suggestion was not favorably considered by the Spanish commissioners, and they again urged an adjournment until the next morning.

"It was plainly stated that on the part of the American commissioners there was no desire to inconvenience General Toral by having him come out to the place of meeting at such a late hour, and further, that there was no desire to unnecessarily force matters, but that the question whether there was to be further fighting must be determined before adjournment for the night. The Commanding General of the American forces and the home government demanded that there be no delay. So finally General Escario went for General Toral and returned with him at 9.40. I had met the General before

at his interviews with General Shafter, and so had General Wheeler. General Lawton was introduced to him, and a short time was passed in conversation. The General is a genial, courtly gentleman, and soon won our respect for his fair dealing. Proceeding to business, he explained his position, which was still as he had described it in his letter to General Shafter early in the morning, which was, that he was willing to surrender, and that he had the permission of General Blanco to do so, but the entire matter had been referred to Madrid for approval there. An answer had not yet been received, though he felt it would certainly come after General Blanco's sanction. Considerable time — two or three days — must elapse before the answer could be received, and both he and General Blanco desired that the points to be included in the formal surrender be decided upon while waiting. He was as anxious as the American commander for a speedy solution of the matter, but without the approval of Madrid he would not surrender. He owed it to his army and to himself that this sanction be first obtained, and without it he would resume fighting. With this sanction, he and his command would be permitted to return home ; without it, there was much doubt. All this, he said, he had stated to General Shafter at noon through the interpreters, and now he wished it made plain to the commissioners. More than this, he had never conceded at any time.

"It was obvious to us now that General Toral had been misinterpreted at the meeting with General Shafter, and that while General Shafter had come away under the impression that General Toral had made an unqualified surrender, he really had not departed from his position set forth in the letter of the morning. Either this or

General Toral had news of reënforcements and had decided to delay matters, if possible, until their arrival.

"The American commissioners consulted Mr. Mason, in whom they had great confidence, and he assured them that General Toral was honest in all his statements. We felt that Mr. Mason would not be a party to any stratagem on the part of the Spaniards, and it is the writer's opinion that the negotiations would not have been successful if Mr. Mason had not been one of the commissioners on the Spanish side.

"The duty of the commission was now plain. A form of agreement must be prepared which could be made final when the approval of Spain arrived. To facilitate the preparation of such an agreement, the Spanish commissioners were invited to draw the clauses as they wished them. General Toral and his commissioners did this, and really from this time on the General was sole commissioner on the Spanish side, the gentlemen appointed by him merely signing the instrument. The form of agreement as prepared and signed by the Spanish commissioners was handed to the American commissioners for their consideration. It was so nearly in accord with their views, now that it was felt the surrender had not been absolute, that it was believed the end of the negotiations were close at hand. It now being half an hour past midnight, the commission adjourned until 9.30 the next morning."

The next morning the terms of capitulation were promptly taken up, and after some further discussion English and Spanish copies were prepared for signature; and at three o'clock in the afternoon they

were signed by all the commissioners. Though the agreement was only provisional, all doubts as to the favourable outcome of the negotiations were dispelled by the receipt, early on the morning of the 16th, of a letter from General Toral announcing that the Spanish government had approved the capitulation.

There now remained only the signing of the final agreement, and the formal ceremony of the surrender. At 4 P. M. on the 16th the commissioners again assembled. The wording of the preliminary agreement was simply changed to make it read as a final document, and at 6 P.M. it was signed.

The final document reads as follows:

TERMS OF THE MILITARY CONVENTION for the capitulation of the Spanish forces occupying the territory which constitutes the Division of Santiago de Cuba and described as follows: All that portion of the island of Cuba east of a line passing through Aserraderos, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo, and Aguilera, said troops being in command of General José Toral; agreed upon by the undersigned commissioners: Brigadier-General Don Federico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel of Staff Don Ventura Fontan, and as interpreter Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by General Toral, commanding the Spanish forces, on behalf of the kingdom of Spain, and Major-General Joseph Wheeler, U. S. Volunteers, and Major-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. Volunteers, and First Lieutenant J. D.

Miley, Second Artillery, Aide-de-camp, appointed by General Shafter, commanding the American forces on behalf of the United States:

1. That all hostilities between the American and Spanish forces in this district absolutely and unequivocally cease.

2. That this capitulation includes all the forces and war material in said territory.

3. That the United States agrees, with as little delay as possible, to transport all the Spanish troops in said district to the kingdom of Spain, the troops being embarked, as far as possible, at the port nearest the garrisons they now occupy.

4. That the officers of the Spanish army be permitted to retain their side arms, and both officers and private soldiers their personal property.

5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the American navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions now in the harbor of Santiago and its mouth.

6. That the commander of the Spanish forces deliver without delay a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces in above described district to the commander of the American forces; also a roster of said forces now in said district.

7. That the commander of the Spanish forces, in leaving said district, is authorized to carry with him all military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish army now in said district.

8. That all that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, movilizados, and guerillas who wish to remain

in the island of Cuba are permitted to do so upon the condition of delivering up their arms and taking a parole not to bear arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war between Spain and the United States.

9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with the honors of war, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon, to await their disposition by the United States government, it being understood that the United States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.

10. That the provisions of the foregoing instructions become operative immediately upon its being signed.

Entered into this sixteenth day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, by the undersigned commissioners, acting under instructions from their respective commanding generals, and with the approbation of their respective governments.

JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General U. S. Volunteers.

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General U. S. Volunteers.

J. D. MILEY,
1st Lieut. 2d Art., Aide-de-camp to General Shafter.

FEDERICO ESCARIO,
Brig.-General, Spanish Army.

VENTURA FONTÁN,
Lieut.-Col. of Staff, Spanish Army.

ROB'T MASON,
Interpreter.

At 9.30 o'clock the next morning General Shafter and his staff and his general officers and their staffs, escorted by one hundred mounted men of

the Second Cavalry, under the command of Captain Lloyd M. Brett, and General Toral and his staff, escorted by one hundred foot soldiers, met between the lines, where the formal ceremony of the surrender was quickly completed. The two generals with their escorts then rode into the city of Santiago, and at precisely 12 o'clock noon the American flag was raised over the governor's palace; the escort of cavalry and the Ninth Infantry, which had been designated as the first American regiment to enter the city, presented arms. Capron's battery fired a salute of twenty-one guns, and the entire American army, which had been drawn up in line along the trenches, greeted with cheers the raising of the Stars and Stripes, while the regimental bands played national airs. Thus ended the active operations of the campaign of Santiago de Cuba.

General Ewers was sent to receive the surrender of the garrison of Guantanamo, and Lieutenant Miley was sent to receive the surrender of the inland garrisons near Santiago, and also the garrisons of Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo on the northern coast.

The total number of troops surrendered by General Toral was about 22,700.[1] About 13,558 surrendered at Santiago, 5820 at Guantanamo, 1322 at Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo, and about

[1] See Appendix U.

2000 at El Cristo, Songo, Moron, Dos Caminos, San Luis, and Palma Soriano.

REËMBARKATION

After the surrender General Shafter urged the War Department to hasten the shipment of the Spanish prisoners to Spain in order that his army, which was in a deplorable condition, might speedily return to the United States. More than half of his soldiers were down with malarial fever or recovering from its effects; dysentery and typhoid fever were prevalent, and there were cases of yellow fever in every regiment.

On July 28 the Secretary of War telegraphed General Shafter:

"Would it not be well to encourage your command by telling them they will be moved north as soon as the fever cases subside? It would stimulate them, it seems to me, and that frequently is a tonic. We have selected Montauk Point, Long Island, for your command when it can be moved. How many troops should be sent to take the places of your command?"

To this Shafter replied on the 30th:

"Made known Secretary's telegram that troops would go to Long Island as soon as fever subsided, and it had a very good effect on the men. Two regiments of immunes, in addition to the two already sent, will be sufficient to garrison this place and the surrounding towns, where insurgents are already behaving badly, and where there is

great and well-grounded fear of molestation. This force will be sufficient to defend the town, even if the Spanish troops at Holguin do not leave there or surrender. The count of prisoners has not yet been accurately made, but so far about twenty-one thousand five hundred have surrendered, and there should be three thousand or four thousand at Sagua and Baracoa. Will send transport around there to receive surrender as soon as immunes arrive."

To check the spread of the yellow fever the troops were moved to new camping grounds. A sufficient force having been left to guard the prisoners, the cavalry was taken to the foothills back of Santiago, and the rest of the troops were moved to higher ground not so far from the city. "These steps," says Lieutenant Miley, "were taken in accordance with the best medical opinion, formulated in orders and transmitted to General Shafter for execution. It was directed that the command be moved in this way every few days, isolating the cases of yellow fever as they arose, and it was expected that in a short time the yellow fever would be stamped out, and the command could then be sent without danger of infection wherever the War Department directed." But it soon became apparent that this plan only weakened the soldiers and increased the number of cases of fever. Debilitated by hardships, sickness, and suffering, the men had not the strength to move their tents and rations; indeed, many could scarcely bear the weight of

their rifles. The situation was daily becoming more desperate; already seventy-five per cent of the command were either sick or slowly recovering from sickness.

With this condition of affairs staring him in the face, General Shafter was fearful lest the yellow fever might become epidemic, and on August 2 he telegraphed the Adjutant-General:

"I am told that at any time an epidemic of yellow fever is liable to occur. I advise that the troops be moved as rapidly as possible whilst the sickness is of a mild type. With the departure of the first lot of prisoners all but a brigade can go, and now cavalry division can be spared."

In reply to this Shafter received the next day from the Secretary of War the following despatch, dated August 2:

"After full consideration with Surgeon-General it is deemed best to have you move your command up to end of railroad where yellow fever is impossible. Then we will move them north as rapidly as possible. What do you advise? It is going to be a long job at best to get so many troops away."

To carry out the order contained in this despatch was a physical impossibility. General Shafter at once assembled his division and brigade commanders, and chief surgeons, and having obtained their opinion on the matter, sent the following cablegrams:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *via* HAITI, August 3, 1898.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., WASHINGTON:

In reply to telegram this date, stating that it is deemed best that my command be moved to end of railroad, where yellow fever is impossible, I have to say that under the circumstances this move is practically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired, although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to exceed one thousand men a day at the best, and it will take until the end of August to make this move, even if the sick list should not increase. An officer of my staff, Lieutenant Miley, who has looked over the ground, says that it is not good camping ground. The country is covered with grass as high as a man's head when riding a horse, and up in the hills there is no water, and it will be required to pump water two miles. He also states that rainfall is twice as great as it is here, and the soil is a black loam that is not suitable for camping. Troops that have been sent to that locality have been housed in barracks. In my opinion there is but one course to take, and that is to immediately transport the Fifth Corps and the detached regiments that came with it to the United States. If it is not done, I believe the death rate will be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every medical officer present. I called together to-day the general officers and the senior medical officers, and telegraph you their views. There is more or less yellow fever in almost every regiment throughout the command. As soon as it develops they are sent to hospital, but new cases arise, — not very many, it is true, and it is of a mild type, but nevertheless it is here. All men taken with it will, of course, have to be left and have to take their chances. Some will undoubtedly be taken sick

on the ships and die, but the loss will be much less than if an attempt is made to move this army to the interior, which is now really an army of convalescents; at least seventy-five per cent of the men having had malarial fever, and all so much weakened by the exposure and hardships which they have undergone that they are capable now of very little exertion. They should be put at once on all the transports in the harbor, and not crowded at all, and this movement should begin to-morrow and be completed before the 15th. All here believe the loss of life by doing this will be much less than if more time is taken. If the plan is adopted of waiting until the fever is stamped out, there will be no troops moved from here until the fever season is past, and I believe there will then be very few to move. There are other diseases which are prevailing — typhoid fever, dysentery, etc., and severe types of malarial fever, which are quite as fatal as yellow fever. The matter of moving this army has been placed before you, and you have the opinions of all commanding officers and chief surgeons, who fully agree with me as to the only course left open for the preservation of this army. There can be no danger to the people at home, and it seems to me that infected ships is a matter of small moment.

SHAFTER, *Major-General.*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *via* HAITI, Aug. 3, 1898. 10.05 P. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., WASHINGTON:

Following letter giving the opinion of the medical officers of this command is sent for the consideration of the War Department:

"THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR, — The chief surgeon of the Fifth Army Corps and the chief surgeons of divisions consider it to be their

imperative duty, after mature deliberation, to express their unanimous opinion that this army is now in a very critical condition. They believe that the prevalent malarial fever will doubtless continue its ravages, and that its mortality will soon increase; that there is imminent danger that the yellow fever, now sporadic and of a mild type, may any day assume a virulent type and become epidemic. They unanimously recommend that the only course to pursue to save the lives of thousands of our soldiers is to transport the whole army to the United States as quickly as possible. Such transport they consider practicable and reasonably free from danger. The proposed move to the plateau of San Luis they believe dangerous and impracticable.

Very respectfully,

V. HAVARD,
Major and Surgeon United States Army,
Chief Surgeon.

H. S. KILBOURNE,
Major and Surgeon, Chief Surgeon Second Division,
Fifth Corps.

M. WOOD,
Major and Chief Surgeon First Division,
Fifth Corps.

FRANK J. IVES,
Major and Surgeon U. S. Volunteers,
Chief Surgeon Provisional Division.

H. S. T. HARRIS,
Major and Surgeon U. S. Volunteers,
Chief Surgeon Cavalry Division."

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *via* HAITI, August 3, 1898.
(Received August 4, 1898. 1.13 A. M.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., WASHINGTON:

Following letter giving the views of the general officers of this command is sent for the consideration of the War Department:

"To MAJ.-GEN. W. R. SHAFTER, *Commanding United States forces in Cuba:*

We, the undersigned general officers commanding various brigades, divisions, etc., of the United States army of occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army must be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point on the northern seacoast of the United States; that this can be done without danger to the people of the United States; that there is no epidemic of yellow fever in the army at present, — only a few sporadic cases; that the army is disabled by malarial fever to such an extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and it is in a condition to be practically destroyed by the epidemic of yellow fever sure to come in the near future. We know from reports from competent officers and from personal observations that the army is unable to move to the interior, and that there are no facilities for such move, if attempted, and will not be until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities in the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season, without losses from malarial fever almost as deadly as from yellow fever. This army must be moved at once or it will perish. As an army it can be safely moved now. Persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful

observations based upon the unanimous opinion of our medical officers who are with the army and understand the situation absolutely.

JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General Volunteers.

SAMUEL S. SUMNER,
Commanding First Cavalry Brigade.

WILLIAM LUDLOW,
Brigadier-General United States Volunteers, Commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

ADELBERT AMES,
Brigadier-General United States Volunteers, Commanding Third Brigade, First Division.

LEONARD WOOD,
Brigadier-General United States Volunteers, Commanding City of Santiago.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
Colonel, Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

J. FORD KENT,
Major-General Volunteers, Commanding First Division, Fifth Corps.

J. C. BATES,
Major-General Volunteers, Commanding Provisional Division, Fifth Corps.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Major-General United States Volunteers, Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General Volunteers, Commanding Second Division, Fifth Corps.

C. MCKIBBEN,
Brigadier-General United States Volunteers, Commanding Second Brigade, Second Division."

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

In adding his signature General Lawton wrote the following explanation:

"In signing the above letter, I do so with the understanding it has been seen and approved by the Commanding General. I desire to express it as my strong opinion that 'the best medical authorities of the island' and 'all the surgeons of the command' be also required to sign the paper, — at least the chief surgeon of the army and

each division. I desire also to express the opinion that the mandatory language used in the letter is impolitic and unnecessary. Milder expressions to those in authority generally accomplish just as much. It is also my opinion that much of the fatal illness is due to homesickness and other depressing influences."

The letter signed by the general officers was given to the Associated Press before it reached General Shafter; and on the morning of August 4 it was published in the newspapers throughout the United States. The facts set forth therein greatly stirred the American people, and caused the families of those who were facing such dreadful conditions in Cuba much apprehension and anxiety. As the giving of this official letter to the newspapers was in violation of army regulations and a breach of military discipline, the Secretary of War, after a conference with the President, sent the following message:

WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON,
August 4, 1898.

GENERAL SHAFTER, SANTIAGO.

At this time, when peace is talked of, it seems strange that you should give out your cable signed by your general officers, concerning the condition of your army, to the Associated Press . . . without permission from the War Department. You did not even await a reply to your communication.

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

To which General Shafter replied:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, August 4, 1898.

HON. R. A. ALGER,
SECRETARY OF WAR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The report was given out, as I have since learned, before it reached me. I called the general officers together, to tell them what I proposed to do and to express to them my views and to ask them to give me theirs. I found we all felt alike. Some one then proposed they write me a letter, setting forth their views, and I told them to do so. Meanwhile, I wrote my telegram, and later it was handed in and forwarded with the letter of the surgeons and the letter of these officers. It was not until some time after that I learned their letter had been given to the press. It was a foolish, improper thing to do, and I regret very much that it occurred. . . . I have been very careful about giving to the press any information, and I will continue to be so.

W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General.

On August 4 General Shafter received instructions from the War Department to begin the removal of his command to Montauk Point, Long Island. Four "immune" regiments had been ordered from the United States to occupy the district as the Fifth Corps was withdrawn. Hood's regiment of "immunes" had already arrived, and Ray's, Pettit's, and Sargent's were about ready to sail. The reëmbarkation of the Fifth Corps began on August 7, and was continued as rapidly as

transports could be secured until August 25, when General Shafter sailed with the last of his command.

The shipment of the Spanish prisoners began on August 9, and by September 18 all had left Santiago except a few yellow fever patients and a small number of soldiers who elected to remain in Cuba. The total number of people transported to Spain was 22,864. Of this number 22,137 were soldiers; the rest were officers' wives and children, priests, and sisters of mercy. Of the soldiers 14,995 sailed from Santiago, 5820 from Guantanamo, and 1322 from Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo.

After the surrender the relations between the American and Spanish troops became very friendly. The courage which had been displayed by both sides on the battlefield had won the respect of each for the other; and the consideration and kindness shown the Spaniards by the Americans after the fighting had ended obliterated all hatred. Though there could be little or no conversation between the individuals of the two armies, they seemed to delight in being together. General Shafter reported that the friendship between them was something remarkable; and of the Spanish prisoners themselves he said they were "the most orderly, tractable, and generally best behaved men" that he had ever known.

Upon leaving Santiago the Spanish soldiers

expressed their appreciation of the courteous treatment they had received from General Shafter and his men in the following remarkable letters :

To Major-General Shafter, Commanding the American Army in Cuba.

Sir, — The Spanish soldiers who capitulated in this place on the 16th of July last, recognizing your high and just cause, pray that, through you, all the courageous and noble soldiers under your command may receive our good wishes and farewell, which we send to you on embarking for our beloved Spain.

For this favour, which we have no doubt you will grant, you will gain the everlasting gratitude and consideration of eleven thousand Spanish soldiers, who are your most humble servants.

Pedro Lopez de Castillo,
Private of Infantry.

Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898.

Soldiers of the American Army :

We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-born men in whose breasts there live gratitude and courage, should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardour and with all our strength, endeavouring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancour or hate toward the American nation. We have been vanquished by you (so our generals and chiefs judged in signing the capitulation), but our surrender and the bloody battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for resentment against the men who fought us nobly

and valiantly. You fought and acted in compliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the power of our respective States. You fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage, as before stated — a quality we had not met with during the three years we have carried on this war against a people without a religion, without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but shot their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of the world; have given honourable burial to the dead of the vanquished; have cured their wounded with great humanity; have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort; and, lastly, to us, whose condition was terrible, you have given freely of food and of your stock of medicines, and have honoured us with distinction and courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony.

With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains but to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in this land, which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours. You have conquered it by force and watered it with your blood, as your conscience called for under the demands of civilization and humanity; but the descendants of the Congos and Guineas, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers — these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will

find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized humanity.

From eleven thousand Spanish soldiers.

PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO,
Soldier of Infantry.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, August 21, 1898.

COMMENTS

THERE were several excellent reasons why Admiral Sampson should not have attempted to force the entrance of the harbour with his armoured vessels.

First: There was great danger from the mines in the channel. "Our trouble from the first has been," said Admiral Sampson, "that the channel to the harbor was well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of the attempt to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part." Again he said, "to throw my ships to certain destruction upon mine-fields would be suicidal folly."

Second: It would have been impossible to remove the mines in the channel before the forts at the mouth of the harbour were captured. But Admiral Sampson had not sufficient marines to capture the forts, nor could General Shafter spare any troops for this purpose. Indeed, it has already

been shown that the capture of the forts at the mouth of the harbour would have been, even with Shafter's entire army engaged in the effort, a much more difficult undertaking than the capture of the city of Santiago itself.

Third: Even if the channel had not been mined, it would have been practically impossible for a warship to enter the harbour while the Spaniards were occupying in force both sides of the entrance. Though the guns of Socapa and the Morro batteries would have been useless against a ship in the channel, the guns of Punta Gorda Battery would have borne directly upon her; the ship would also have been subjected to a terrific fire from the cannon and machine-guns of the Lower Socapa and Estrella batteries. But even without the fire of the big guns, the hail of bullets and small projectiles that would have come from the heights on either side of the narrow channel would have made it very difficult to direct the ship successfully into the harbour. Such a fire, though harmless against the ship itself, would have swept from the decks every sailor exposed to view. To run past a battery, or to slip through the wide mouth of a bay defended by shore guns, is a much less difficult undertaking than to sail up a long narrow channel whose bottom is strewn with mines and whose sides bristle with cannon, machine-guns, and small arms. Even in time of peace great care is

necessary to direct a ship safely through Santiago Channel.

Fourth: If Sampson had succeeded in forcing the entrance without losing a single ship, he would, nevertheless, have lost the tactical advantage which he had formerly possessed; for as the American ships would have been obliged to enter the bay one by one, Cervera could have brought against each in turn the concentrated fire of his four cruisers. In other words, the tactical advantage, which remained with Sampson so long as he held his position at the mouth of the harbour, would have passed over to the enemy the moment an attempt was made to force the entrance.

Fifth: The loss or serious disablement of two or more American armoured vessels in an attempt to force the entrance of the harbour prior to the destruction of Cervera's squadron would have given Spain a naval preponderance in fighting power, which might have proved fatal to the American cause.

Sixth: Even after the destruction of Cervera's squadron, the United States could not afford, on account of the threatening aspect of international affairs, to take the risk of losing a single armoured ship in an effort to force an entrance into the harbour. Touching upon this matter, John D. Long, the Secretary of the Navy during the war with Spain, in his book on "The New American Navy," says:

"Ostensibly to provide protection for Austrians in Cuba, the Vienna government sent the cruiser *Maria Teresa* on a visit to the ports of the island. The department was of the opinion that the purpose was to determine whether the blockade was conducted in accordance with international law. This was also believed to be one of the objects of the presence in Cuban waters of the German cruiser *Geier*, which arrived at Cienfuegos on June 11, and which reported not a single vessel blockading that port. The commander of the *Geier*, in cruising on the north shore of the island, purposely 'kept close to the shore, in order to inspect the harbor of Mariel and to see how far the American blockading line extended.' The *Geier* was somewhat inclined to neglect the customary amenities. On June 22 she was sighted off Havana by the *Wilmington*, to whom she explained that she was from Jagua Bay bound to Havana. Commander C. C. Todd, commanding the American gunboat, signalled that the position of the senior officer was north of Havana, and he expected the German cruiser would communicate with that officer before proceeding on her course. But the *Geier* did not alter her direction, and shortly disappeared in a squall. She was not again seen by the *Wilmington*, having entered Havana.

"Here were the men-of-war of two nations, both friendly to Spain, cruising in Cuban waters, apparently for the purpose of finding flaws in our blockade; and as their conduct was based necessarily on orders from their government, the President could not but consider the possibility of the interference of the latter in the conflict. The advisability of guarding our armored ships by every possible means and of not permitting them to incur unjustifiable risk of

injury by a shot from a shore battery became more apparent."

Again he says:

"As Shafter's position before Santiago increased in seriousness, his appeals to the navy to force the harbor of Santiago increased in earnestness. 'Navy should go into the harbor at any cost,' he cabled to the War Department. 'If they do, I believe they will take the city and all the troops that are there. If they do not, our country should be prepared for heavy losses among our troops.' This cablegram was sent two days after the destruction of Cervera's squadron. The international situation did not permit us to take the risk of throwing our armored vessels away on the mines in Santiago Harbor when there were no Spanish vessels to attack and destroy. We could not afford to lose one battleship; our efforts to purchase warships before the war showed that the acquisition of a single battleship was impossible. Moreover, as has already been stated, the attitude of continental Europe forbade the reduction of our armored naval strength, because upon it we might have to rely for defence, not only from the Spanish force in European waters, but from an attack by the navy of another country."

On this point Captain Mahan, also, makes the following striking comment:

"We had to economize our ships because they were too few. There was no reserve. The Navy Department had throughout, and especially at this period, to keep in mind, not merely the exigencies at Santiago, but the fact that we had not a battleship in the home ports that could in

six months be made ready to replace one lost or seriously disabled, as the *Massachusetts,* for instance, not long afterwards was, by running on an obstruction in New York Bay. Surprise approaching disdain was expressed, both before and after the destruction of Cervera's squadron, that the battle fleet was not sent into Santiago either to grapple the enemy's ships there, or to support the operations of the army in the same way, for instance, that Farragut crossed the torpedo lines at Mobile. The reply — and in the writer's judgment the more than adequate reason — was that the country could not at that time, under the conditions which then obtained, afford to risk the loss or disablement of a single battleship, unless the enterprise in which it was hazarded carried a reasonable probability of equal or greater loss to the enemy, leaving us, therefore, as strong as before relatively to the naval power which in the course of events might yet be arrayed against us. If we lost ten thousand men, the country could replace them; if we lost a battleship, it could not be replaced. The issue of the war, as a whole and in every locality to which it extended, depended upon naval force, and it was imperative to achieve, not success only, but success delayed no longer than necessary. A million of the best soldiers would have been powerless in face of hostile control of the sea."

Seventh: Battleships and armoured cruisers are not built for the purpose of attacking fortifications and land forces. Their purpose is to gain and hold control of the sea. Of course, where a decisive advantage is within reach, and there is a reasonable chance of success, a commander would be

justified in taking the risk of attacking shore batteries, just as the commander of an army would under similar conditions, especially in cases where time is an important consideration, be justified in throwing his troops against a fortification at great sacrifice rather than wait to capture the place in the usual manner by regular approaches. But such cases are exceptions to the general rule. Any one can butt out his brains against a stone wall. Any commander can lose his squadron by foolhardy recklessness. Much, of course, may be accomplished by judicious daring; but it is not every one who has the good sense to know when the risk is justifiable. This, in a great measure, is what determines the ability of a commander. Good judgment is at the basis of all good generalship. Let the warrior have the brains, the implements, and good judgment, and he is equipped for great deeds; but good judgment he must have, otherwise the brains and the implements will avail him nothing.

Why then should General Shafter have so persistently urged Admiral Sampson to force an entrance into the harbour? No doubt this was due partly to General Shafter's lack of knowledge of naval matters, and to his failure to grasp clearly the correct naval strategy of the campaign, but undoubtedly it was mainly due to the unintentionally erroneous and misleading statements of Admiral Sampson. On July 2, the day before the

destruction of Cervera's squadron, Admiral Sampson, after writing to General Shafter that, "the forts which we silenced are not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except to seaward," added, "They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago."[1] And in the same letter he wrote, "If it is your earnest desire that we should force an entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it." The first statement quoted above must certainly have given General Shafter the impression that the batteries at the mouth of the harbour had been silenced, and that the forts could offer no further resistance to the American warships. And the second statement could hardly be regarded by General Shafter in any other light than as a promise on the part of Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance at an early date. As a matter of fact, the first statement was far from expressing the true condition of affairs. In the sense of being put out of action none of the batteries of the forts had been "silenced." They had stopped firing during the bombardments; that was all. No harm whatever had been done to the heavy guns of Punta Gorda Battery, or to the smaller guns of the Lower Socapa Battery. In fact, the only damage done during the bombardments was the dismounting of one piece in the Morro Battery and the disabling of one Hontoria gun in the Socapa Battery.

[1] See page 10.

General Shafter showed his wisdom in not breaking off negotiations and assaulting the Spanish intrenchments as he was advised to do by a number of his officers, who believed that the Spanish commander was simply trying to gain time. An assault of these intrenchments, protected as they were in front by barbed wire entanglements, would have involved a frightful loss to the Americans. Moreover, an assault at this time was unnecessary; for with Cervera's squadron already destroyed, it was only a question of time when the Spanish forces, not only at Santiago, but in the entire island, would be compelled to surrender. It was therefore wise to prolong the negotiations and to attempt by diplomacy and patience to bring about the surrender. Other things being equal, the victories most to be desired are those obtained at the least expense of blood and treasure. "Like a good business man," says Von der Goltz, "the commander ought not to part with his means uselessly when success is not profitable; but neither should he stint when promising gains are in prospect." "It should," says Captain Mahan, "be an accepted apothegm, with those responsible for the conduct of military operations, that 'War is business,' to which actual fighting is incidental. As in all businesses, the true aim is the best results at the least cost; or, as the great French Admiral, Tourville, said two centuries ago, 'The best victories are those which expend least of blood, of hemp,

and of iron.' Such results, it is true, are more often granted to intelligent daring than to excessive caution; but no general rule can supersede the individual judgment upon the conditions before it. There are no specifics in warfare."

Though the proposition of General Toral to be allowed to evacuate Santiago and to march to Holguin with his army was not favourably received by the authorities at Washington, it should be noted that there was, from a purely strategical point of view, no great objection to this movement. Had the movement been made, Spain might have been momentarily encouraged to prolong the conflict for a while; but in any case the surrender of the land forces was only a question of time, because with the sea power of Spain practically destroyed there was no longer any hope of maintaining an army in Cuba.

The proposition to march to Holguin was doubtless made more with the hope of saving the Spanish army the humiliation of a surrender than for the purpose of gaining time with the expectation of ultimate success. It is highly probable that, owing to a lack of sufficient supplies for such a movement, Toral's army would have gone to pieces almost immediately after leaving Santiago, and that a great number of his men would have drifted into the American lines in order to obtain food.

It is much to be regretted that the "Terms of the Military Convention of the Capitulation"

allowed the Spanish commander, upon his departure from Santiago, to take with him all the military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish forces of eastern Cuba. Without these records it has been impossible for American writers to obtain, except in few cases, copies of the orders issued by the Spanish commanders, and very difficult for them to obtain accurate information as to the strength and losses of the Spanish army at Santiago, and especially as to the exact number of men in the different organizations composing that army.

The general officers of Shafter's army should not be adversely criticised for writing the letter of August 3, in which they urged so strongly the necessity for the speedy withdrawal of the Fifth Corps from the island. The views of the general officers were sought by General Shafter; and the letter contained nothing but the truth. Though, perhaps, as General Lawton stated, the mandatory language of the letter was unnecessary and impolitic, yet it must be remembered that the dreadful condition of the troops and the prospect of their having to remain in the island for yet many days most naturally caused the officers to feel and speak strongly. With so large a number of soldiers desperately sick, and the certainty that practically all would perish if they were not speedily removed from the island, it became the imperative duty of the officers to express their opinions in no

uncertain way. But the chief harm consisted in giving the letter to the press; and this act, which was in violation of army regulations and a serious breach of military discipline, most naturally aroused the indignation of the Secretary of War. Referring to this matter in his book on "The Spanish-American War," General Alger says:

"Of the 'Round Robin'[1] itself I have no criticism to offer. General Shafter invited his officers to a conference, and himself telegraphed to the War Department their conclusions and recommendations, which was entirely proper for him to do. But I do criticise the agencies through which these alarming utterances were given to the world. The publication of the 'Round Robin' at that time was one of the most unfortunate and regrettable incidents of the war. . . . The information this startling paper made known not only brought terror and anguish to half the communities and neighborhoods in the land, but it returned to Cuba in due time to spread demoralization among our troops. It did more than this — it threatened, and might have accomplished even, an interruption of the peace negotiations then in progress between the United States and Spain. Those negotiations had been inaugurated by Spain on the 26th of July, through M. Cambon, the ambassador of France, and had reached their most delicate stage at the time when the 'Round Robin,' with all its suggestions of panic and disaster, was made public in the four corners of the earth. That a satisfactory agreement between the

[1] Though this letter was generally known as the "Round Robin letter," it was not, according to the accepted meaning of that phrase, a round robin.

two governments was at last reached cannot be credited to those who precipitately gave out information which might have prevented it. Moreover, the publication of this official letter was a gross breach of army regulations and military discipline ; and through the agency of it the enemy secured information regarding our situation when the government was most anxious to conceal the facts until the acceptance of the demands of the United States could be assured."

Again he says:

"It would be impossible to exaggerate the mischievous and wicked effects of the 'Round Robin.' It affected the country with a plague of anguish and apprehension. There are martyrs in all wars, but the most piteous of these are the silent, helpless, heart-broken ones who stay at home to weep and pray and wait — the mother, sister, wife, and sweetheart. To their natural suspense and suffering these publications added the pangs of imaginary terrors. They had endured through sympathy, the battlefield, the wasting hardships of the camps, the campaign in the tropics, the fever-stricken trench. They might at least have been spared this wanton torture, this impalpable and formless yet overwhelming blow."

Probably no more remarkable letters were ever sent by a conquered to a conquering army than those written by Pedro Lopez de Castillo to General Shafter and his soldiers. It was certainly a happy augury for the speedy reëstablishment of cordial relations between the two contending powers that scarcely had the smoke of battle died

away than the soldiers of these two opposing armies began to extol each other's courage and to extend the hand of fellowship across the bloody chasm.

Within twenty-four days after landing at Daiquiri and Siboney, General Shafter forced back the Spaniards from Las Guasimas, won the battles of El Caney and San Juan, drove Cervera's squadron out of the harbour, and compelled the surrender of twenty-two thousand seven hundred Spaniards, a much larger force than he himself had. These results, great in themselves and in their consequences, accomplished under most trying difficulties, in a tropical climate during the worst season of the year, without a single backward step, or the loss of a gun or a colour, or the surrender of a man, speak for themselves. They could never have been achieved without a courageous, decided, and forceful commander, educated and trained officers, and a thoroughly disciplined army.

When this conquering army, which had landed but a few weeks before full of hope and courage and in the vigour of health, turned its face homeward, it was wrecked and wasted by disease; but in the hearts of officers and men there was the satisfaction of feeling that they had given to their countrymen and the world an heroic example of how soldiers should fight, suffer, and, if need be, die.

CHAPTER XV

GENERAL COMMENTS

RECENT CHANGES IN THE MILITARY ART — THE FORTUNE OF WAR — THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES — THE NAVY — THE ARMY

AS this campaign furnishes the first instance of a conflict between two armies, each equipped with small-calibre magazine rifles using smokeless powder, it will not be uninteresting to inquire what changes, if any, these weapons have wrought in the military art.[1] Theoretically, it was to be expected that the modern rifle would give to the defenders a great advantage; and the experiences of this war, as well as those of the Boer War and the Russian-Japanese War, have demonstrated the fact that purely frontal attacks,

[1] The art of war is broadly divided into the subjects of strategy and tactics. "The theatre of war," says Hamley, "is the province of strategy, the field of battle is the province of tactics." The object of all strategical manœuvres is to secure for the fighting forces advantageous positions in the theatre of war. Strategy is the art of moving an army in the theatre of war with a view of placing it in such a position relative to the enemy as to increase the probability of victory, make greater the consequences of victory, or lessen the consequences of defeat. Tactics is the art of disposing, manœuvring, and fighting troops on the battlefield.

unsupported by enveloping or flank attacks, against troops in defensive positions, armed with modern rifles, have little or no hope of success, unless the attacking forces overwhelmingly outnumber the defenders, and even then only under exceptional circumstances. At El Caney, where the Americans outnumbered the Spaniards more than ten to one, a frontal attack was finally successful, but not until after a most desperate struggle in which forty-nine per cent of the defenders were killed or wounded; and at San Juan Hill the relative preponderance of the attacking forces was even greater. In the fierce and bloody assault of the Japanese on Nan-shan Hill at Kinchow near Port Arthur, they had overwhelming numbers, but "in the early rushes of the engagement every man participating was shot down before he reached the first line of the Russian trenches. It was found necessary to stop these infantry charges and renew the artillery fire from the rear before the final and successful assault on the Russian position could be made."[1] Captain Carl Reichmann, United States Army, who was detailed by the American government as an observer on the Russian side during the Russian-Japanese War, says:[2]

"Formerly the battlefield was a narrow strip; the opposing forces came promptly together, and brought about

[1] "New York Times."

[2] "Journal of the United States Infantry Association," July, 1906.

a tactical decision by the slaughter of the short-range conflict and hand-to-hand fighting. An inferior force could be quickly overpowered. The men were still comparatively fresh when entering the decisive part of the action. Modern long-range arms have changed all this; the fire-swept zone which must be crossed by the attacker has steadily increased, has grown deeper, until to-day shrapnel is used with accuracy at six thousand yards. Modern arms give great defensive power. To get at the enemy with the bayonet may require not minutes and hours, but days of exposure to fire, coupled with immense exertions and with lack of shelter, food, and water. At one point at least in the battle of Liaoyang the infantry fire never ceased for thirty-six hours, and the Japanese infantry was lying within a few hundred yards of the Russian trenches. Russian non-commissioned officers, who helped to repulse a night attack on the south front of the First Siberian Corps, were unanimous in stating that the Japanese soldiers seemed to be at the end of their physical strength and were slaughtered with the bayonet like sheep. Battle has become a long-enduring, nerve-racking contest, extending over days and consuming the last minim of mental and physical strength of the participants; inferior forces can no longer be quickly overpowered, and other things being equal, an opponent attacking the enemy with equal forces ought to fail. The duty of the commander 'to get there first with the most men' has become an absolute obligation on the part of the offensive. I have not heard of a case where the Japanese attacked and defeated an equal force of Russians. Before the battle of Liaoyang, both to the east and south, the Japanese not only confronted the Russians

everywhere with superior forces and a large superiority in guns, but whenever they attacked, the commander was careful to array on his side every chance of victory; he would assemble against the decisive point a sufficient force to carry it and an overwhelming number of guns; he would also turn one or both flanks of the Russians to make sure of the victory, while he heavily engaged the Russian front. These tactics were bound to be successful. In the mountains southeast of Liaoyang, Kuroki outnumbered the Russians two to one; he had there enough men to attack in front with the decisive superiority, and generally he had enough men to spare to turn both Russian flanks; he acted on the offensive in a broken mountainous country which absolutely shielded his movements and concentration of troops; he acted in a country where all the advantages are with the offensive and none with the defensive; his numerical superiority made the offensive possible on his part and impossible on the part of the Russians. Moreover, as we know, it lay not in Kuropatkin's plan to hold any position for an indefinite length of time; his sole purpose was to gain time for the arrival of his reënforcements.

"At Wafangho four Japanese divisions fought against two and a half Russian divisions and over two hundred Japanese guns against eighty guns. In the battle of Liaoyang four and a half Japanese divisions with two hundred and forty guns assailed the key of the position held by the First Siberian Corps numbering less than fifteen thousand men and eighty guns; in this last case the numerical superiority was not sufficient. Though smothered under a blanket of concentrated fire such as was never before known in military history, though their trenches

were blown about their ears by high explosive shells, though attacked by superior numbers during three consecutive nights and two days, and suffering hunger and thirst, the First Siberian Corps repulsed all attacks. This will convey some idea of the strength of the defensive. In the case of the battle of Liaoyang it should be added that the enemy's infantry could approach under cover of the high crops to a distance of less than one thousand yards of the trenches of the First Siberian Corps, and that any losses suffered by them prior to that time were due to accident rather than to design."

But though the experiences of recent wars make it plain that purely frontal attacks are destined henceforth almost always to fail, it must not be inferred from this that they will for the most part be abandoned in future wars. On the contrary, they are as necessary now as ever; for without them there can be no overlapping or flank attacks, which are now, except under very unusual conditions, absolutely necessary to success. Nor must it be inferred that the conditions of modern warfare greatly favour defensive tactics. On the contrary, it is as true now as in the past, that the offensive alone offers decisive results; and the main reason for this is, that the commander of the attacking army has the power at any time of taking the defensive temporarily along all or any portion of his battle line with a small part of his forces, while with the larger part he can mass overwhelming numbers against some weak point of the

enemy's line and break through it, or move against his flank, or strike far enough to his rear to threaten his communications. In other words, an army acting offensively always has in reserve, until it is defeated, the power of acting defensively for a time with all or a part of its forces; but the army acting defensively, so long as it is hard pressed, never has the power to act offensively.

Suppose, for instance, that two armies of one hundred thousand men each are about to engage in battle. One elects to make its stand and fight in a defensive position; the other must take the offensive. Being well aware of the strength of the defensive position, the general of the attacking army knows that he cannot with his entire army drive the enemy from his intrenchments by a frontal attack; one hundred thousand men are not enough; four, five, even six hundred thousand men would most probably fail, if they had to make the attack over open, level ground. Must the commander of the attacking army therefore give up the attack? By no means. He could order forty thousand men to make a direct attack upon the enemy, and instruct them to hold every foot of ground gained, and to intrench themselves in order to resist any counter attack of the enemy; then with the remaining sixty thousand he could move to the right or the left to attack the enemy's flank. Such a movement might be a surprise to the enemy; and as his army is occupying a long line, parts of

it might be defeated in detail before there could be sufficient concentration to repel the attack. Or perhaps the attacking force might be directed far enough to the rear to threaten seriously the communications of the enemy, and thus cause him to fall back with a part, or all, of his forces.

It is this freedom of movement, this mobility, which gives the offensive its great strength. It can strike the weakest link in the chain. It can go to the point where the enemy is unprepared — where perhaps he is extremely vulnerable, and there, pressing home the attack, achieve great results. On the offensive a general can follow his own plan; on the defensive he must conform to that of his adversary. On the offensive, the parts of an army can be concentrated and the enemy can be surprised and defeated before he can unite the necessary force to repel the attack; on the defensive, the parts of the army must be kept separate, in order to guard all the threatened points until the enemy's point of attack is developed. The moral advantage, too, is nearly always on the side of the offensive. The fact that an army is pushing forward instead of waiting to be attacked is in itself an incentive to success. The forward movement fills the soldier with enthusiasm, his expectations rise; and with firm tread and elastic step he marches on, thrilled with the hope and the spirit of victory.

"It is often urged," says Colonel Henderson of the

British army, "that the force which awaits attack can develop the full force of each arm with more facility than that which delivers it. The contention may be true; but it is not always realized that anything which gives new strength to the defence at the same time adds to the advantage of the army which attacks. The net outcome of the improvements in rifles, guns, and powder is that far fewer men are required to hold a position than of old. A direct (or frontal) attack against good troops well posted, always a desperate undertaking, has now become suicidal. To a certain extent this favours the defence. A much larger number than formerly can be employed by the defenders *in attack*. This is to the good. But the assailant profits in almost equal ratio. His strength has always lain in his power of manœuvring, of hiding his movements, and of massing suddenly against some weak point. To-day his power of manœuvring is greater than before. The increased strength of the defence renders it comparatively easy for him to form with a part of his force an impenetrable barrier behind which the remainder can move unobserved. He needs far fewer men and guns to cover his communications; and a general counter-attack delivered like those of Wellington, of the French in 1870, of Osman at Plevna, direct to the front, is very little to be dreaded. Moreover, the object of the assailant's manœuvres will be to place portions of his force on the flank, or flanks,

of the position he is attacking. If he can accomplish this, the effect, moral and physical, of the enfilade fire he brings to bear on the enemy's front will be far greater than that which attended a similar operation when fire was of less account. In short, the process of envelopment is easier than it used to be; and envelopment which means that the enemy is under fire from several directions is much more effective than in the past.

"It does not appear, then, that the new conditions are altogether in favour of the defender. To win a decisive victory and annihilate the enemy he must, at some time or another, leave his position and attack. But the time, if not the place, must depend on his adversary's movements, and will only be disclosed during the progress of the battle. What time will be given the defender for the long preliminaries which attack against even a shaken force demands, for the preparation by artillery, for the massing of the infantry, for their deployment in line of battle, for the issue of adequate orders? Tacticians have long been puzzled over the rarity and ineffectiveness of the counter-stroke in modern campaigns. The reason lies in the increased power of the local defensive, even with the needle gun and the slow-firing cannon. With the newer weapons the power is trebled. The counter-stroke, therefore, is more difficult than ever; and the difficulty, combined with the greatly enhanced effect of enveloping fire, gives a marked advantage to

the assailant. Resistance is more protracted than heretofore, but defence, as a method of giving battle, is no stronger.

"The question will probably suggest itself, why should envelopment be the monopoly of the advancing army? The reply is easy. Save in exceptional circumstances the force that surrenders the initiative and stands still in positions will be too weak for far-reaching manœvres. Envelopment requires a numerical superiority or a vastly higher *morale;* and an army possessing these advantages must needs seek out its adversary and attack him, for the very simple reason that not otherwise can he be brought to battle. Yet it is not to be understood that the numerically inferior army is to be debarred from attacking; but it may be taken for granted that it will not do so until it sees the opportunity — the fruit as a rule of more skilful strategy — of falling on an isolated portion of the enemy's forces."

"When the rifle was first introduced," says Colonel Hart, "the general idea was that the defence would benefit enormously; and it was not realized that the attack had really gained a relative advantage. But the increased range and accuracy of fire-arms, by greatly extending the field of battle, has offered the assailants more choice in the selection of ground from which to direct and cover their attacks. At the same time the defenders are embarrassed by an extent of ground that may be

of great value to the enemy, but which they cannot themselves occupy. The increased range has also made it more difficult to obtain early information of movements which may threaten to dislocate all the defensive arrangements.

"Whenever there has been a great improvement in weapons, most people have imagined that there would be a relative advantage for the defence, but Napoleon was more foreseeing: 'L'invention des armes à feu a tout changé, observait-il; celle grande découverte était; du reste, tout à l'avantage des assailants, bien que jusqu'ici la plupart des modernes aient soutenu le contraire.'" [1]

In the campaign of Santiago de Cuba it will be noted that at the start the Spaniards had in their land operations every opportunity of taking the offensive both strategically and tactically, but utterly failed to do so. There was really no good reason why the greater part of the troops at Manzanillo, Holguin, and Guantanamo should not have been concentrated at Santiago for an offensive campaign prior to the landing of Shafter's army; nor was there any good reason why these troops and the greater part of those at Santiago should not have been concentrated near Daiquiri and Siboney for the purpose of taking the offensive against the

[1] Las Cases, ii, p. 439. Translation: "The invention of fire-arms has changed everything, he remarked; besides, this great discovery was to the advantage of the assailants, although until now, the majority of modern writers (critics) have maintained the contrary."

Americans during their disembarkation. By the employment of a very little skill in strategy and stratagem,[1] it would have been entirely feasible to mass secretly a large force of Spaniards behind the hills of Daiquiri and Siboney, and to surprise and capture or destroy a large part of Shafter's army. The Spaniards had sufficient troops and an abundance of time to do this, and they should have seized the opportunity and struck like "a bolt from the blue."

But it might be replied that the garrisons at Manzanillo, Holguin, and Guantanamo were so short of transportation and supplies that there would have been considerable difficulty in concentrating at Santiago. This is true; but the answer is that the garrisons had enough supplies to last for several weeks; and knowing that there was a shortage at Santiago, they could easily have seized sufficient vehicles and pack animals in the towns they were occupying to transport their supplies. To Blanco and Linares the difficulties in the way of concentration probably seemed insurmountable; but to an able soldier they would scarcely have been worthy of a moment's thought.

Then, again, it should be noted that it was the business of the Spanish government and its officials to provide the troops not only of Santiago Province, but of the whole island, with the needed

[1] Stratagem is an artifice or trick of war for deceiving the enemy.

transportation and supplies in advance of the emergency. It is safe to say that with an army in Cuba of one hundred thousand soldiers, well supplied with food, hospital stores, ammunition, cannon, and transportation, Spain would have been in much better shape to withstand the Americans than she was with nearly two hundred thousand soldiers without adequate supplies. In these days, when so much depends upon the quick concentration of troops and the bringing of a greatly preponderating force upon the battlefield, the matter of transportation and supply is one of supreme importance.

In failing to take the offensive when the opportunity offered, the Spaniards made their first and greatest mistake; and it may be remarked here that not only in this war, but in the Boer War and in the Russian-Japanese War, the side that seized the initiative whenever the opportunity offered was in the end victorious. This, too, has generally been true in all campaigns since the invention of fire-arms; so that it may now be stated as a general truth that, "*A deliberate defensive is generally right only when all the conditions are so unfavourable that practically there is no alternative.*" [1]

The increased power of the modern rifle has also greatly increased the importance of strategical movements. Now that positions can be held with

[1] Colonel Reginald C. Hart, British Army.

smaller numbers, and lines of battle can be weakened with less risk of fatal results, better opportunity is given for rapid manœuvring and swift combinations. Thus mobility has become of greater consequence in the organization of armies, and strategy has greatly increased in importance. Then, again, the multiplication of railroads and telegraph lines, the invention of the telephone and of wireless telegraphy, and the great improvements made in canning and preserving food stuffs, have all had more or less effect upon strategy.

In some respects these things have made war simpler, and in other respects more complex. Armies to-day can be more easily moved, fed, and manœuvred; but it requires much more skill to train them up to a high standard of efficiency, and it is much easier than formerly for the enemy to obtain accurate information regarding the doings of his adversary. Consequently it has become much more difficult for one army to surprise another. But while all these things have made it in some respects easier and in others more difficult to carry out strategical manœuvres and combinations, they have made no changes whatever in the underlying principles of strategy. The methods of carrying out the principles have changed, and are constantly undergoing change as new inventions and discoveries are made, but the principles themselves are immutable; they are the same to-day as in the days of Grant, Von Moltke,

Napoleon, and Julius Cæsar. To manœuvre so as to divide the forces of the enemy and beat them separately; to manœuvre so as to concentrate greatly superior forces on the battlefield; to manœuvre so as to strike the communications of the enemy without exposing your own, — these are principles that do not change, however rapid and destructive the fire of guns, however quick the movement of troops, or however swift the despatch of orders.

The increased range and effectiveness of modern rifles and cannon, enabling the defence to hold long lines of intrenchments with small numbers against the attacks of large bodies of the enemy, have increased enormously the area of battlefields. Thus battlefields, which in the days of Grant and Lee were but two or three miles in extent, would to-day, with the same number of troops engaged, extend over a space of fifteen or twenty miles. In modern battles positions properly defended with anything like adequate numbers cannot, as formerly, be carried by a few hours' fighting followed by a charge. In these days the power of the defensive is so great that when two armies come in contact on the battlefield, it is necessary for both to intrench. Then one or the other begins to push forward by rushes, taking advantage of every inequality of the ground, and intrenching every position gained. Thus for days armies may face each other, neither able to drive the other out of

his intrenched position. In the meantime, while they are in this life-and-death grapple, the commander who is strong enough to take the initiative will try to mass his unengaged troops at some weak point of the enemy's line and break through, or to overlap and envelop one or both flanks of the enemy, or to gain a position on the flank and rear of the enemy and seriously threaten or destroy his communications. Any of these movements, if successfully executed, would most probably bring victory to the attacking army, but they all would require great superiority in numbers or in moral force. Thus it will be seen that the first great immutable principle of strategy, namely, *To concentrate superior strength, physical, moral, or both, on the battlefield*, is even more important to-day than ever before in the history of warfare.

This enormous increase in the extent of modern battlefields, together with the fact that an enveloping or flank attack or attacks, in addition to a frontal attack, will often be the only way to victory, has greatly increased the necessity for a larger proportion of cavalry[1] in the organization of modern armies. In the great battles of the future, when the opposing armies are grappling with each other and each side is holding on like grim death, neither able to drive the other from his intrenched position, the moment will come when a great enveloping or

[1] Mounted troops armed and trained to fight on foot as well as on horseback, like the American cavalry.

turning movement or flank attack will be the only hope of victory. At this critical moment the side which has in reserve a great cavalry force trained to fight on foot as well as on horseback, will be able to direct it on the vulnerable flank and, with the troopers fresh for dismounted work, to strike the blow that shall turn the tide of battle and win the victory. And what is of immense importance, too, is that when the blow is struck this great cavalry force will be near the communications of the enemy — near the very point where it can do him the greatest damage. In former times, when battlefields were narrow strips only two or three miles long, these great flank attacks and turning movements, which were then less necessary and much more dangerous, could be made by the infantry; but under present conditions the infantry could not make them without consuming much time and arriving at their destination too greatly fatigued to fight with the necessary energy and spirit.

Though the above conclusion is based more upon a careful study of the tactics and conditions of the last three wars than upon actual experiences, — for in none of these wars was a great cavalry force used in the manner indicated above, — yet in each war there were a number of instances and conditions that go to prove the correctness of the conclusion. The Russians, it is true, had a goodly proportion of cavalry; and for a time it appeared

that a considerable force could be spared from reconnoissance, scouting, and outpost duty, and used offensively in one large body upon the flank or the rear of the Japanese army; but owing to inefficient leadership, or other causes, the plan was abandoned, and the force divided, subdivided, and greatly scattered. Upon this phase of the war, A. Denikin, a Russian, in the "Voenny Galos" of April 16, 1906, writes as follows:

"A characteristic feature of the war in our operations is the complete absence of creative work in the leading of our army. Something like an unaccountable fear of large plans, bold decisions, and energetic initiative seems to have been characteristic of the generalship in the conduct of the campaign. This must have been the reason why our cavalry, superior in numbers and quality, has played comparatively such a modest part. . . .

"The Trans-Baikel Division, immediately on arrival at the scene of action, was divided into two brigades: one for scouting in the region of Fengwangcheng, the other broken into sotnias [squadrons] for outpost service, field post service, messenger service for the troops of the Siberian Army Corps, and after September, 1904, for service with the detachment of General Rennenkampf, where it did scouting work and formed protecting lines, appearing in conflict with the enemy almost exclusively dismounted.

"Somewhat more to the west General Samsonov, with his Siberian Cossacks, remained in the hills, doing hard vanguard outpost work and overworking nearly the whole contingent of his command. All his urgent requests to

pass with his troops to the valley and let him work in the field were of no avail.

"On the right flank, after January, 1905, a large force, a corps of two and a half divisions, was concentrated under General Mischenko's command. One would think that the numerical strength of the force and its strategical position gave it a great importance in view of the coming offensive movement, so much the more as its brilliant fighting qualities had previously been proved at Sandepoo. But we see an unpardonable and incomprehensible neglect of this corps. When General Mischenko was wounded, Baron Stackelberg was appointed to command it; but he soon departed for Russia. General Rennenkampf was then given the command, but in a week's time he was summoned back to Tzinhenchen. In the meantime, just at the most important moment, the corps of the Don Cossacks was hurried north on the report of an assumed raid of a strong Japanese cavalry force towards Goondchoolin. Later it was broken into sotnias, which served as an escort and a protection here and there, but took no part in subsequent operations as one whole homogeneous corps.

"In February, 1905, two commanders of the independent cavalry force, General Greko and General Eichholz, appeared almost at the same time. One was sent by the Commander-in-chief, the other by the commander of the Second Army. After establishing his right to the command, General Greko took charge; but in a fortnight his command was totally broken up, and, during the Mukden days, the sotnias were constantly ordered about. They were first sent to form connecting links between the army corps, then recalled to protect the headquarters and staffs,

then again formed in small detachments for scouting under Generals Tolmachev, Greko, Eichholz, and Prince Orbiliany.

"If, in such conditions, our dispersed cavalry could not afford the full assistance which a strong cavalry mass should afford when skilfully and properly directed by an energetic commander, the fault lies not with it, but most certainly with the persons in command."

Had a man like Skobeleff, that great leader of men, who was such a careful student of the work of the American cavalry under Sheridan, Stuart, and Forrest, been in command of the Russian army, the many opportunities of massing cavalry upon the flanks and rear of the enemy would most certainly not have been neglected.

The Japanese had only a small cavalry force. It was not, however, because they failed to appreciate the importance of this arm of the service, but because they were unable, either before or during the war, to obtain the necessary mounts. The need for more cavalry was daily apparent in their operations; and for the want of it their infantry had to undergo untold exertions in making long-forced marches around the Russian flanks. Indeed, it is safe to say that if either side in this war had had an additional cavalry force of fifty or sixty thousand men, trained like the American cavalry to fight on foot as well as on horseback, and had used them energetically in one body against the flank or rear of the enemy at the critical stage of

any of the great battles, a sweeping victory would have been the result. Had the Japanese possessed such a force, the great battles of the war which continued through several days of desperate fighting could have been more quickly decided; certainly at the battle of Mukden they would have been able with such a force to sever the communications of the enemy, to seize the pass in his rear, to capture his army, and to end the war.

In the South African War the Boers used mounted infantry with great effect; indeed, this was their principal force. This gave them great mobility, which, combined with the fact that they were excellent shots, made them for a time more than a match for the British, whose cavalry was not properly trained to fight on foot.[1] In his book on this war, Lieutenant-Colonel Wisser, United States Army, says: "The principal tactical principle that has been corroborated in the battles of South Africa is that the purely frontal attack is no longer successful. It must be combined with flank attacks; but since the latter will generally be met by counter-measures on the part of the enemy, converting them again into frontal attacks, these counter-attacks must be continued and extended into far outflanking movements, requiring much time for their execution, during which, between two original fronts, a contest for position is

1 "The Science of War," by Colonel Henderson, British Army, p. 376.

taking place." These words, written shortly after the Boer War, not only express the exact tactical situation in the battles of that war, but apply with equal exactness to the battles of the Russian-Japanese War and will apply with more and more exactness to the battles of the future; for as weapons improve and the power of fire becomes greater, flanking movements will become more important, more effective, and easier of execution.

In his report of the operations of the Boer army, Captain Carl Reichmann, United States Army, who was sent by the government of the United States to observe the South African War from the Boer side, says: "Cavalry that is incapable of effective fire-action has no place in modern war. All its functions are influenced by the fire-effect at the increased range. The *arme blanche* is useful to-day only under circumstances where the enemy is helpless and can be knocked in the head with a club as easily as stuck with a lance or cut down with a sabre. On the other hand, there is not a single function of cavalry that it is not better fitted to discharge if capable of the same fire-action as infantry. The British cavalry was neither sufficient in number nor trained in full appreciation of its modern rôle, and mounted infantry had to be resorted to as a stop gap. But mounted infantry is at best a makeshift. What is wanted is cavalry capable of fighting on foot with the carbine, a cavalry like Sheridan's,

which acted as cavalry in heading off an entire army, and like infantry in fighting and holding that army until sufficient troops reached the spot to bag the enemy. The soundness of the traditions and theories of our service as regards cavalry, and its armament and training, has simply received a further confirmation in this war. The fighting of the Boer resembles very much that of our cavalry; in fact, our cavalry with its training and armament would have been a far better match for the Boers than either the British cavalry or mounted infantry. The resemblance is further illustrated by the raids made by the Boers; with them, as with our cavalry in the Civil War, similar causes brought forth similar effects. Nor will the British mounted troops be a match for the Boers until they can ride, not like mounted infantry, but like cavalry, and until they can fight, not like cavalry, but like infantry. The only cavalry lesson we draw for ourselves from this war is that we cannot have enough of our kind of cavalry."

"Even our own cavalry," said Colonel Henderson of the British army, "when it took the field in 1899, was more or less paralyzed by the burden of effete traditions. Despite the lessons of the American and the Russo-Turkish wars, it had been trained, so far as battle was concerned, to shock tactics, and to little else. It was not equipped for great mobility; of fighting on foot it knew but little; and when confronted by the Boer riflemen

the inferiority of the carbine placed it at great disadvantage.

"Yet it has long been clear that the opportunity for shock-tactics are very rare, and that for once cavalry has the chance of charging it is twenty times compelled to dismount and fire. Moreover, it is quite open to question whether the firearm, on all occasions except in the pursuit of an absolutely demoralized enemy, is not more deadly than lance and sabre; and whether, in this particular phase of the battle, a cavalry which manœuvres like clockwork and charges in exactly dressed lines is a whit more formidable than any scratch pack of good horsemen whose hearts are in the right place. Be this as it may, the South African War affords much additional proof that cavalry must be thoroughly trained, properly equipped for dismounted action, and made far more mobile. The extraordinary results, strategical as well as tactical, that may be produced by mobility have been conclusively demonstrated; and it is as clear as noonday that a mounted force as mobile as the Boers and equal — as was Sheridan's troopers — to any emergency of attack or defence, will be a most effective weapon, even on a European theatre of war in the hands of the strategist who grasps its possibilities."

Though in the Spanish-American War there were but few mounted troops engaged on either side, yet in one respect the experiences of the war have an important bearing upon the question under discussion,

for they show that the dismounted troopers, armed with a modern firearm, were able to do excellent work on the battlefield. Indeed, it is admitted by all, that the fighting of the dismounted cavalrymen at San Juan was but little, if any, inferior to that of the infantry; and that such inferiority, if any existed, was due entirely to the fact that the cavalrymen were armed with a shorter range rifle. Since then, however, the United States cavalry has been armed with the same rifle as the infantry.

Cavalry will still be indispensable for covering the front and flanks of the attacking army, for securing it against surprises and enabling it to carry out its movements unembarrassed and unobserved, for breaking through the screen which covers the movements and manœuvres of the opposing army, and for obtaining information which will be valuable to the Commander-in-chief. But in addition to the cavalry used for these reconnoitring, screening, and scouting duties, a large body will be needed to make the great enveloping or flanking movements which will be necessary in the conduct of the great battles of the future. Of course great battles may be fought without such a force, as was done in the Russian-Japanese War; but the need of it will nevertheless be painfully apparent, and the nation that realizes now this great fact and acts upon it, will do much towards the accomplishment of success in future wars.

The improvements in weapons of warfare, great

as they are, however, have not eliminated the element of chance. The fortune of war still enters largely into all military problems, and plays an important part in the conduct of campaigns. The campaign of Santiago de Cuba was no exception; but it is a remarkable fact that from the beginning to the end the Americans were the ones who were exceptionally favoured. Again and again good luck came to their assistance, until it would almost seem that the god of battles was smiling on their efforts.

It was fortunate for the Americans that General Linares failed to concentrate the troops of his command at Santiago, that he made no effort to prevent the disembarkation of Shafter's army, that he did not assemble the troops which were immediately about Santiago on the field of Las Guasimas, and that he fought the battles of El Caney and San Juan with only a small fraction of the forces which he could easily have concentrated there. It was fortunate for the Americans that the Spanish navy was divided into two squadrons, and that Cervera's squadron was sent to the West Indies, that Cervera failed to receive at Martinique the despatch that would have permitted the return of his squadron to Spain, that Sampson in his wild goose chase from Havana to San Juan, Porto Rico, did not meet Cervera's squadron on the high seas, that Cervera's squadron entered the harbour of Santiago de Cuba instead of the harbour of Cienfuegos

or of Havana, and that it remained at Santiago without making an effort to escape until after Schley's and Sampson's squadrons had closed in upon it.

Then, again, it was fortunate that the United States was stronger on the sea than her adversary, for the issues of this campaign depended almost solely upon sea power. Had the strength of Spain's navy been greater and the strength of her army been correspondingly less, she would have been in much better condition than she was to meet successfully the issues of the campaign. And it may well be remarked here that if a nation has important island possessions of great strategical value, she cannot, in case of war, expect to hold them, unless her navy is strong enough to prevent them from being successfully blockaded. She may have an immense standing army and unlimited resources; her people may be as courageous as were the Greeks at Thermopylæ, but all this will avail nothing if she has not sufficient naval power to maintain control of the sea in the theatre of operations. Island possessions mean and can mean nothing else than a strong navy, unless the people of the country to whom they belong, for the lack of spirit and patriotism, are willing to subject themselves to the inglorious and ignominious humiliation of losing them when war comes. "We know," said Lord Randolph Churchill, "that great empires must sometimes fight great battles, and that empires

which fear to fight battles will soon cease to be empires."

It was fortunate for the United States that her first war since the great Civil War should have been with Spain, which was weak on the sea, instead of with Germany or France, which were strong; for the issues of war between the United States and any great European naval power not possessing territory contiguous to the United States depended then, depends now, and will depend in the future, almost entirely upon sea power. In a war of this kind the navies of the two belligerents would form the first great battle line, the first line of defence; and not until the vessels of one side or the other were swept from the sea would the armies of the belligerent nations have an opportunity to come in contact. With a million men under arms and no navy, the United States would be helpless against the smallest European or Asiatic power possessing a few battleships. Indeed, a situation may be easily imagined in which a nation at war with another may have practically unlimited military resources and yet, for the lack of sufficient naval power, have no military strength. Navies cannot be purchased in time of war, nor can they be built in a day, a month, or a year. Military resources should never be confounded with military strength. "With the greater mass of people, who have neither the time nor the inclination to study the requirements of military science," said

General Upton, "no error is more common than to mistake military resources for military strength, and particularly is this the case with ourselves."

On the other hand, a strong navy, unsupported by an efficient army, would be powerless, even though it gained complete control of the sea, to bring a war to a successful issue. The navy is the first line of defence; "but this very title," says Colonel Henderson, "proves its weakness." Broadly speaking, it is a defensive force, pure and simple. It can ward off the blow of the enemy, it can crush the vessels of his navy, but farther than that it cannot go. After it gains complete control of the sea, there is nothing to call forth its strength. It still has the power, but without the assistance of the army its strength continues to remain almost entirely passive. It may still cripple the enemy's commerce, but it cannot destroy his military resources or his bases of supply; nor can it cut his land communications, or crush and annihilate his land forces. It was after Trafalgar that Napoleon won his greatest victories and reached the zenith of his military power.

On first thought it might seem that this conclusion is directly at variance with the statement in a former chapter that Sampson's victory at Santiago meant the end of the war; but it is not so. This victory meant the end of the war not solely because it gave the Americans virtual control of the sea, but because it severed the sea

communications of the Spanish army in Cuba, because it gave the large American army on the mainland near by the opportunity to strike, and because it would have enabled the United States to utilize all her vast military resources for bringing the campaign to a successful termination. Moreover, it was the very presence of an efficient army at Santiago that made the victory possible.

"So remote is the prospect," says Colonel Henderson, "that either British or American soldiers may suddenly be called upon to confront the trained hosts of continental Europe, that the efficiency of the army has comparatively little interest for the nation at large. Yet even to these maritime empires an efficient army is the first necessity. Their land frontiers are vulnerable. They may have to deal with rebellion, and a navy is not all powerful, even for the defence of coasts and commerce. It can protect, but it cannot destroy. Without the help of an army it can neither complete the ruin of an enemy's fleet nor prevent its resuscitation. It can ward off attack, but counter-attack is beyond its scope. Without the help of the army it can hardly ask a hostile power to ask for terms. Exhaustion is the object of its warfare; but exhaustion, unless accelerated by crushing blows, is an exceedingly slow process. In the Spring of 1861 the blockade was established along the coasts of the Southern Confederacy, and maintained with increasing stringency from month to

month. Yet it was not till the Spring of 1865 that the colours of the Union floated from the capitol of Richmond, and it was the army which placed them there.

"A state, then, which should rely on naval strength alone could look forward to no other than a protracted war, and a protracted war between two great powers is antagonistic to the interests of the civilized world. With the nations armed to the teeth, and dominated to a greater or smaller extent by a militant spirit, with commerce and finance dependent for health and security on universal peace, foreign intervention is a mere question of time. Nor would public opinion, either in Great Britain or America, be content with merely a defensive policy, even if such policy were practicable. Putting aside the tedium and dangers of an interminable campaign, the national pride would never be brought to confess that it was incapable of the same resolute effort as much smaller communities. 'An army and a strong army,' would be the general cry. Nor would such an army be difficult to create. Enormous numbers would not be needed. An army supported by an invincible navy possesses a strength which is out of all proportion to its size. Even to those who rely on big battalions and huge fortresses, the amphibious power of a great maritime state, if intelligently directed, may be a most formidable menace, while to the state itself it is an extraordinary security."

But though the element of chance has not been, and will never be, entirely eliminated from the conduct of campaigns, it may be greatly lessened by a more careful preparation for war, a more thorough education of officers in their profession, and a deeper study of military history. To the commander of an army a thorough knowledge of military history is of untold value. Its study should never be neglected by military men; for in its pages are to be found not only many instances showing how chance played a decisive part in war, and how great commanders profited by it on the one hand or successfully combated it on the other, but also many examples showing how the great captains of the world, by applying correctly the immutable principles of war, gained their marvellous victories.

If the navy of Spain had been fully prepared for war; if the government of Spain had adopted the advice of Cervera and his captains; if Cervera himself had been imbued with the great principle of war that *the offensive alone offers decisive results;* if Generals Blanco and Linares had studied military history sufficiently to learn that *concentration of superior forces on the battlefield is the secret of success in war*, and that "*offensive power — not defensive — determines the issues of war*," and had acted accordingly, fortune would have been far less favourable to the Americans, and the campaign of Santiago de Cuba would have been vastly

different from what it was. Even with the situation as it was, Linares had in his favour nearly all the chances of victory, but utterly failed to take advantage of them. It should have been fortunate for him that the destination of Shafter's army, even before it left Tampa, was widely published in the newspapers, for this information gave him an abundance of time to assemble the troops of his command at Santiago; it should have been fortunate for him that Shafter's army was to make the campaign in Cuba during the rainy and sickly season, for this, if the campaign were sufficiently prolonged, would have enabled the deadly fevers to come to his assistance; it should have been fortunate for him that Shafter's army was compelled to land on a rugged shore, unprotected from the winds and surf of the ocean, for this gave him a splendid chance to defeat the Americans while they were attempting the difficult task of disembarking; it should have been fortunate for him that Shafter's army numbered but seventeen thousand soldiers, for with some thirty thousand under his own immediate command he had a fine opportunity to concentrate and overwhelm his adversary with superior numbers; and, lastly, it should have been fortunate for him that the situation immediately about Santiago was such that he could have taken up an almost impregnable position with the city at his back, where his adversary was precluded from making any other

than a direct attack without running the greatest risks.

Campaigns are more often won by good generalship, or lost by poor generalship, than by any other means. As in every other profession, it is brains, and education, and training that tell. A genius can accomplish more with a poor army than the best army can accomplish led by a mediocre general. "It should never be forgotten," says Colonel Henderson, "that success depends far more on the skill of the general than on the efficiency of the troops. There have been soldiers' battles, it is true, battles like Albuera and Inkermann, where the generals gave no order, and which were won solely and entirely by the courage and endurance of the officers and men; but soldiers' battles are only exceptionally victories. The truth of Napoleon's saying that in war 'it is the man who is wanted and not men' is incontestable; and his own magnificent campaigns of 1796 and 1814 are sufficient in themselves to prove that an able general, although with far inferior numbers, need never despair of success. Let the converse — that superior numbers, if indifferently commanded, may be utterly defeated and demoralized — be taken to heart, and the supreme importance of good leading, and of thorough training in the art of leading, becomes at once apparent.

"There is no instance more convincing of this assertion than our great war at the beginning of

the last century. Of what fine material our armies were made there is no need to speak. But it is a significant fact that during the period of the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns those magnificent soldiers, when neither Wellington nor his great lieutenants, Hill and Graham, commanded them, were unable to win victories. Pakenham, with a force of those veterans whom Wellington declared could go anywhere and do anything, was decisively defeated by the American militia at New Orleans. Other veterans were beaten by their own general at Plattsburg. The unfortunate expedition to Walcheren, undertaken in the same year as Corunna, cost the army the lives of thousands without a single success to compensate; in the same year five thousand English soldiers were turned out of Egypt by the Turks; and the campaign in Holland of 1814, although conducted by Lord Lynedoch, was not fortunate. It is a melancholy fact that throughout the great war the army suffered in its leaders." "Alas," says Carlyle, "we have known times call loudly enough for their great man, but not find him when they called."

The United States needs a navy as strong as that of any great power of the world except Great Britain. Great Britain is excepted, first, because she has large possessions on the North American continent contiguous to the United States. In case of war with Great Britain undoubtedly one

of the first moves attempted by the United States would be an invasion of Canada. At any rate, the United States would not have to await the outcome of the naval struggle before she could begin utilizing her vast military resources for attacking Great Britain in a vulnerable spot on land. And if she were successful on land, as there is every reason to believe she would ultimately be, all the successes of England's mighty navy could not bring her to terms; for with her great extent of territory and its productiveness; her rivers, railroads, and telegraph lines; and her wealth, manufactures, and great food-stuff industries, she could, independently of all foreign commerce, maintain herself on the North American continent against the world; and in the end the acquisition of the British possessions of North America would probably be more valuable to her than any possessions she might lose, or any losses she might suffer, as a result of Great Britain's superiority on the sea.

Secondly, because Great Britain's future, the destiny of the great empire, depends entirely upon sea power. If she loses that, she loses all, for with her commerce cut off the people of Great Britain would starve. The island could not produce enough food to support the population. Since, therefore, her people are so dependent on commerce, it follows that as long as she has the means, she will continue to maintain a navy stronger than that of any

other people.[1] For the United States to attempt, therefore, to build a navy equal to or stronger than that of Great Britain would only force Great Britain to greater exertions to maintain the lead. It would be a costly undertaking for both, and one of folly on the part of the United States, for if she persisted in such a course with the settled purpose of ultimately challenging Great Britain's mastery of the sea, it would speedily lead to war between these two powers; and in such a war Great Britain would be in the right, for no juster cause for war can be imagined than that of attempting to deprive a people of the power to live. Self-preservation is the first law of nature.

Thirdly, because, under ordinary conditions, there is little probability of war between the United States and Great Britain; first, because both peoples are in the main of the same great race, speak the same language, have in large measure the same or similar laws, and trace their liberties back to the same great charter. As among individuals, so among nations, "Blood is thicker than water." Secondly, because both are preëminently a liberty-loving people, having in common similar hopes, aspirations, aims, and ambitions. Thirdly, because

1 "To Great Britain, of the great powers of Europe, are the problems of naval strategy of paramount importance. Upon a thorough knowledge and just appreciation of them, with a sufficient provision of physical force to secure their successful development in her own interests, depends the existence of the British empire." Captain C. C. Penrose FitzGerald, R. N., in Encyclopædia Britannica.

the commercial interests of the two countries are closely interwoven and much English capital is invested in American enterprises and securities. Fourthly, because a number of events in recent years have obliterated past ill feeling and jealousies, and greatly strengthened the friendship between the two powers. The Americans will not soon forget the part taken by Great Britain in the Spanish-American War, at a time when the United States seemed to have few friends among the nations of the world. And, lastly, because Great Britain, under the existing conditions of the armaments of the great powers of continental Europe, could not afford to risk a war with the United States, unless she were greatly provoked by acts which affected deeply her honour, or which involved her very existence. Even if such a war were to occur, and the Americans were in the end defeated on the sea, it is not at all unlikely that there would be a considerable loss of Great Britain's sea power in accomplishing the result. Indeed, it would be almost a miracle for Great Britain to pass through such a struggle without a heavy loss in warships, for there would be many hard blows struck on both sides. America, as well as England, has reason to be proud of her past record as a sea fighter, and it may be safely said that she would not go down in defeat without leaving some mighty scars on her powerful adversary.

But even though Great Britain has such a great

superiority on the sea, she could not, by reason of that fact, count on certain victory; for as she has more possessions to defend and more points of strategical importance to guard, her naval forces would need to be more scattered than those of her adversary, and her battle-squadrons might be met with equal or superior forces. Much, too, would depend on the strategical skill of the directing admiral, much upon the abilities of the battle commanders. As on the land, so on the sea, generalship, intellect, education, training, are of more importance than efficient forces, and Great Britain has no monopoly of men possessing these qualities. Neither power, at present, so far as is known, has a Nelson. A great war, however, seldom fails to produce a great man; but there is nothing in the nature of things to indicate on which side he would appear.

In either case, then, whether Great Britain should win or lose in a war with the United States, her naval forces would most probably be greatly diminished. They might become of less strength than those of France or of Germany; and such a situation would be highly perilous to Great Britain, for her very existence depends upon her naval supremacy in European waters. Great Britain and Germany are to-day great commercial rivals. Germany is seeking new markets everywhere for her manufactured goods, and in many places is underselling Great Britain and driving out British goods.

This commercial rivalry has already led to some jealousy and bitterness between the two peoples. They are not friendly; there is, as the saying goes, no love lost between them. With these conditions prevailing, how long would peace continue if Germany's navy were stronger than Great Britain's? How long would the British empire survive if it had not a sufficient number of battleships to control the English Channel? The Boer War taxed heavily the resources of Great Britain; but if the blows which were struck at her land forces had with equal and correspondingly destructive effect been struck at her sea power, they would have shaken to its very foundation her mighty empire. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is nevertheless true, that the British empire is most vulnerable at the point where she is the strongest.

But to return to the original proposition that the United States needs a navy as strong as that of any other power of the world except Great Britain. Take the case of France, whose navy is next in size to that of Great Britain. In case of war with that country what would be the outcome? France has no territory contiguous to the United States. She owns the island of Martinique in the West Indies; but for the United States to send an expeditionary army there, without first gaining control of the sea, would be suicidal. The truth is that the war would have to be decided almost entirely on the sea; and with the great superiority

of France in naval strength the chances of victory would be greatly in her favour. Or take the case of Germany with her great naval establishment. What would become of our commerce? what would become of Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines, and the Panama Canal, if in a war with the United States Germany finally gained control of the sea? She has the land forces ready to occupy all these places, and the United States, with her naval forces destroyed, could not possibly prevent such occupation. From a catastrophe of this kind the United States could not recover in a hundred years; perhaps never; for once a nation is down, those who reap great commercial benefits from her downfall would strive with might and main to keep her down. For the people of a great nation, possessing almost unlimited resources, to be compelled to stand idly by and view such a struggle without being able to render any assistance to their navy battling against greatly superior forces, would indeed be humiliating. And if their navy were defeated, their possessions seized, and their commerce swept from the sea, the cry would be heard up and down the land, "Why were we not prepared?" Is it not the business of our rulers, our statesmen, our senators and representatives, to see these things and provide for them? Was it not the father of our country who, at the very beginning of our national existence, warned us to prepare for war in time of peace? Why has his warning

been neglected? Why have his wise words been forgotten?

It is no reply to all this to say that neither the people of France nor the people of Germany have in the past shown themselves to be great sea fighters, and that, accordingly, the United States, even with inferior naval forces, need have no fear of either power in a naval war. It is never wise to underrate the fighting power of an enemy. Under the changed conditions of naval warfare no one can tell what a brave people may accomplish on the sea. Who would have predicted a few years ago that Japan would to-day stand forth as one of the greatest sea-fighting nations of the world? Then again, the abilities of the naval commander and the fortune of war would play important parts; and although the United States has been particularly lucky in these respects in the past, it does not follow that her good luck will continue forever. The god of battles, in his mad career, after smiling for many years upon Hannibal and Napoleon, finally deserted them; and he may yet desert the fortunes of the Great Republic, and probably will do so, if her people continue to neglect the most ordinary precautions for their future safety and welfare.

It should never be forgotten that even in the war with Spain, in which the United States had a superiority in naval strength, the need of greater naval forces was again and again felt by the

authorities at Washington, and that for the lack of them many favourable opportunities for partial, if not for decisive, success, were offered Spain.

The United States needs a large navy not because she wishes to make war upon other nations, but because they have large navies and she does not wish them to make war upon her; she needs it for her defence, protection, and safety; and she knows that if she is well prepared for war, other nations will have little inclination to seek war with her. In other words, she knows that a strong navy makes for peace. There can be no question as to the truth of this assertion. In August, 1906, the following item appeared in the *New York Times*: "The German government has placed itself on record that it will only take part in the next Hague Conference on condition that the question of limiting armaments should not be raised. Consequently there is no political party in Germany, with the exception of the Socialists, which advocates a reduction. At the present time Germany, it is maintained, cannot reduce her armed forces either on land or on sea. Her geographical position will not permit it, and the burden of cost which her armaments impose is a trifle compared with the cost of a disastrous war, the inevitable result of inadequate preparation." "As for the navy," says President Roosevelt, "it has been and is now the most potent guarantee of peace; and it is such chiefly because it is formidable and ready for use."

There are, however, some good people who do not entertain these views. They advocate the reduction of standing armies and the limitation of armaments, because they believe that these policies make for peace. They do all they can to prevent the United States from adding a battalion to her land forces, or a battleship to her navy, because they believe that any increase in the military strength of the nation is simply another step towards war. They believe that by destroying or limiting the implements of war they will destroy or limit warfare itself. But nothing could be further from the truth. In the first place, logic is against them. That limitation of armaments would have no tendency to decrease war, but, on the contrary, would rather have a tendency to increase it, will become apparent from a very simple illustration. Let us suppose that two nations, say, for instance, Germany and France, both of which have strong navies and strong armies, go to war with each other. In a few months, or a year, perhaps, one power is victorious; its navy is not greatly harmed; and its army, flushed with success, is strong and confident. The other power has its navy almost swept from the sea; its armoured vessels are destroyed or in ruins; its army is defeated, crushed, captured. The result is that the relative military strength of the two powers has become so unequal that the defeated power cannot recover from its downfall and regain its

former prestige for years and years, perhaps never. Bitter feelings still remain, but the chances to even up the score pass away, and peace continues between the powers for many years. On the other hand, let us suppose that neither of the two powers has much military strength; each has a small navy and a small standing army, sufficient only for policing the sea and preserving internal tranquillity. War comes. Both begin to turn their military resources into military strength as fast as possible, and then, as before, begin to fight with the determination and desperation of two brave peoples. In a short while one is defeated, overwhelmed, crushed. But after the war the relative military strength of the two powers is not so unequal as it was in the former case. Neither has a navy worthy of the name, for neither had had time during the war to build a navy. In a few years, before the feeling for revenge has had a chance to die out, the conquered power is able to recover its lost military strength and is again ready to appeal to arms.

In the second place, history is against them. As the weapons and implements of warfare have increased in destructive power, wars have not only become less frequent, but battles have become less bloody. And, logically, this is exactly what one would expect. The increased power which nations have obtained from better implements and weapons of warfare has enabled them to extend greatly their dominions and to bring under their sway many

smaller states. By this process the great nations of the world have been formed. Each is a patchwork of formerly sovereign states, of parts of states, territories, principalities, and free towns, and of half civilized or savage tribes, all of which, until they were made to obey a central authority and became a part of the nation, were more or lest constantly at war with each other. Thus many warring and discordant peoples have been united into, or become a part of, a great and peaceful nation; and in the aggregate the amount of strife, conflict, and war throughout the world has been greatly lessened. The fewer sovereign states there are, the fewer opportunities there are for war, because there are fewer states to quarrel; and although wars have continued partly as a result of the carrying out of this process, nevertheless they are far less frequent than they were a century or two ago. These views may, perhaps, seem novel to some people, but convincing proof of their correctness may be obtained by any one who will take the trouble to study the history of the great nations of the earth, and to compare the wars of the past century with those of the centuries preceding. The fact is that the world is gradually, though slowly, becoming better, and the principal reason for this is that the improved weapons and implements of warfare have given the nations of the earth the power to preserve order throughout their extensive domains, to curb and restrain unruly elements, to force respect everywhere for law,

and to strike swift and telling blows against lawlessness, crime, and rebellion. All this makes for righteousness; and though there is no possibility of wars ceasing entirely, yet the mighty power which nations have in their standing armies and navies, equipped as they are with such terrible weapons of destruction, are bound to continue to make wars less and less frequent. Not only that, but there can be no question that if there should ever be a "Parliament of man," a "Federation of the world," it will be brought about not through, or by reason of, a limitation of armaments, but more by a consolidation or concentration of them in support of the acts of the Congress and decisions of the Federal Judiciary of such a world government. There must be physical force behind the acts and decisions of such a tribunal to make them binding; and whether it be delegated power, or power exercised directly by the nations themselves through mutual agreement, matters not; the point is that the physical force must be there in some form and of sufficient strength to compel obedience to the acts and decisions of the world government; for the histories of all governments show that moral force can accomplish little without the support of physical force.

Thirdly, that battles have become less bloody is also substantiated by history. The psychological reason for the fact is that modern weapons of warfare produce a greater moral effect upon the courage of the troops. To make the matter plainer,

it may be pointed out that the defeat of troops in battle is nearly always due more to the loss of moral courage than to actual physical losses, and that the very best troops will nearly always give up the contest and retire before they have lost forty per cent of their number. Now, if the danger zone of the battlefield is small, if the contest continues a considerable time, and if the losses are gradual, the moral effect produced will be comparatively small, and the men will stand a large percentage of physical loss before yielding; but if the danger zone is large, if the losses are at times very sudden, and if the weapons are such as to produce great destruction and excite terror, the moral effect upon the courage of the men will be greatly increased, and they will give up the struggle with a much smaller percentage of physical loss. Though the great battles of the Russian-Japanese War were fought on both sides with extraordinary desperation and courage, there was not one of them in which the percentage of losses was as great as that of Gettysburg, Eylau, or Borodino. In his book on "The Second Boer War" Lieutenant-Colonel Wisser gives the following table illustrative of the point in question:

	Percentage of killed and wounded.
Wars of Frederick the Great	15
Wars of Napoleon	13
Crimean War	12
Campaign of 1859	8
Campaign of 1866	8
Campaign of 1870–71	9
Five of the prominent battles of the Boer War	5.6

Another fact that should be mentioned is, that owing to the smaller calibre bullet used in modern small arms, the percentage of killed among the total losses is much smaller than in former wars; consequently, a much larger percentage of the wounded recover. In the Encyclopædia Britannica Supplement, 1902, Colonel Henderson says:

"It is true that the losses in battle are relatively less than in the days of Brown Bess [1] and smooth-bore cannon, and almost insignificant when compared with the fearful carnage wrought by sword and spear. The reason is simple. A battlefield in the old days, except at close quarters, was a comparatively safe locality, and the greater part of the troops engaged were seldom exposed for a long time together to a hot and continuous fire. To-day death has a far wider range, and the strain on the nerves is consequently far more severe. Demoralization, therefore, sets in at an earlier period, and it is more complete. When troops once realize their inferiority, they can no longer be depended upon. If attacking, they refuse to advance; if defending, they abandon all hope of resistance. It is not the losses they have actually suffered, but those they expect to suffer, that affect them. The ordeal of facing the hail of modern fire tells so heavily on ordinary flesh and blood that those who have been hotly engaged, if casualties have been very numerous, will seldom be brought to fight again, except on the defensive, the same day, or even the same month. There is no bringing up men again and again to the attack, as in the days of Napoleon; and unless discipline and national spirit are

[1] A musket used by the English army in Wellington's time.

of superior quality, unless even the private soldier is animated by something higher than the mere habit of mechanical obedience, panic, shirking, and wholesale surrender will be the ordinary features of a campaign."

And, lastly, the fact that the leading nations of the world are well prepared for war makes them hesitate a long time before appealing to the decision of arms; they do not, as in the past centuries, rush forth to fight at every petty annoyance. As an individual hesitates to pick a quarrel with another whom he knows to be thoroughly armed, so does a nation. There can be but little doubt that if all the navies and armies of the world were to-day blotted from the face of the earth, the world to-morrow would become a seething whirlpool of war. Not only would nations rise against nations, and peoples against peoples, but throughout every land there would be internal dissensions, quarrels, strife, wars; and the great empires, republics, and kingdoms of the world would melt away like blocks of ice in a Summer's sun. Physical force is the controlling element in the life of every nation; moral force, too, is a power, but it cannot stand upright without the support of physical force. Yonder battleship with its thirteen-inch guns that send an eleven-hundred-pound projectile many miles, yonder army of a quarter million of men, trained to move like clockwork and to strike mighty blows, are the greatest peacemakers on this earth.

With possibly one exception, all the great powers of the world to-day have about all the territory and island possessions that they need or care for; and they are maintaining their armaments, not because they intend to enlarge their possessions by force, but because they desire to keep and develop what they have, and to extend and safeguard their commerce. They are, in short, maintaining their armaments not because they want war, but because they desire peace.

It might, on first thought, seem that the great powers of the world, in order to reduce expenses, could easily come to some agreement as to the limitation of their enormous naval establishments; but as sea power is of much greater importance to some nations than to others, it can readily be seen that such an agreement would be very difficult to make. Evidently an agreement, to be just, would have to specify different limits for each power, depending upon the relative importance of its sea power with respect to the sea power of other nations; but this in itself would be a most difficult matter to decide, even by impartial experts, and in a matter of this kind there are no impartial experts. Each nation, of course, would strive to have its own limit placed as high as possible; and it is very doubtful whether Germany or France would consent to have their limits placed lower than the limit placed on Great Britain, or whether Russia would consent to have her limit placed lower than

that of Japan.[1] Indeed, it seems likely that the most probable outcome of a serious attempt to make such an agreement would result in war. It does not, however, follow from this that the great naval powers of the world are to continue forever to increase their naval establishments; for the matter of expense is bound eventually to put a limit upon them. But, under present conditions, there would seem to be no good reason why the United States, with her vast resources, small standing army, and small national debt, should think seriously of limiting her navy, and especially so, since it is absolutely necessary to her future defence, security, and safety, and is powerfully instrumental in promoting the welfare and prosperity of her people.

Another great lesson taught by the campaign of Santiago de Cuba was that the United States then needed a much larger regular army than she had. Though it is true that a mere handful of trained soldiers and sailors at Santiago were able in a few days to bring Spain to her knees and end the war, yet it was little short of the miraculous that all this should have happened just as it did. Indeed, at the outset, there was not one chance in a thousand that Shafter's little army of seventeen thousand men would be able to do practically all the land

[1] Strategically Japan is situated very much like Great Britain. Her very existence depends almost entirely upon sea power. With a hostile power in control of the adjacent seas she could not feed her people.

fighting needed for bringing the campaign to a close. Had there been on the Spanish side any generalship worthy of the name, it is doubtful whether there would have been anything left of Shafter's army. Of course the Washington authorities did not know what force General Shafter would have to meet at Santiago, but they did know that there were some thirty-five or forty thousand troops in eastern Cuba; and there was no good reason to believe that at least twenty-five or thirty thousand of them would not be concentrated at Santiago before General Shafter's arrival, nor that they would not be supplied with sufficient provisions to make a prolonged campaign. In planning a campaign the enemy's forces in the field of operations should always be taken into account, and it should always be assumed, without positive knowledge to the contrary, that they have the necessary supplies to last for several months. Had the Spaniards been given credit for even a little energy and skill, the least force which the Americans might reasonably have expected to meet at Santiago was twenty-five thousand men. And when it is remembered that such a force could have taken up a defensive position on the hills of Santiago with little or no risk of being outflanked or turned, and that the Americans had no other alternative than to make an offensive campaign, which under present conditions of warfare requires greatly superior numbers, one cannot fail to appreciate how inadequate

were General Shafter's forces. Had twenty-five thousand Spanish soldiers been assembled at Santiago and been commanded by a Masséna, it is doubtful whether seventy-five thousand of the best troops in the world, under as able a commander as Masséna himself, could have carried the Spanish lines by assault. No doubt such a force would have finally captured the city, unless assistance had come to the beleaguered garrison, but not without desperate fighting and a long siege.

A larger force of regulars was not sent, for the simple reason that neither men nor transports were at the time available. There were, it is true, plenty of volunteers that could have been added to General Shafter's forces, if there had been any way to transport them; but as they were raw, undisciplined troops, only recently organized, they would have been of very little value in the desperate fighting which took place at Santiago. There can be no doubt that if the campaign had been prolonged, the volunteers would in time have proved themselves to be excellent soldiers, for they have invariably done so in the past; but it always takes time for civilians to become soldiers; the task is not accomplished by simply putting on a uniform and shouldering a musket. The histories of our wars prove this. Invariably when raw, untrained troops have been rushed into battle against veterans or trained troops, they have met defeat. It was so in

the battles of Long Island, Camden, Queenstown, Bladensburg, and Bull Run; and it would have been so at Santiago if that little army had been nearly all volunteers instead of nearly all regulars. It is true that the "Rough Riders" were volunteers, and that they fought well; but this regiment was largely made up of trained officers and men. Many had had experience in various kinds of warfare, and a large proportion were skilled in the use of firearms. If, however, the volunteers that became demoralized at the battle of San Juan had had the training, they no doubt would have been as courageous as the other regiments. "Nothing," says General Funston, "can take the place of training and discipline; self-control and patience are as important as courage." The importance of courage on the battlefield can hardly be overestimated; and yet, without brains and balance, without training and discipline, it is of little value. In commenting on the discipline and behaviour of the troops sent to San Francisco immediately after the great earthquake, the Reverend William Rader says:

"For one, I am proud of the discipline of the regular army. The stalwart young men show training. They are trained to behave themselves under great difficulties. When they reached San Francisco on the morning of the earthquake and were intrusted with the welfare of the city, they behaved as men who were trained, and the citizens felt safe under the rigid protection of the United States

army. They bore witness of the government, and their uniforms and rifles represented the people of the republic. But even this effective testimony could not take the place of self-control and discipline. Nothing can — as General Funston has pointed out. No matter what the position a man holds or what knowledge he may possess, nothing can take the place of training. Training is the mastery of power, whether it is catching the lightning and sending it down into wires and car wheels, or dipping up water from the sea or river and pouring it through pipes, or subduing the energies of a horse and making them useful in daily toil. Training is the refinement of strength and making it obedient to the laws of utility. Education is the training of mental and moral faculties, the bringing into obedient subjection all one's faculties. The soldier is one who is trained to be master, first of himself, then of other men. The soldier who loses his temper, or, as we say, his head, who shoots without cause and strikes down without judgment, is a poor soldier. The soldier of our regular army is supposed to be trained in patience and in the performance of great deeds under terrible and trying conditions.

"What the regular army possesses all men should have in abundance. The military virtues are good things for the common people to have. Most of our mistakes are made through a lack of training. The grievous blunders in trade and society, in politics and religion, are made because we lack the gift of self-mastery. To be trained in the business of winning against great odds, to know how to be patient when impatience is the natural impulse, to be cool when under excitement, is indeed a rare endowment.

"As one studies men under fire, whether before

Richmond or in the destruction of a city, or in the ups and downs of business, and the ordinary occurrences of the daily routine, he is convinced that the main difference among men is not courage, but training; not physical bravery, but self-control and patience. There is probably more courage among the people than the other qualities. There is an impulsive fighting courage that beats down with aimless strokes and hard fists the manifold enemies; but there is wanting that higher and equally indispensable virtue of self-mastery.

"Courage may be born in us, but training is born in no man. It comes only through discipline. We must be trained to do the important things of life and to meet emergencies. We must be trained to suffer with heroism, trained to stand, and, having done all, to stand. . . . While crude courage is born with us, like the color of our eyes, he who fancies that he is capable of successfully competing with trained and disciplined minds in the exigencies of life, makes a mistake. He cannot match such men. He will one day fail when the hour is big with destiny and the mastery of the strong is necessary to still the tempest and rule the waves."

Let those who believe that newly organized and untrained volunteers are a match for trained troops make a careful study of the fighting at Santiago, and then let them ask themselves the questions, How many of such regiments would it have taken to capture El Caney? How many to have planted the stars and stripes on top of San Juan Hill? The American people do not realize how much blood and treasure was saved to their country by

the desperate fighting of that little handful of regulars on July 1, 1898; nor do they realize how small were their chances, nor how great was their luck. Because the Spanish-American War ended so quickly and the Americans were victorious in every conflict, Spain is regarded by many Americans as having been an adversary of so little consequence that the marvellous victories at Santiago could hardly have happened otherwise; and yet, the only thing that was lacking on the Spanish side to have caused a prolonged and costly war, involving millions of American dollars and the sacrifice of thousands of American lives, was a soldier — one able Spanish general.

The fact is that the United States needed and ought to have had at the beginning of the war a much larger regular army. Fair chances of success on land demanded this. Regular troops were absolutely indispensable for manning the coast artillery in the fortifications along the Atlantic seaboard; seventy or seventy-five thousand were needed for the Santiago expedition; and a much larger proportion than was sent was needed for the Philippine expeditions. As it was, the United States was forced to send to Manila a number of newly organized volunteer regiments that had little discipline and scarcely any training. Fortunately there was no serious fighting there with the Spaniards as there was at Santiago; but had there been, the need of a larger proportion

of regular troops would have become painfully apparent.

Then, again, such an army was needed on the ground of economy. Had it been in existence at the time, there would have been little, if any, necessity for calling out volunteers. Thus, much of the expense and extravagance necessitated by hasty preparation would have been avoided. Even though the Americans were everywhere victorious, the Spanish-American War cost the United States Government $321,833,254,[1] and the Philippine War cost $171,326,572;[2] and to these amounts must be added $11,996,198[3] already paid out in pensions, not to mention the many millions that will be paid out in future years. And had Shafter's little army been destroyed at Santiago there is hardly any question but that the war would have continued for a year or two longer, which would have added hundreds of millions of dollars to the cost of the war, not to mention the thousands of additional lives that would have been sacrificed.

The fact is, that for want of a respectable standing army and timely preparation for war, nearly every war in which the United States has been engaged has not only been needlessly prolonged,

[1] Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1905, p. 98.

[2] From May, 1898, to April, 1902, both inclusive, according to the statement sent to the Senate by the Secretary of War, June 19, 1902.

[3] Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1905, pp. 10 and 11.

but has cost the government an enormous and unnecessary amount of blood and treasure. The Revolutionary War, which lasted seven years, cost the government $370,000,000,[1] besides $70,000,000,[2] since paid out in pensions. On August 20, 1780, Washington wrote to the President of Congress:

"Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding Winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of everything, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this Spring so weak as to be insulted by five thousand men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on

[1] Upton. Military Policy of the United States, p. 66.
[2] Annual Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, 1904.

a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been, the greatest part of the war, inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same cause.

"Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expense of the war and the paper emissions have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had a great part of the time two sets of men to feed and pay — the discharged men going home, and the levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in 1775 and 1776. The difficulty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among the present lines we find that there are some who have received $150 in specie for five months' service, while our officers are reduced to the disagreeable necessity of performing the duties of drill sergeants to them with this mortifying reflection annexed to the business, that, by the time they have taught these men the rudiments of a soldier's duty, their services will have expired and the work recommenced with a new set. The consumption of provisions, arms, accoutrements, and stores of every kind has been doubled in spite of every precaution I could use, not only from the cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness incident to militia and irregular troops.

Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined, by such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the cultivation of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occasioned a scarcity, and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours, order and economy have been impracticable. No person who has been a close observer of the progress of our affairs can doubt that our currency has depreciated without comparison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments than it would have done otherwise.

"There is every reason to believe that the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes, and at every period of the dissolution of a considerable part of it they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. *Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy would have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since.*

"If the army is left in the present situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the enemy; if it is put upon a respectable one, it must have a contrary effect, and nothing, I believe, will tend more to give us peace the coming Winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. An army on foot not only for another campaign, but for several campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enable us to insist upon favorable terms in forcible language; an army insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied and crumbling to pieces, would be the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a little longer.

It is an old axiom, that *the surest way to make a good peace is to be well prepared for war.*"

And in a speech made to both Houses of Congress on December 3, 1793, Washington said:

"I cannot recommend to your notice measures for the fulfilment of our duties to the rest of the world without again pressing upon you the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defence, and of exacting from them the fulfilment of their duties towards us. The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds. *There is a rank due to these United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.*"

The Civil War lasted four years; the sacrifice of life was enormous; and the cost of the war is almost beyond the mind of man to grasp; yet it is the deliberate judgment of military men who have carefully studied the subject, that if the government had at the time been thoroughly prepared for war, and had had a regular army of one hundred thousand men, the struggle would have been of very short duration; it probably would not have lasted many days after the first battle of Bull Run. Brevet Major-General Emory Upton,

United States Army, one of the most distinguished and accomplished soldiers of the Civil War, and a profound military student, in his work on "The Military Policy of the United States," said: "Twenty thousand regular troops at Bull Run would have routed the insurgents, settled the question of military resistance, and relieved us of the pain and expense of four years of war." The Civil War has thus far cost the government $8,520,617,417.[1] Of this amount $3,149,537,669[1] have already been paid out in pensions; and there are hundreds of millions more yet to be paid out to the surviving veterans and their widows.

In the Introduction to his work, "The Military Policy of the United States," General Upton said:

"Shortly after the disastrous battle of Camden, Washington wrote to the President of Congress, 'What we need is a good army, not a large one.' Unfortunately for the country, the object sought by this assertion, so thoroughly in harmony with our cherished institutions, has only been partially attained in time of peace.

"In view of the growth of our neighbors, the vast extent of our territory, and the rapid increase of our floating population, the time must speedily arrive when all intelligent and law-abiding people will accept, and adhere to, the opinion of John Adams, that 'The national defence is one of the cardinal duties of a statesman.'

[1] Frederic Louis Huidekoper, in "North American Review," February, 1906, p. 164. Figures are taken by him from official documents. For a detailed statement of the cost of all our wars see tables and comments by same author, Appendix X.

"Our military policy, or, as many would affirm, our want of it, has now been tested during more than a century. It has been tried in foreign, domestic, and Indian wars; and while military men, from painful experience, are united as to its defects and dangers, our final success in each conflict has so blinded the popular mind as to induce the belief that as a nation we are invincible.

"With the greater mass of people, who have neither the time nor the inclination to study the requirements of military science, no error is more common than to mistake military resources for military strength, and particularly is this the case with ourselves.

"History records our triumph in the Revolution, in the War of 1812, in the Florida War, in the Mexican War, and in the Great Rebellion; and as nearly all of these wars were largely begun by militia and volunteers, the conviction has been produced that with us a regular army is not a necessity.

"In relating the events of these wars, the historian has generally limited himself to describing the battles that have been fought, without seeking to investigate the delays and disasters by which they have been prolonged, till, in nearly every instance, the national resources have been exhausted.

"The object of this work is to treat historically and statistically our military policy up to the present time, and to show the enormous and unnecessary sacrifice of life and treasure which has attended all our armed struggles.

"Whether we may be willing to admit it or not, in the conduct of war we have rejected the practices of European nations, and with little variation have thus far pursued the policy of China.

"All of our wars have been prolonged for want of judicious and economical preparation, and often when the people have impatiently awaited the tidings of victory, those of humiliating defeat have plunged the nation into mourning.

"The cause of all this is obvious to the soldier and should be no less obvious to the statesman. It lies partly in the unfounded jealousy of not a large, but even a small standing army, in the persistent use of raw troops, in the want of an expansive organization, adequate for every prospective emergency, in short and voluntary enlistments, carrying with them large bounties, and in a variety of other defects which need not here be stated. In treating this subject, I am aware that I tread on delicate ground, and that every volunteer and militiaman who has patriotically responded to the call of his country in the hour of danger may possibly regard himself as unjustly attacked. To such I can only reply, that where they have enlisted for the period of three months and, as at Bladensburg and on many other fields, have been hurled against veteran troops, they should not hold me responsible for the facts of history, which I have sought impartially to present. To such volunteers as enlisted for the period of the Mexican War, and particularly for two and three years during the War of the Rebellion, with whom it is my pride to have served and to whom I owe all of my advancement in the service, I but express the opinion of all military men in testifying that their excellence was due, not to the fact that they were volunteers, but to the more important fact that their long term of service enabled them to become, in the highest sense, regulars in drill, discipline, and courage.

"With a keen appreciation of their own ignorance and helplessness when they entered the service, the veterans of Gettysburg laughed at the militia who assisted in driving Lee across the Potomac, satirically asking the full regiments fresh from home 'Where they buried their dead.' The same men who felt hostile to the regular troops because of their superior discipline, found as they approached the same standard that no gulf lay between them, and with the recollection of Bull Run fresh in their memories they in turn ever after made sport of the raw troops which came temporarily to their aid.

"Every battlefield of the war after 1861 gave proof to the world of the valor of the disciplined American soldier; but in achieving this reputation the nation was nearly overwhelmed with debt, from which we are still suffering, while nearly every family in the land was plunged in mourning.

"Already we are forgetting these costly sacrifices, and unless we now frame and bequeath to the succeeding generation a military system suggested by our past experience and commended by the example of other enlightened nations, our rulers and legislators in the next war will fall into the same errors and involve the country in the same sacrifices as in the past. . . .

"No one can study the subject without acknowledging that our military policy is weak, and that it invites and inevitably produces long wars. . . . A century is a short period in the life of a nation, but its history may convey many valuable lessons as the result of the system which we cherish as our own invention; thus the War of the Revolution lasted seven years, the War of 1812 three years, the Florida War seven years, the Mexican War two years, and the Rebellion four years, not to mention the

almost incessant Indian wars of this period. In other words, since the publication of the Declaration of Independence to this time [1880] these figures show that for every three years of peace we have had one year of actual war. . . .

"As the man who uses a weapon is the best judge of its fitness, so a professional soldier should be the best judge of what constitutes a good military system.

"In every civilized country success in war depends upon the organization and application of its military resources. The resources themselves consist of men, material, and money. Their organization is wholly within the province of statesmen. Under our Constitution Congress has the power to raise and support armies, and, subject to the supervision of the President, only professional soldiers should command them. In time of war the civilian as much as the soldier is responsible for defeat and disaster. Battles are not lost alone on the field; they may be lost beneath the dome of the Capitol, they may be lost in the Cabinet, or they may be lost in the private office of the Secretary of War. Wherever they may be lost, it is the people who suffer and the soldiers who die, with the knowledge and the conviction that our military policy is a crime against life, a crime against property, and a crime against liberty. The author has availed himself of his privileges as a citizen to expose to our people a system which, if not abandoned, may sooner or later prove fatal. The time when some one should do this has arrived.

"Up to the Mexican War there was little that was glorious in our military history. In the Revolution, the continentals or regulars often displayed a valor deserving

of victory, but which was snatched away by the misconduct of undisciplined troops. In the War of 1812 the discipline and victories of the navy alone saved the country from dishonor. On the land the historian of the army was glad to slur over needless disasters, to dwell on the heroism in the open field displayed by the regulars at Chippewa and Lundy's Lane. The Mexican War was a succession of victories. The volunteers as well as the regulars were disciplined troops. The Rebellion began with the defeat at Bull Run, but a multitude of subsequent battles again proved that the valor of disciplined American troops, be they regulars or volunteers, cannot be excelled by the best armies of Europe. No longer compelled to doubt the prowess of our armies, the time has come to ask what was the cause of defeats like those of Long Island, Camden, Queenstown, Bladensburg, and Bull Run. The people who, under the war powers of the Constitution, surrender their liberties and give up their lives and their property, have a right to know why our wars are unnecessarily prolonged. They have a right to know whether disasters have been brought about through the neglect and ignorance of Congress, which is intrusted with the power to raise and support armies, or through military incompetency. Leaving their representatives free to pay their own salaries, the people have a right to know whether they have devoted their time to studying the art of government. John Adams wrote the maxim that 'The national defence is one of the cardinal duties of a statesman.' War, it need scarcely be said, affects the life, liberty, and property of the individual citizen, and beyond that the life of the nation. On its issue necessarily depends the fate of governments and

the happiness of millions of human beings, present and future.

"From the known methods of selecting generals in most of our wars no one assumes that the title implies knowledge of the art of war. Conscious that our legislators make a merit of neglecting the national defence, shall they, too, like our generals, enjoy unearned titles, or the highest of all titles, that of statesmen? Foreign governments, surrounded by powerful neighbors, act on the theory that military commanders can be educated, no less than captains and lieutenants. The same theory is true of statesmen. A general does not so much regard the causes of war; his duty is to be familiar with military history, and to know the details and principles upon which successful war is conducted. The statesman, on the contrary, should study peace and the causes which tend to preserve or destroy it. History will teach him that peace ends in war and war again ends in peace. If the causes which terminate peace and produce war can be removed, and if the legislator does not recognize and know how to create a powerful army, he ceases to be a statesman. . . .

"Ultimate success in all our wars has steeped the people in the delusion that our policy is correct and that any departure from it would be less difficult than dangerous. Again, our remoteness from powerful nations has led to another delusion — that we shall forever be free from foreign invasion. Within the present year [1880] a senator of the United States, standing on the parapet of Fort Monroe and witnessing the firing of smoothbore artillery, assured the author that we would not have another war in a century. No statesman would have made such a prediction.

He would have recalled the Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War. He would have pointed to the British possessions on the north, to Mexico on the southwest, and to Spain on the south; he would not have forgotten the affair of the *Virginius* and the frequent complications on the Rio Grande as proof that at any moment we may be plunged into another foreign war. He would, furthermore, have condemned the useless ordnance before him, and would have declared that wisdom and economy demand that we should be ready for any war whenever and wherever it may occur. He would not have stopped there; accepting the truth that the nation is governed best which is governed least, and that ours is a government of the people, he would nevertheless have told the senator that the military policy of a republic should look more to the dangers of civil commotion than to the possibility of foreign invasion. He need not have referred to the forty years of anarchy and civil war which terminated in the establishment of the Roman Empire; he could have appealed to our own history and informed the senator that in less than a century our peace had been disturbed by Shays' Rebellion, the Whisky Rebellion, the Great Rebellion, and more recently still the railroad riots of 1877. He could have informed the senator that if our policy in foreign wars has been feeble and childish, at least half the expenditure and bloodshed has been borne by our enemies, while in civil commotion the loss of every dollar and the sacrifice of every life fall upon the citizens of the republic. He could have continued his lecture and told the senator that as a nation we can afford to imitate the daily example of our citizens. The pioneer who seeks a home in the forest first builds a cabin, then a log house,

and next a frame house. He does not accuse himself of extravagance. The cabin answered his purposes when he was poor and without family, but when his children multiplied he tore it down and put such material as was worth saving into his log house. This, too, satisfied his wants, but when he began to have neighbors, when roads were opened and friends and neighbors began to visit him, he saw that he lacked room and, having become more prosperous, he abandoned the log home, and for comfort and appearance built a house and barn, which excited the admiration of every passer-by. Looking at the example of every pioneer, as well as the prosperous man of business, the statesman could have informed the senator that the military policy of an agricultural nation of three million people just emerging from the forest was no policy for a nation extending from ocean to ocean and now numbering more than fifty millions." [1]

These ringing words were written eighteen years before the war with Spain, yet in spite of them and the lessons of the past, this war "found us with the smallest regular army, in proportion to population, that we have had at the beginning of any of our wars. It consisted of but 2143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, *or less than four-hundredths of one per cent of our estimated population.*" [2]

In the halls of Congress and in other places the

[1] By the last census, 1900, the population of the United States exclusive of colonial possessions, Alaska, and Indian Territory, was 75,568,686.

[2] Captain Rhodes, United States Army, in Gold Medal Prize Essay of Military Service Institution, 1904.

argument is often made that an increase in our standing army is not only a step towards war, but an unnecessary and burdensome expense. The exact reverse is true. Our wars have cost us billions of money, and the chief reason why they have cost so much is that we have listened to this kind of argument and neglected to make timely preparation for war. We have invariably waited until the emergency was upon us, then, as a broken dike lets loose its torrents upon the fields, we have poured forth money and life. We have bound up the nation's wounds with billions, when the judicious expenditure of a few millions at the proper time would have prevented most of the wounds. Are we as a nation to continue to be penny wise and pound foolish forever? Is there to be no end to conducting our wars in this unmilitary and extravagant manner? Are the lives of our people of so little value, is the money of our country of so little worth, that we will not be guided by the experiences of the past and make proper provision for future wars? May not a soldier appeal to his countrymen for true economy in the national expenses? May he not plead for peace?

The regular army of the United States should not only be strong enough to suppress civil disturbances and quell all rioting in the States, when it is called upon to do so in a lawful way, but it should also be strong enough to crush insurrection and rebellion throughout American territory, and in

time of war to defend the country against invasion while its military resources are being converted into actual military strength. Fortunately the United States is so situated with respect to the great military powers of the earth that it does not need a large standing army; and probably will never need one, unless Canada or Mexico, or both, should largely increase their permanent military establishments. Under present conditions, war between the United States and any great power, except Great Britain, would be almost entirely decided on the sea. But even in such a war highly trained troops would be a necessity for occupying the seacoast fortifications and for coöperating with and assisting the navy.

It is generally agreed by military men, and others who have given the subject careful study, that one soldier to every thousand inhabitants would give a regular army sufficiently large, but none too large, to meet the needs of the United States. This was the proportion advocated by General Upton as early as 1880, after he had made an exhaustive and profound study of the subject; and though military conditions have greatly changed in the last few years, there is still good reason to believe that a regular army maintained practically at the proportional size he suggested would be sufficient for the needs of the country for many years. As the inhabitants of the entire territory of the United States now number about one hundred millions,

the application of this rule would give at the present time a regular army of about one hundred thousand men.

Since the Spanish-American War the regular army of the United States has been increased and greatly strengthened by a number of needed changes in its organization. It contains now about sixty thousand enlisted men, but the enlisted strength can be increased by the President, at his discretion, to a limit of one hundred thousand men. But there has been only a small increase in the number of regiments of infantry and of cavalry. Consequently the result will be, when the companies of infantry and troops of cavalry are filled to their maximum, they will be too large; that is to say, they will contain more men than can be used to the best advantage on the battlefield. In these days, when companies and troops have to be deployed on the battlefield with wide intervals between the men, it becomes much more difficult for company and troop commanders to handle their men and to exercise proper control over them than it was in the past when they fought arm to arm and boot to boot. In other words, the changes made necessary in the tactics of the battlefield, as a result of the increased power of modern firearms, require, or should require, that companies and troops at war strength be smaller than formerly. The army is also in need of more batteries of artillery. There is not enough field artillery; nor is there sufficient

coast artillery for an effective defence of the fortified harbours.

It is not the purpose here to discuss in detail the organization of the regular army, but simply, in a general way, to indicate that in several respects it is far short of what it should be. The regular army to-day would be much stronger if the enlisted strength were organized into a greater number of regiments and batteries. The regiments of infantry should be increased from thirty to forty; the regiments of cavalry from fifteen to twenty; the batteries of field artillery from thirty to forty-five; and the number of coast artillery companies sufficiently to garrison properly and keep in thorough working order the seacoast fortifications and guns.[1]

[1] I am of the opinion that the regular army would be greatly strengthened if the enlisted force were organized about as follows:

	Enlisted men. (About)
For seacoast fortifications and mine defences	24,000
Twenty regiments of cavalry	18,300
Forty regiments of infantry	45,000
Five regiments of artillery of nine batteries each	7,200
Five siege batteries	800
Engineers	1,300
Ordnance Department	700
Signal Corps	1,200
Military Academy	400
Quartermaster Department	200
Subsistence Department	200
Enlisted men unattached to regiments, and Indian scouts	700
Total	100,000

The enlisted strength of the hospital corps is not included in this table for the reason that the law now provides that it shall not count as a part of the enlisted force of the regular army.

The army would also be much strengthened if provision were made by law to add a few more officers to the medical department, to fill the vacancies in the line of the army caused by the temporary transfer of officers to military colleges and to the general staff, and to increase slightly the pay of officers and enlisted men. While the salaries of officers have remained the same for more than a third of a century, the cost of living has greatly increased, the necessaries of life being now from twenty to one hundred per cent higher than they were thirty-five years ago. Then again, the changed conditions of the service since the Spanish-American War, necessitating frequent and long moves, have so greatly increased the expenses of officers that in many cases they have found it practically impossible to live on their salaries without going in debt. As to the enlisted men, it seems certain that an increase of pay will soon become necessary, for, owing to the high wages now paid labouring men in the trades and on the farms, it is becoming more and more difficult to obtain suitable recruits for the army.

In these days there is among the thinking people of the world much sentiment in favour of arbitration. No doubt in this way many disputes between nations might be settled; but we all know that the only effect it could possibly have would be to make wars less frequent. That universal peace will never come is as certain as that the laws of nature will

remain unchangeable through the ages. Strife, battle, war, are the conditions that govern all life. The vegetable kingdom feeds upon the mineral kingdom, and the animal kingdom upon the vegetable. The tiny grass blades take their nourishment from the soil and air, and each blade struggles for food and light with its neighbour; the ox consumes the grass, and man consumes the ox. In every breath of air we draw, in every drop of water we drink, we destroy millions of beings, and millions of beings are at all times attempting to destroy us. Destruction and death follow in our wake, and destruction and death are constantly at work in our bodies, — "for what is life but a continual dying?" Robert Louis Stevenson once said that "The planet on which we live is more drenched with blood, animal and vegetable, than a pirate ship." Life itself is nothing but a battle, and force is the ruling power that governs all. Life is force; death is force; brains, the weapons given us for doing battle, are nothing more or less than concentrated force. From the cradle to the grave we battle on, fighting against the forces of nature, and against one another and the world, until finally we meet in death itself a power greater than ourselves, the greatest conqueror of all. Such is nature's stern law. It regulates the life of the worm that crawls at our feet, governs the actions of men, and determines the destinies of nations.

"The fate of nations," says ex-Governor Black,

" is still decided by their wars. You may talk of orderly tribunals and learned referees; you may ring in your schools the gentle praises of the quiet life; you may strike from your books the last note of every martial anthem, and yet out in the smoke and thunder will always be the tramp of horses and the silent, rigid, upturned face. Men may prophesy and women pray, but peace will come here to abide forever on this earth when the dreams of childhood are the accepted charts to guide the destinies of men. Events are numberless and mighty, and no man can tell which wire runs around the world. The nations basking to-day in the quiet of contentment and repose may still be on the deadly circuit and to-morrow writhing in the toils of war."

Nor is war to be condemned altogether. There have been and will continue to be righteous as well as unrighteous wars. Was not our Revolutionary War worth the sacrifice? In the history of every great people there is a record of battles fought and won for the right. At Lexington, at Bunker Hill, at King's Mountain, at the Cowpens, men died for liberty, for freedom — died that a nation might live. With all its sacrifices of blood and treasure, who would if he could blot out the record of that glorious struggle? Wars have been necessary in the past; they will be necessary in the future. In the life of every people there comes a time when

"They needs must fight,
To make true peace their own;
They needs must combat might with might,
Or might would rule alone."

The people of this Great Republic, then, should not be foolish enough to declare that "war has become a thing of the past, and that the battles of the future will be fought in the Cabinet and before the great international tribunals"; they should look at things as they are, not as they would wish them to be; they should remember that though "peace is the dream of the wise, war is the history of man"; they should view calmly the experiences of the past and find in them lessons of wisdom for future guidance; they should never forget that there is peace and economy in military strength, and war and extravagance in military weakness; they should burn into their souls the wise words of the great Washington: "*If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.*"

THE END

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont,
February 21, 1903.

Adjutant-General, U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.

Sir, — During some of the spare time from my official duties I have been studying the Santiago Campaign with a view of writing something upon the strategy of the campaign. Among the numerous histories and reports which I have read, I find very little reliable information as to the exact numbers of the Spanish troops that took part in the several engagements. I would like to obtain the exact numbers as near as possible; and I cannot but believe that the Spanish government would gladly furnish these data from its rolls and official records.

I therefore have the honor to request, provided the War Department deems such request a proper one, that this information be sought for and obtained through the State Department, or our Minister or Ambassador in Spain, or the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, or in any manner that the Secretary of War or Adjutant-General may deem best.

The following is the detailed information desired:

1. Size of organized forces of Spain — Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery — at outbreak of war.

2. Number of regulars at outbreak of war.

3. Number of volunteers under arms at outbreak of war.

4. Number of regulars in Cuba at outbreak of the war, April 21.

5. Number of volunteers in Cuba at outbreak of the war.

6. Number of infantry in Cuba at outbreak of the war.

7. Number of cavalry in Cuba at outbreak of the war, and number of artillery in Cuba at outbreak of the war.

8. Number of Spanish soldiers, regulars and volunteers, in the province of Santiago at the time the American army landed.

9. Number in and about Santiago at the time the American army landed.

10. Number in and about Guantanamo at the time the American army landed.

11. Number in and about Baracoa at the time the American army landed.

12. Number in and about Sagua de Tanamo at the time the American army landed.

13. Number in and about Holguin at the time the American army landed.

14. Number in and about Manzanillo at the time the American army landed.

15. Number of Spanish troops engaged in action of Las Guasimas and number of Spaniards killed and wounded in that engagement.

16. Number of Spanish troops engaged in battle of San Juan Hill and number of killed and wounded in the battle.

17. Number of Spanish troops engaged in battle of El Caney and number of killed and wounded in the battle.

18. Number of Spanish troops in and about Santiago and at the Morro and mouth of harbor on July 1, 1898, and their stations and positions.

19. Number of Spanish troops from Manzanillo that entered city of Santiago under General Escario on or about July 3, 1898, and their casualties *en route.*

20. Total number of Spanish troops that were surrendered to American forces in province of Santiago.

21. Total number immediately about Santiago that were surrendered to American forces.

22. Should be thankful, too, for any reliable information as to the number of insurgents actually in arms opposed to the Spaniards in Cuba, and also in Santiago Province at outbreak of Spanish-American War.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
(signed) H. H. SARGENT,
Captain 2d Cavalry, U. S. Army.

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1903.

Sir, — I have the honor to enclose, herewith, copy of letter of February 21, 1903, from Captain H. H. Sargent, 2d Cavalry, U. S. Army, in which he asks for certain information respecting the Spanish troops engaged in Cuba in the campaign of 1898, and to request

that our Minister at Madrid be instructed to obtain, if practicable, the information Captain Sargent desires.

Very respectfully,

(signed) ELIHU ROOT,

Secretary of War.

1 enclosure.

TO THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

No. 21.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1903.

THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR, — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, enclosing the request of Captain H. H. Sargent, U. S. A., for certain official information from the Spanish government, with a view to writing something on the strategy of the Santiago Campaign.

Copies of your letter and its enclosures have been forwarded to the United States Minister, and he has been instructed that it may be a matter of some delicacy to obtain information of this detailed nature for the described use, and that it would be well in the first instance to ascertain, discreetly and informally, whether the Spanish War Office would be disposed to entertain such a request. He has been advised that the Department does not desire to take any step which might touch the natural sensitiveness of a government to which we bear only good will and friendliness.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) FRANCIS B. LOOMIS,

Acting Secretary.

For CAPTAIN H. H. SARGENT,
2d Cavalry,
Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1903.

THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR, — Referring to your letter of March 6 last, I have the honor to enclose copy of a despatch from the United States Minister to Spain, reporting that he hopes to obtain the information desired by Captain Sargent, U. S. A., relating to the Santiago Campaign.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(signed) JOHN HAY.

Enclosure: From Spain, No. 61, May 9, 1903.

No. 61.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES

MADRID, May 9, 1903.

THE HON. JOHN HAY,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

SIR, — Referring to your No. 21 of March 10, 1903, transmitting the request of Captain H. H. Sargent, United States Army, for certain official data from the Spanish government desired for the preparation of a work on the strategy of the Santiago Campaign, and to my No. 44 of April 8 last, reporting a conversation with the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Perez Caballero, on this and other matters, I beg to say that in an interview yesterday with the Under-Secretary, in which I asked him whether it was agreeable to the War Department to furnish the information asked for, he told me that application had been made therefor, and that he had reason to believe it would be

forthcoming. As many of the questions transmitted in Captain Sargent's letter are of a delicate nature, although involving facts of historical interest, I shall be agreeably surprised if the Department of War furnishes complete answers, and shall, in the event of a favorable reply, regard the same as evidence of the friendly spirit which animates the Spanish government in regard to this and kindred questions.

In view of the lapse of time since your note of March 10 was received, I have thought it proper to inform you that Captain Sargent's request has not been lost sight of.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(signed) ARTHUR S. HARDY.

For CAPTAIN H. H. SARGENT,
2d Cavalry,
Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont.

No. 82.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES

MADRID, June 5, 1903.

THE HON. JOHN HAY,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

SIR, — Referring to your No. 21 of March 10, 1903, enclosing a copy of a letter from the Secretary of War transmitting the request of Captain H. H. Sargent, U. S. A., for certain official information from the Spanish government with a view to the preparation of a work on the strategy of the Santiago Campaign, I have the honor to enclose herewith the information furnished by the Minister of War and transmitted to the Legation to-day through

the Under-Secretary of State, a copy and translation of whose letter is also enclosed.

. . . . . .

I have the honor, Sir, to be,
Your obedient servant,
(signed) ARTHUR S. HARDY.

(*Translation.*)

The Under-Secretary of State
kisses the hand

of His Excellency Arthur S. Hardy, and has the honor to send him the enclosed information, confirming what he verbally stated, and informing him that, although the numbers of the questions do not coincide exactly with those of the note he transmitted, it is easy to understand the subject to which each one refers.

Juan Perez Caballero

takes this occasion to present to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States the testimony of his highest consideration.

MADRID, June 3, 1903.

Questions 1 and 2.

	Jefes.	Oficiales.	Tropas.
Infantería	319	4,022	123,308
" de Marina	13	122	2,895
Caballería	49	453	8,033
Artillería	14	207	5,398
Ingenieros	10	160	5,290
Guardia Civil	26	214	4,769
Total de regulares	431	5,178	149,693
Fuerzas irregulares á pié . . .	32	1,462	27,637
Voluntarios y Guerrillas á cabal .	11	180	12,196
Total de irregulares	43	1,642	39,833

These answers are to questions 4, 5, 6, and 7 in my letter to Adjutant-General, United States Army.

They give the number of regulars and volunteers under arms in Cuba at outbreak of war.

(*Translation.*)

	General and Field officers.	Company officers.	Enlisted men.
Infantry	319	4,022	123,308
Marines	13	122	2,895
Cavalry	49	453	8,033
Artillery	14	207	5,398
Engineers	10	160	5,290
Civil Guard	26	214	4,769
Total of regular army	431	5,178	149,693
Irregular Infantry	32	1,462	27,637
Mounted volunteers and guerillas	11	180	12,196
Total of irregular forces	43	1,642	39,833

From the above figures it appears that the total number of officers and men in regular and irregular organizations was 196,820.

Question 3.

	Jefes.	Oficiales.	Tropas.
Santiago y zona poblada	27	292	9,111
Guantánamo	17	175	5,800
Baracoa	1	15	726
Sagua de Tánamo	2	15	703
División de Holguín	12	333	8,019
División de Manzanillo	25	301	8,342

NOTA: Esta era la fuerza el 21 de Junio 1898 al desembarcar los americanos, de la cual el día 22 de Junio hay que descontar la columna Escario que salió de Manzanillo á las 5 de la tarde este último día.

These answers are to questions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. They give the number of Spanish soldiers, regulars and volunteers, in the principal cities of the province of Santiago at the time the American army landed.

(*Translation.*)

	General and Field officers.	Company officers.	Enlisted men.
Santiago and outskirts	27	292	9,111
Guantanamo	17	175	5,800
Baracoa	1	15	726
Sagua de Tanamo	2	15	703
Division of Holguin	12	333	8,019
Division of Manzanillo	25	301	8,342

NOTE: The number of troops given above for the division of Manzanillo were those present on June 21, 1898, on the landing of the Americans; on June 22 this number was decreased by the departure of the column under Escario, which left Manzanillo at 5 P. M. June 22.

From the above figures it appears that there were in these places 84 general and field officers, 1131 company officers, and 32,701 enlisted men, or a total of 33,916 officers and men.

Question 4. — En los combates de las Guásimas (Guásima-Sevilla) tomaron parte 1500 hombres con dos piezas de artellería. Las bajas fueron: 3 oficiales y 9 de tropa muertos y 24 heridos de tropa.

En los combates de San Juan y el Caney tomaron parte 1700 hombres. Las bajas fueron: más de 500 de tropa entre muertos y heridos y 50 de Generales, Jefes y Oficiales.

These answers are to questions 15, 16, and 17. They give the number of Spanish troops that were engaged at Las Guasimas, El Caney and San Juan, and the losses.

(*Translation.*)

In the fights of Las Guasimas (Guasima-Sevilla) 1500 men with two pieces of artillery took part. The losses were: 3 officers and 9 men killed and 24 men wounded.

In the fights at San Juan and El Caney 1700 men took part. The losses were 50 general, field, and company officers, and more than 500 men killed and wounded.

Question 5.

Punta Cabrera.	Cuatro compañías.
Monte-Real.	Una Compañía.
Cobre.	Dos Compañías.
Mazamorra.	Una Compañía de Asia y otra movilizada.
Entre Mazamorra y Monte-Real.	Dos compañías de desembarco de la escuadra.
En Dos Caminos del Cobre.	500 hombres de dotaciones de la escuadra.
Socapa.	Una compañía de la escuadra, otra del regimiento de Cuba y una movilizada.
Bahía. Puertos de la Sierra. Linea ferrea hasta el Cristo	Ocho compañías de Cuba y seis movilizadas.
Morro.	Tres compañías.
Interior de la población de Cuba.	Voluntarios y bomberos.
El Caney.	Tres compañías, una guerrilla á pié, 100 hombres de la gnon del poblado.
Loma Quintero.	Una compañía movilizada.
Atrincheramientos San Antonio, Santa Inés y el Sueño.	Cuatro compañías Talavera y una movilizada.
Camino del Caney y posiciones de San Juan.	Tres compañías.
Immediaciones de Canosa.	140 caballos de guerrillas.
Valle del Guayabito y Salientes de Santa Úrsula y Cañadas.	Tres compañías Puerto Rico y una movilizada.
Alturas de Chicharrones y Camino Lagunas.	Tres compañías y resto del regimento de Cuba.
Aguadores.	Dos compañías movilizadas.
Cruces.	Una compañía de desembarco.
Altos de la Y griega.	Una compañía de ingenieros.

This answer is to question 18. It gives the positions of the Spanish troops in and about

Santiago and at the Morro and mouth of the harbour after the fight at Las Guasimas.

(*Translation.*)

Punta Cabrera.	4 companies.
Monte Real.	1 company.
Cobre.	2 companies.
Mazamorra.	1 company of the Asia regiment and one mobilized company.
Between Mazamorra and Monte Real.	2 companies disembarked from the squadron.
In Dos Caminos del Cobre.	500 men from the crews of the squadron.
Socapa.	1 company from the squadron, one company of the regiment of Cuba, and one mobilized company.
Bay. Passes of the Sierra. Railroad to El Cristo.	8 companies of the regiment of Cuba and six mobilized companies.
Morro.	3 companies.
Interior of City of Santiago.	Volunteers and firemen.
El Caney.	3 companies, one company of dismounted guerillas, 100 men of the garrison of the village.
Loma Quintero.	1 company mobilized.
Intrenchments of San Antonio, Santa Inés, and Sueño.	4 companies of the Talavera regiment and one mobilized company.
Road to Caney and positions on San Juan.	3 companies.
In the vicinity of Canosa.	140 mounted guerillas.
Valley of Guayabito and salients of Santa Úrsula and Cañadas.	3 companies of Porto Rico regiment and one mobilized company.
Heights of Chicharrones and Laguna Road.	3 companies and the remainder of the regiment of Cuba.
Aguadores.	2 mobilized companies.
Cruces.	1 company disembarked from the squadron.
Heights of The Y.	1 company of engineers.

Question 6. — Entraron en Santiago de Cuba el 3 de Julio de 1898 de la Columna Escario 11 Jefes, 135 oficiales y 3433 de tropa.

Las bajas durante el camino fureon 1 coronel, 2 oficiales y 78 de tropa heridos.

This answer is to question 19.

(*Translation.*)

General Escario's column entered Santiago on July 3, 1898. It consisted of 11 general and field officers, 135 company officers, and 3433 men.

The losses *en route* were one colonel, two company officers, and seventy-eight men wounded.

Question 7. — Las detalladas en la 3a. pregunta que se hallaban en Santiago y las de la columna Escario.

This is an answer to question 21. It gives the number of Spanish troops surrendered immediately about Santiago.

(*Translation.*)

The troops surrendered were those given in answer to question 3 [question 9 of my letter] as stationed at Santiago plus the troops in Escario's column.

Note by author:

	General and Field officers.	Company officers.	Enlisted men.
In Santiago	27	292	9,111
Escario's column	11	135	3,433
Total	38	427	12,544
Total officers and men			13,009

From this total, of course, the number of casualties in and about Santiago must be subtracted in order to reach correct results.

Question 8. — Número de los insurrectos aproximado en la provincia de Santiago 5000. Idem en toda la Isla 15,000.

This is in answer to question 22.

(*Translation.*)

The approximate number of insurgents in the province of Santiago was 5000; total in the island of Cuba 15,000.

APPENDIX B

On June 5, 1903, the Spanish government kindly furnished me with certain data relating to the Spanish-American War. (See Appendix A.) In reply to the question, "How many Spanish troops, regulars and volunteers, were in Cuba at the outbreak of the war?" the Spanish War Department gave me the following figures: Total of regular army: general and field officers, 431; company officers, 5178; enlisted men, 149,693. Total of irregular forces: general and field officers, 43; company officers, 1642; and enlisted men, 39,833. Grand total, officers and men, 196,820.

The following is a quotation from the proceedings of the Cuban evacuation commission, composed of Admiral Sampson and Generals Wade and Butler:

"*December* 30, 1898. — The secretary then stated that according to memoranda furnished him by one of the staff officers of the Spanish commission there were embarked for Spain from the different ports of the island of Cuba from the 16th of August to the 28th of December, inclusive, 71,816 troops, which number includes generals,

officers, and men. The secretary further stated that according to information furnished him by the Captain-General there will remain after January 1, 1899, at Matanzas and neighborhood 17,277 men, and at Cienfuegos 28,775 of the Spanish army awaiting embarkation."

From these figures furnished the secretary of the Cuban evacuation commission by a staff officer of the Spanish evacuation commission and by the Captain-General of the Spanish forces in Cuba, it appears that 117,868 Spanish troops were transported from Cuba to Spain at the expense of the Spanish government, and from the report of the Quartermaster-General for 1898 it appears that 22,137 were transported to Spain at the expense of the United States, which makes a total of 140,005 repatriated troops. In addition to this number the proceedings of the Cuban evacuation commission show 80,504 volunteer or provincial troops, variously distributed among the provinces of Havana, Matanzas, Pinar del Rio, Santa Clara, and Puerto Principe. The proceedings also show that these volunteer or provincial troops were all armed, but that some fifty odd thousand were not on duty at that time. They were all mustered out of the Spanish service in Cuba and are not included among the total number of troops transported to Spain. It would therefore seem certain that there were in Cuba, after the Spanish surrender at Santiago, 220,509 regular

and volunteer Spanish troops. Tabulating these results, we have the following:

Statement of Spanish troops in Cuba.		Regulars.	Volunteers.	Total.
From Spanish Government.	Strength at outbreak of war.	155,302	41,518	196,820
From Evacuation Commission.	Strength after Spanish surrender.	140,005	80,504	220,509

If we take into account the casualties resulting from battle and diseases, the different times at which these statements were made, and the probability that a certain percentage of the regular troops remained in Cuba and were not counted by the evacuation commission, and the probability also that there were forty or fifty thousand volunteers in Cuba at the outbreak of the war enrolled and under arms, but not on duty, and therefore not included in Spanish government's figures, there will be found a substantial agreement in the statements obtained from these two sources.

It will be found interesting to compare these figures with those obtained from the "Anuario Militar de España" of 1898 which gives the strength of the forces of the Spanish army of Cuba in December, 1897.

FROM "ANUARIO MILITAR DE ESPAÑA, 1898."

Infantry (regular forces)	134,919	
" (volunteers)	63,760	
Total Infantry		198,679

Cavalry (regular forces)	7,752	
" (volunteers)	14,796	
Total Cavalry		22,548
Artillery (regular forces)	5,308	
" (volunteers)	4,123	
Total Artillery		9,431
Engineers (regular forces)	4,905	
" (volunteers)	1,441	
Total Engineers		6,346
Hospital troops	1,975	
Pack trains	1,930	
Civil Guard	4,456	
Mobilized forces, volunteers and guerillas	30,584	
Marine Infantry	2,508	
Total		41,453
Total		278,457

Though it seems probable that these figures are considerably in excess of the actual numbers present under arms at the time, yet from this source it would seem one ought to obtain reliable data.

APPENDIX C

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
HABANA, CUBA

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ,
September 6, 1903.

CAPTAIN H. H. SARGENT,
Hollywood, California.

MY DEAR SARGENT, — Lieutenant-Colonel Enrique Ubieta, Aid-de-Camp to General Blanco during the war, since resigned from the Spanish army and now a Cuban citizen, has given me the following data:

The total of Spanish cavalry in Cuba during the insurrection was 4,300, and was distributed as follows:

Province of Pinar del Rio	300
Province of Havana	1,100
Province of Matanzas	1,300
Province of Santa Clara	1,200
Province of Puerto Principe	200
Province of Santiago de Cuba	200
	4,300

Colonel Ubieta states in his letter to me that the cavalry was being constantly changed to meet the necessities of the war, and that "just before the blowing up of the *Maine* in Havana harbor, General Blanco had sent two cavalry regiments to Puerto Principe to operate

there and thus encourage the determination of a number of the Insurrectionary leaders there to enter into an agreement to lay down their arms. Had the United States not intervened in the war it would have ended within six months, such was the discouraged and disorganized condition of the Cuban forces."

Three of the regular cavalry regiments were armed with the Mauser and the sabre and the remaining regiments with the sabre and the "tercerola" (a short kind of carbine). The volunteer cavalry of Puerto Principe was armed with the machete and the "tercerola."

The cavalry was mounted on Cuban horses and on horses purchased in New Orleans. At the termination of the war the former were strong and healthy compared with the latter. Colonel Ubieta, who was a cavalry officer, states that the majority of the New Orleans horses died of various sicknesses, and that they could not stand, as could the Cuban horses, the continuous marching that they had to do.

There were two guerilla organizations in the Spanish army (in addition to the troops I have already given) known by the names "Guerrillas Volantes Locales" and "Guerrillas de Campo." Both Cubans and Spaniards could voluntarily enlist in the former, and they were commanded by officers of the volunteers. Each company or troop of these organizations had not more than one hundred men. Each company of the latter organization had from sixty to eighty men and was commanded by regular officers of the corps to which it belonged. Officers of the volunteers and Cuban and Spanish soldiers were permitted to enlist in these companies.

Colonel Ubieta says that there were probably seven thousand cavalry guerillas in the Spanish army when the war with the United States began. The larger part of this force was very badly mounted.

. . . . . .

Yours, etc.,

(signed) MATTHEW E. HANNA.

APPENDIX D

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HABANA, CUBA

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ,
August 29, 1903.

CAPTAIN H. H. SARGENT, U. S. Army,
Hollywood, California.

MY DEAR SARGENT, — According to my promise of a few days ago I am able to send you the following information at this time with reference to the Cuban forces during the Insurrection.

The military organization of the Cuban army was as follows: Six army corps distributed as follows: 1st and 2d Corps in the province of Santiago de Cuba; 3d Corps in Puerto Principe; 4th Corps in Santa Clara; 5th Corps in Havana and Matanzas; 6th Corps in Pinar del Rio.

These six corps were commanded by a general-in-chief and a lieutenant-general (Lugar Teniente General).

The island was divided into two departments, the eastern and the western, with three corps in each, commanded by two major-generals.

The 1st Corps comprised 2 divisions, with 6 brigades and 13 regiments.

The 2d Corps had 4 divisions with 8 brigades and 18 regiments.

The 3d Corps had 2 divisions with 4 brigades, of 9 regiments and 2 guerilla regiments.

The 4th Corps had 2 divisions with 6 brigades and 19 regiments.

The 5th Corps had 2 divisions of 7 brigades of 18 regiments.

The 6th Corps had 2 divisions of 4 brigades of 8 regiments.

There were a headquarters and staff for each corps, and an Inspector-General's Department and a Sanitary Department for the entire army. Besides these there was a corps for forming expeditions (from the United States), and there was a headquarters for the entire army, known by the name of "Administración Militar."

The following table will give you the total number of men that served in each corps at one time or another, the number of those that are still living, the number that have died during and since the war, and the percentage of deaths on the total enlistment.

Corps.	Living.	Dead.	Total.	Per cent.
First Corps .	13,965	2,185	16,150	13-52
Second Corps .	11,737	1,569	13,306	11-79
Third Corps .	3,930	436	4,366	9-98
Fourth Corps .	6,980	2,559	9,539	26-82
Fifth Corps .	3,537	2,398	5,935	40-40
Sixth Corps .	2,960	1,518	4,478	33-89
Total . .	43,109	10,665	53,774	

These data are taken from the report of the board for revising the army rolls and for auditing the final statements

of the members of the army; this board was provided for by an Act of the Cuban Congress, and its work is now practically complete. If there are any changes in these figures in the future I will let you know.

The total number of deaths during and since the war was 10,665; of this number 8617 occurred during the war, and 2048 after the termination of the war; 433 were in the year 1895, 2296 in the year 1896, 4425 in the year 1897, and 1463 in the year 1898. Bullet wounds caused 4560 of these deaths, sword and machete wounds 620, sickness 5270, and the remainder, 215, died in the hands of the enemy.

Of the total number of men in the army at one time or another, 5736 were officers and 48,038 were non-commissioned officers and privates, or, in other words, 1 officer for every 8 men and a fraction.

The rank at the time of death of the 10,665 men who died during and after the war was as follows: 9314 privates, 147 corporals, 129 2d sergeants, 137 1st sergeants, 241 2d lieutenants, 203 1st lieutenants, 205 captains, 151 majors, 73 lieutenant-colonels, 40 colonels, 16 brigadier-generals, 2 generals of divisions, and 7 major-generals. In the army there were 15 major-generals, 21 generals of divisions, and 52 brigadier-generals.

If I have failed to give you the information that you want of the Cuban army, let me know, and I will gladly see what more I can do for you.

I hope to be able to send you something of the Spanish army in a short time.

. . . . . .

Yours,

(signed) MATTHEW E. HANNA.

APPENDIX E

(*The Consul at Santiago de Cuba to Secretary of State*)

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, January 12, 1898.

SIR, — I deem it a duty to lay before the honorable Department of State the situation here as affecting American interests, and to enclose herewith an order issued by command of General Maximo Gomez, and a translation of the same, forbidding the grinding of the sugar crop for the years 1897 and 1898.

In this part of Cuba, so far as I can learn, all idea of making a sugar crop is entirely abandoned.

I regret to say that the stoppage of industries, from present appearances, will not halt at the sugar crop, but coffee and other agricultural crops fall under the same ban.

I had hoped that, after the reconcentration order was revoked, through the energetic action of the present administration, we would find no trouble in reinstating American industries; but it appears that all of the benefits that should have accrued to our citizens are thwarted by the action of the insurgents, who refuse to allow them to return to their sugar, coffee, and other estates . . .

The three Rivery brothers, whom I informed you recently I was about to assist in returning to their coffee and fruit estates, got there only to find they could not go

to work until permission was obtained from the insurgent commander, which permission seems doubtful; I myself, as I understand my duty, being inhibited from rendering them any assistance at this point.

These, with several sugar estates within my consular district, are held up and becoming more worthless than before.

It is beyond the power of my pen to describe the situation in eastern Cuba. Squalidity, starvation, sickness, and death meet one in all places. Beggars throng our doors and stop us on the streets. The dead in large numbers remain over from day to day in the cemeteries unburied.

Very respectfully,

(signed) PULASKI F. HYATT,
United States Consul.

(*Consul at Sagua la Grande to Secretary of State*)

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SAGUA LA GRANDE, December 28, 1897.

SIR, — . . . The suffering and destitution among the concentrados . . . is fearful, and must continue to grow worse.

How could the situation be otherwise, since the island is producing absolutely nothing, save some growing cane, and at the same time completely exhausted of all food? Relief alone can be obtained from the outer world in the way of charitable contributions.

This — Santa Clara — province is capable at this season of producing perhaps two-thirds of whatever cane might be made in the entire island.

To grind this cane without interruption would be the means of saving the lives of thousands who, without this or outside aid within the next thirty or fifty days, must die of actual hunger. Over a month since the planters were officially advised of Spain's inability to provide protection in order to operate the mills. This leaves the sugar growers entirely in the hands of the Cubans in revolt, as to whether they will be allowed to grind without hindrance or fear of total destruction of their property. I know that strict orders have been given to subordinate commanders that under no circumstances must mills be permitted to grind, under penalty of violation of the order for the destruction of property.

Without contributions of food and medicine from the outer world, and at once, a sacrifice of lives will ensue, the responsibility for which no Christian people can face.

I am, etc.,

WALTER B. BARKER, *Consul.*

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SAGUA LA GRANDE, January 31, 1898.

SIR, — . . . At my suggestion several families returned to the American-owned "Central Santa Anna," the owner having been forced to abandon the property in order to prevent further spoliation of the mill machinery. Although a government guard is stationed on the place, they (former tenants) were ordered to leave.

One sugar mill is running, not without interruption, with chances of making one-fourth of a crop. Another, just started up, was attacked yesterday by a band of insurgents, killing fourteen and wounding five of the guerillas paid by

the estate to protect the operatives. Seven laborers were killed, the insurgents leaving two of their dead.

An adjoining estate, the property of the British consul, was also attacked, the growing cane burned. This precludes further attempts to grind, as men cannot be induced to work while the insurgents roam at will over the country.

I am, etc.,

WALTER B. BARKER, *Consul.*

On November 11, 1895, General Gomez issued a proclamation dated at Sancti Spiritus, placing the responsibility, as he said, for the great ruin he was about to inflict, upon "passive" people. He added: "This people cannot hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the liberty of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with blood without effecting its purpose because of puerile scruples and fears which do not concur with the character of the men who are in the field."

On July 1, 1895, at Najasa Camaguay, General Gomez issued an address to the planters and cattle ranchers, as follows:

"Whereas, all exploitations of any product whatsoever are aids and resources to the government that we are fighting, it is resolved by the General-in-Chief to issue this general order throughout the island that the introduction of articles of commerce, as well as beef and cattle, into the towns occupied by the enemy, is absolutely prohibited. The sugar plantations will stop their labours, and whosoever shall attempt to grind the crop notwithstanding this order, will have their cane burned and their buildings demolished."

General Gomez also issued a peremptory order as follows:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF LIBERATION

TERRITORY OF SANCTI SPIRITUS.

November 6, 1895. — Animated by the spirit of unchangeable resolution in defence of the rights of the revolution of redemption of this country of colonists, humiliated and despised by Spain, and in harmony with what has been decreed concerning the subject in the circular dated the 1st of July, I have ordered the following:

ARTICLE 1. That all plantations shall be totally destroyed, their cane and outbuildings burned, and railroad connections destroyed.

ARTICLE 2. All labourers who shall aid the sugar factories — these sources of supplies that we must deprive the enemy of — shall be considered as traitors to their country.

ARTICLE 3. All who are caught in the act, or whose violation of Article 2 shall be proven, shall be shot. Let all chiefs of operations of the army of liberty comply with this order, determined to unfurl triumphantly, even over ruin and ashes, the flag of the Republic of Cuba.

In regard to the manner of waging the war, follow the private instructions that I have already given.

For the sake of the honour of our arms and your well-known courage and patriotism, it is expected that you will strictly comply with the above orders.

M. GOMEZ, *General-in-chief.*

To the chiefs of operations. Circulate this.

APPENDIX F

THE total number of Spanish officers and soldiers shipped to Spain by the United States after the surrender was 22,137, of whom 14,995, representing the garrison of Santiago and the six inland stations of El Cristo, Songo, Dos Caminos, Moron, San Luis, and Palma Soriano, sailed from Santiago; 5820 sailed from Guantanamo; and 1322 from Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo. (See Appendix H.)

Between the outbreak of the war and the date of the sailing of the Spanish troops back to Spain, about a month after the surrender, a number of soldiers died of disease, some were killed, a few elected to remain in Cuba, and a few, sick with yellow fever, were left behind at Guantanamo and Baracoa.

According to the Spanish government's figures (See Appendix A), 5992 Spanish soldiers were at Guantanamo at the outbreak of the war, and 1462 at Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo. According to the records of the War Department of the United States, 5820 of these soldiers were transported to Spain from Guantanamo, and 1322 from Baracoa

and Sagua de Tanamo. The difference, including those who had died of disease, who had been killed in battle, and who had remained behind, numbered 312. Assuming that in General Linares' command at Santiago, including Escario's column, the aggregate of those who were killed in battle, who died of disease, and who remained behind, was in the same proportion, we have 761, which number added to 312 gives 1073. Or, in other words, between the outbreak of the war and the sailing of the Spanish troops back to Spain, there were in the province of Santiago, exclusive of the garrisons of Holguin and Manzanillo, 1073 Spanish soldiers who died of disease, elected to remain in Cuba, or were killed in battle. Adding this number to the 22,137 that were transported to Spain, we have 23,210, which undoubtedly approximates very closely the actual number of Spanish soldiers in the province of Santiago outside the garrisons of Holguin and Manzanillo. Adding to these figures the garrison at Holguin, 8364, and that left at Manzanillo, 5008, after the departure of Colonel Escario's column, we have a total of 36,582 Spanish soldiers in the province of Santiago on the day General Shafter's army landed.

To this number must be added also about 1000 sailors, who disembarked from Cervera's squadron on June 22 and took part in the fighting of July 1. In an order dated June 26 General

Linares gives their number as more than 1000; and Lieutenant Müller in his "Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba" gives their number as about 970. One thousand is probably very nearly correct.

The total number of Spanish officers and soldiers shipped to Spain by the United States from Santiago and the six inland towns of El Cristo, Songo, Dos Caminos, Moron, San Luis, and Palma Soriano was 14,995. Of the 761 Spanish soldiers who died of disease, elected to remain behind, or were killed in battle, 81 were in Escario's column. Making the subtraction, we have 680, and adding this number to 14,995, we have a total of 15,675 at Santiago and the six inland towns of El Cristo, Songo, Dos Caminos, Moron, San Luis, and Palma Soriano. It will be remembered, however, that this number included Escario's column of 3579 that did not arrive at Santiago until July 3 after the battles of El Caney and San Juan had been fought. Exclusive of Escario's column there were therefore 12,096 officers and men at Santiago and the six inland towns of El Cristo, Songo, Moron, Dos Caminos, San Luis, and Palma Soriano on June 22 when the American army landed. Of this number, according to the Spanish government's statement, 9430 (see Appendix A) were in and about Santiago. Subtracting 9430 from 12,096, we have 2666 officers and men at El Cristo, Songo, Moron, Dos Caminos, San Luis, and Palma

Soriano. But it should be noted that on July 2 a company of the San Fernando regiment, a company of the Constitución regiment, two troops of the King's regiment (Cavalry), and an organization of mounted guerillas, all of which up to this time had been in San Luis, joined Escario's column as a reënforcement (see page 213, "La Guerra Hispano-Americana, Santiago de Cuba," by Major Núñez of the Spanish Army) and marched to Santiago, arriving on July 3, so that, at the time of the surrender, July 17, the troops occupying these six inland towns probably numbered about 2000 officers and men. On this point I quote the following letter from Captain Thomas J. Lewis, Second Cavalry, who with two troops of his regiment accompanied the officers designated by General Shafter to receive the surrender of the inland towns.

RECRUITING STATION, U. S. ARMY,
No. 514 WEST JEFFERSON STREET,
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY,
January 2, 1904.

MY DEAR SARGENT, — I apologize for delay in answering your query as to the number of Spanish troops we found at the places you name. I have looked over my report as well as Clark's, and can get no definite information from them. We did not visit Songo, but we were told that there were two companies there. I believe their companies were very much larger than ours, — about one hundred and twenty men strong.

The following is merely a rough estimate:

El Cristo . .	300	A major commanded there.
Moron . . .	300	A major commanded there.
Dos Caminos .	100	One company, captain commanding.
San Luis . .	600	Reported as having been disarmed by Clark (Troop C).

Palma Soriano, between 500 and 600.

There were a large number of sick at San Luis and about one hundred and twenty sick and wounded left at Palma Soriano by the Manzanillo column on its march to Santiago. I hope this will be of some service to you. I regret that the reports are not clear on this matter, and I can only account for the omission from the fact that we were pretty well run down physically and very nearly all sick, but still keeping up in spite of it. . . .

Yours sincerely,
(signed) THOS. J. LEWIS.

The results are tabulated on page 184.

I am strongly confirmed in the approximate correctness of these figures by the statement of Major Núñez in his "La Guerra Hispano-Americana, Santiago de Cuba," and of Lieutenant Müller in his "Combates y Capitulación de Santiago de Cuba," that the needs of the troops of Santiago de Cuba and immediate vicinity at the beginning of hostilities amounted to 360,000 rations a month. (See Núñez's book, page 52, and Müller's book, page 61.) This meant, of course, about 12,000 rations a day. According to my figures there were at this time at and in the vicinity of Santiago

SPANISH TROOPS IN PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO

Spanish garrisons.	Officers and enlisted men present June 22.	Officers and enlisted men transported to Spain.	Officers and enlisted men who were killed or died or were left behind.
Guantanamo	5,992	5,820	172
Baracoa	742	1,322	140
Sagua de Tanamo	720		
Escario's column	3,660		
Santiago	9,430		
El Cristo, Songo, Moron, Dos Caminos, San Luis, Palma Soriano	2,666	14,995	761
General Linares' command exclusive of garrison at Manzanillo	23,210	22,137	1,073
Manzanillo	5,008		
Total of General Linares' command	28,218		
Holguin	8,364		
Total of Spanish troops in Santiago province	36,582		
Sailors	1,000		
Grand total, including sailors	37,582		

General Linares' command of 28,218 included the garrison at Manzanillo but not at Holguin. Adding 1,000 sailors, which were under his orders during the fighting about Santiago, gives a total of 29,218; or, in round numbers, 29,000 officers and men under his orders in province of Santiago.

and in the six inland towns of El Cristo, Songo, Moron, Dos Caminos, San Luis, and Palma Soriano, 12,096 officers and men.

Again, the following statement of General Wood to Colonel Roosevelt (see "The Rough Riders," pages 295 and 296) strongly confirms the approximate correctness of my figures:

"A word in regard to the number of troops in Santiago. I have had, during my long association here, a good many opportunities to get information which you have not got and probably never will get; that is, information from parties who were actually in the fight, who are now residents of the city; also information which came to me as commanding officer of the city directly after the surrender.

"To sum up briefly as follows: The Spanish surrendered in Santiago 12,000 men. We shipped from Santiago something over 14,000 men. The 2000 additional were troops that came in from San Luis, Songo, and small up-country posts. The 12,000 in the city, minus the force of General Escario, 3300 infantry and 680 cavalry, or in round numbers 4000 men (who entered the city just after the battles of San Juan and El Caney), leaves 8000 regulars, plus the dead, plus Cervera's marines and blue-jackets, which he himself admits landing in the neighborhood of 1200 (and reports here are that he landed 1380), and plus the Spanish Volunteer Battalion, which was between 800 and 900 men (this statement I have from the lieutenant-colonel of this very battalion), gives us in round numbers, present for duty on the morning of July 1, not less than 10,500 men. These

men were distributed, 890 at Caney, two companies of artillery at Morro, one at Socapa, and half a company at Punta Gorda; in all, not over 500 or 600 men, but for the sake of argument we can say a thousand. In round numbers, then, we had immediately about the city 8500 troops. These were scattered from the cemetery around to Aguadores. In front of us, actually in the trenches, there could not by any possible method of figuring have been less than 6000 men. You can twist it any way you want to; the figures I have given you are absolutely correct, at least they are absolutely on the side of safety."

The facts given in the text relative to the number and positions of the Spanish companies at Santiago de Cuba have been obtained mostly from the Spanish government's statement, from Lieutenant Müller's "Combates y Capitulación de Santiago de Cuba," and from Major Núñez's "La Guerra Hispano-Americana, Santiago de Cuba," the only accessible Spanish authorities on the subject. As these authors differ slightly as to the number and names of the companies present, there is some doubt as to whether the organizations to which the companies belonged are in all cases accurately designated. For instance, according to Lieutenant Müller (see page 34) there were only twelve mobilized companies at Santiago; according to Major Núñez (see pages 54 and 55) there were fourteen; and according to the Spanish government's statement (see Appendix A) there were thirteen

at and in the immediate vicinity of Santiago, which number does not include the three that were at this time known to be at or near the inland towns north of the city. Again, according to Lieutenant Müller (see page 35 of his work) there was but one battalion (presumably six companies) of the Asia regiment at Santiago, but on page 127 he gives the stations of seven companies of the Asia regiment, and Major Núñez on pages 102 and 103 of his work gives the stations of eight companies.

That the total number of the companies of infantry, artillery, engineers and sappers, and civil guards, namely, sixty-five, given in the text, is not, however, an overestimate, appears clearly from the Spanish government's statement, in which are given the positions occupied by fifty-three companies of these same organizations in and immediately about Santiago just after the Las Guasimas fight. (See Appendix A.) Adding to this number the twelve or thirteen companies that were at this time known to be at Palma Soriano, San Luis, Dos Caminos, Moron, and Songo, we have a total of sixty-five or sixty-six companies.

According to the Spanish government's statement (see Appendix A) there were 9430 officers and men of the Spanish army in and immediately about Santiago when the American army landed. According to the same statement there were, including two companies of guerillas, fifty-five companies of the army, besides the volunteers and

firemen, at and in the immediate vicinity of Santiago just after the fight at Las Guasimas. The volunteers and firemen numbered 1869 (see page 36 of Lieutenant Müller's "Combates y Capitulación de Santiago de Cuba"). Subtracting this number, 1869, from the total number of forces, 9430, and dividing the remainder, 7561, by the number of companies, 55, we obtain an average strength of 137 men per company. I am aware, of course, that the companies varied considerably in size; for instance, the six companies of the Talavera battalion are known to have contained about one hundred and fifty men each. According to Lieutenant Müller (see page 146 of his work) the Talavera battalion numbered 850 officers and men. According to Major Núñez (see page 145 of "La Guerra Hispano-Americana, Santiago de Cuba") the two companies of the Talavera regiment that fought on San Juan Hill each numbered 150 men. On the other hand there were a number of companies of special troops whose average strength fell considerably below 137 men per company.

According to the statement of the commanders of the different organizations of Linares' army, the guerillas numbered 1000 men. (See Müller's book, page 241.)

Tabulating these facts and estimating the average strength of the companies at 137 men each, we obtain the following:

STRENGTH OF LINARES' ARMY IN AND IMMEDIATELY ABOUT SANTIAGO AND IN THE SIX INLAND TOWNS NORTH OF THE CITY ON JUNE 22, 1898.

	Officers and men.
Sixty-five companies of infantry, artillery, engineers and sappers, and civil guards	8,905
Volunteers and firemen	1,869
Guerillas, mounted and dismounted	1,000
Cavalry	200
Mounted battery	50
Signal corps	72
Total	12,096

In addition to these forces 1000 sailors that were disembarked from Cervera's squadron on that day were under Linares' orders.

APPENDIX G

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
WASHINGTON, December 26, 1903.

CAPTAIN H. H. SARGENT, 2d Cavalry,
College Station, Texas.

SIR, — In reply to your letter of December 12 to the Adjutant-General of the Army, I have the honor, by direction of the chief of staff, to advise you as follows:

From information on file in this division, the number of troops transported from Spain to Cuba from March 1, 1895, to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, appears to be 217,282.

. . . . . .

Very respectfully,
(signed) W. D. BEACH,
Major, General Staff,
Chief Second (Mil. Inf.) Division.

APPENDIX H

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL,
WASHINGTON, April 4, 1904.

CAPTAIN H. H. SARGENT,
2d United States Cavalry,
Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas,
College Station, Texas.

CAPTAIN, — Referring to your letter of the 29th ultimo, requesting to be furnished the number of Spanish soldiers, prisoners of war, sent from Cuba to Spain, after the surrender at Santiago in 1898, showing the number sent from Santiago, the number sent from Guantanamo, and the number sent from Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo, I am directed by the Quartermaster-General to inform you that the report of the agent of the Quartermaster's Department who superintended the embarkation of the Spanish prisoners of war shows that there were embarked at Santiago —

Officers	839	
Men	14,156	
Total		14,995

and at Guantanamo —

Officers	324	
Men	6,818	
Total		7,142
Total		22,137

The agent reports that of those embarked at Guantanamo 55 officers and 1267 men, a total of 1322, came from Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo.

Respectfully,

(signed) CHAUNCY B. BAKER,

Major and Quartermaster, U. S. A.

APPENDIX I

SEVENTH INDORSEMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
January 15, 1904.

SUBJECT

War Department: relative to transfer of Cuban insurgents by the navy during the war with Spain, etc.

Respectfully returned.

The log of the U. S. S. *Vixen* shows that during the forenoon of June 21, 1898 263 officers and men, including General Castillo and staff, were received on board off Aserraderos.

The log of the *Gloucester* shows that during the forenoon of the same date 299 Cuban troops were taken on board; both vessels got under way at eleven o'clock A. M., for Cojobaba, failing to land the troops at this place on account of the surf, and vessels continued on to La Segua, where they were landed during the afternoon of the same day.

I have no personal knowledge of the 3500 Cuban troops said to have been landed about the 24th, and would suggest the reference of this communication to Lieutenant T. A. Kearney, United States Navy, who is now serving on board the *Oregon*.

(signed) ALEX. SHARP,
Lieut.-Commander, U. S. N.

SIXTEENTH INDORSEMENT

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

U. S. S. Oregon, First Rate,
Cavite, P. I., March 22, 1904.

SUBJECT

War Department: Refers to Navy Department, with request for such favorable consideration as may not be inconsistent, letter of Captain H. H. Sargent, 2d Cavalry, asking for certain statistics regarding transfer of Cuban insurgents by the navy during the war with Spain, and also asking for information regarding the Spanish army and navy in Cuba.

Respectfully returned.

2. On or about June 23d I was sent by Admiral Sampson from Daiquiri with three transports to Aserraderos with orders to embark General Garcia's forces.

3. Embarked 2978 officers and men, including General Garcia.

4. Transported this force to Siboney, where they were disembarked on the 24th or 25th, by Captain Goodrich, United States Navy, commanding U. S. S. *St. Louis.*

(signed) T. A. Kearney,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

APPENDIX K

FROM "Anuario Militar de España, 1898," I take the following figures:

Strength of active army in Spain and in islands near there	152,284
Strength of the army and volunteers in Cuba	278,447
Strength of the army and volunteers in the Philippines	51,331
Strength of the army and volunteers in Porto Rico	10,005
Total	492,067

The "Anuario Militar" is published officially by the Spanish War Department; it corresponds to our "Army Register." Though it seems probable that these figures are considerably in excess of the actual numbers present under arms at the time, yet from this source it would seem that one ought to obtain reliable data. It will be remembered that, according to statement furnished me by the Spanish government there were under arms in Cuba at the outbreak of the war, 196,820 Spanish soldiers. Assuming that the number of Spanish soldiers under arms in Spain and her other possessions bore the same proportion to the number given in the "Anuario Militar" as did those in Cuba, we have:

Total number under arms is to 492,067 as 196,820 is to 278,447, and solving the proportion we have: Probable total strength of land forces of Spain under arms at outbreak of the war, 347,817.

APPENDIX L

On the 1st of April, 1898, the regular army of the United States, including the staff corps, and professors and cadets of the United States Military Academy, comprised the following officers and enlisted men:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Infantry, 25 regiments	886	12,828
Cavalry, 10 regiments	437	6,047
Artillery, 7 regiments	288	4,486
General and Staff Officers and Staff Corps	532	2,026
Miscellaneous	..	653
Total	2,143	26,040

The two additional artillery regiments, added to the regular army by Act of Congress of March 8, 1898, are included in the table, though only a part of the officers and enlisted men of these two regiments had then been selected.

APPENDIX M

MAJOR Severo Gómez Núñez of the Spanish army in his book, "The Spanish-American War, Santiago de Cuba," gives the casualties in the batteries at the mouth of the harbour resulting from the bombardment of June 6 as 10 men killed and 118 wounded. Lieutenant José Müller of the Spanish navy in his book, "Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba," gives the casualties sustained from the different bombardments as follows: on June 6, crew of *Reina Mercedes*, 6 killed and 12 wounded; on June 14, at Socapa, 7 wounded; on June 16, at Morro and Socapa, 3 killed and 18 wounded; June 21, at Morro, 3 wounded; June 22, at Socapa, Aguadores, and Daiquiri, 1 killed and 13 wounded; July 2, at Morro and Socapa, 4 killed and 38 wounded. Total casualties, 24 killed and 209 wounded.

APPENDIX N

THIRD INDORSEMENT

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 31, 1904.

SUBJECT

Captain Herbert H. Sargent, 2d Cavalry, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, encloses copy of letter to Colonel R. W. Huntington, United States Marine Corps, and his reply thereto for reference to the Marine Corps, to be returned with enclosures to him, informing him from official records accurate statement of the number of officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps that landed at Guantanamo Bay in 1898.

1. Respectfully returned to the Brigadier-General, Commandant, United States Marine Corps.

2. The total number of officers and enlisted men United States Marine Corps, comprising the 1st Battalion of Marines which landed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, June 10, 1898, was 636 (21 officers and 615 enlisted men); also serving with this battalion were 2 officers and 2 enlisted men United States navy, who landed at the same time with the marines.

(signed) GEO. C. REID,
Colonel, Adjutant, and Inspector,
U. S. Marine Corps.

APPENDIX O

At the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C., published a pamphlet under the title, "Views of Admiral Cervera regarding the Spanish Navy in the late War," which views were a translation of a series of letters published at Madrid, Spain, in La Epoca of November 5, 1898, in vindication of the Spanish navy. This pamphlet contains the following letters.

In January, 1898, Admiral Cervera wrote to one of his relatives:

DEFICIENCIES OF THE NAVAL INDUSTRY

"About two years ago I wrote you a letter concerning our condition for undertaking a war with the United States. I requested you to keep that letter in case some day it should be necessary to bring it to light in defence of my memory or myself when we had experienced the sad disappointment prepared for us by the stupidity of some, the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all, even of those with the best of intentions.

"To-day we find ourselves again in one of those critical periods which seem to be the beginning of the end, and I write to you again to express my point of view and to explain my action in this matter, and I beg you to put this

letter with the other one, so that the two may be my military testament.

"The relative military positions of Spain and the United States have grown worse for us, because we are extenuated, absolutely penniless, and they are very rich, and also because we have increased our naval power only with the *Colon* and the torpedo destroyers, and they have increased theirs much more.

"What I have said of our industry is sadly confirmed in everything we look at. There is the *Cataluna*, begun more than eight years ago, and her hull is not yet completed. And this when we are spurred on by danger, which does not wake patriotism in anybody, while jingoism finds numerous victims, perhaps myself to-morrow. And the condition of our industry is the same in all the arsenals.

"Let us consider, now, our private industries. The Maquinista Terrestrey Maritima supplies the engines of the *Alfonso XIII;* Cadiz the *Filipinas*. If the *Carlos V* is not a dead failure, she is not what she should be; everything has been sacrificed to speed, and she lacks power. And remember that the construction is purely Spanish. The company of La Grana has not completed its ships, as I am told. Only the *Vizcaya, Oquendo*, and *Maria Teresa* are good ships of their class; but, though constructed at Bilbao, it was by Englishmen. Thus, manifestly, even victory would be a sad thing for us. As for the administration and its intricacies, let us not speak of that; its slow procedure is killing us. The *Vizcaya* carries a 14-cm. breech plug which was declared useless two months ago, and I did not know it until last night, and that because an official inquiry was made. How many cases I might mention! But my purpose is not

to accuse, but to explain why we may and must expect a disaster. But as it is necessary to go to the bitter end, and as it would be a crime to say that publicly to-day, I hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly to face the trials which God may be pleased to send me. I am sure that we will do our duty, for the spirit of the navy is excellent; but I pray God that the troubles may be arranged without coming to a conflict which, in any way, I believe would be disastrous to us."

STATE OF THE FLEET

In the beginning of February Admiral Cervera wrote to a high official personage:

"Although I am sure that I am telling you nothing new, I think it is not idle, in these critical times, to make a study of the condition of the fleet. We must discount the *Alfonso XIII*, so many years under trials that it appears we shall not have the pleasure ever to count it among our vessels of war. The fleet is reduced to the three Bilbao cruisers, the *Colon*, the *Destructor*, and the torpedo destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*. The three Bilbao cruisers are practically complete, but the 14-cm. artillery, the main power of these vessels, is practically useless, on account of the bad system of its breech mechanism, and the bad quality of the cartridge cases, of which there are only those on board.

"The *Colon*, which is undoubtedly the best of all our ships from a military point of view, has not received her guns. The *Destructor* may serve as a scout, although its speed is not very high for this service in the fleet. The *Furor* and *Terror* are in a good condition, but I

doubt if they can make effective use of their 75-mm. pieces. As for the supplies necessary for a fleet, we frequently lack even the most necessary. In this arsenal (Cadiz) we have not been able to coal, and both at Barcelona and Cadiz we could only obtain half of the biscuit we wanted, and that only because I had ordered 8000 kilos to be made here. We have no charts of the American seas, although I suppose that they have been ordered; but at the present time we could not move. Apart from this deficient state of the material, I have the pleasure to state that the spirit of the personnel is excellent, and that the country will find it all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that a lack of better and more abundant material, greater supplies, and less hindrances are wanting to put this personnel in a condition to amply carry out its rôle."

. . . . . .

"I note [said the Admiral in another letter] what I am told concerning the heavy artillery of the *Colon*. It is to be very much regretted that there is always so much underhand work about everything, and that there should be so much of it now regarding the acceptance of the 254-mm. guns, because if we finally take them, it will seem that we are yielding to certain disagreeable impositions, and if things come to the worst, it seems to me we will have to accept, as the proverb says, 'hard bread rather than none'; and if we have no other guns, and these ones can fire at least twenty-five or thirty shots, we will have to take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and inefficient. And we must not lose time, so that the vessel may be armed and supplied with ammunition as soon as possible."

Some time afterwards, when matters were getting worse, the Admiral was more explicit still. Shortly after the Dupuy de Lome incident he said :

"I do not know when the *Pelayo* and the *Carlos V* will be able to join the fleet, but I suspect that they will not arrive in time. Of the first one I know nothing at all, but I have received some news concerning the second one, and certainly not very satisfactory as regards the time it will take for it to be ready. It seems to me that there is a mistake in the calculation of the forces we may count upon in the sad event of a war with the United States. In the Cadiz division I believe the *Numancia* will be lacking. I do not think we can count on the *Lepanto*. Of the *Carlos V* and the *Pelayo* I have already spoken. The *Colon* has not yet received her artillery, and if war comes she will be caught without her heavy guns. The eight principal vessels of the Havana station have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly worn out; therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not moved by a fault-finding spirit, but only by a desire to avoid illusions that may cost us very dear.

"Taking things as they are, however sad it may be, it is seen that our naval force when compared with that of the United States is approximately in the proportion of one to three. It therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think that with this force, extenuated by our long wars, we can establish the blockade of any port of the United States. A campaign against them will have to be, at least for the present, a defensive or a disastrous one, unless we have some alliances, in which case the tables may be turned. As for the offensive, all we could do

would be to make some raids with our fast vessels in order to do as much harm as possible. It is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a successful one for us, for how and where would we repair our damages? I, however, will not refuse to do what may be judged necessary, but I think it convenient to analyze the situation such as it is, without cherishing illusions which may bring about terrible disappointments."

MORE DEFICIENCIES — THE COUNTRY MUST BE TOLD THE TRUTH

On February 26 the Admiral wrote the following:

"When I received yesterday the letter in which, among other things, you asked me if the *Colon* could go out for target practice, I answered that the vessel was ready, and at the same time I took measures so that the cartridge cases which might be used in that practice should be recharged, but it appears that there is no furnace in which they can be reannealed, or a machine to reform the cartridge cases. The extra charges which the vessel brought (72 per gun) are therefore useless.

"I send to-day the official letter which I announced yesterday. Its conclusions are indeed afflicting, but can we afford to cherish illusions? Do we not owe to our country not only our life, if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs? I am very uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to us no more, because even if we should not lose it by

right in the war we have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of the climate and bullets, in the defence of what is now no more than a romantic ideal. Furthermore, I believe that this opinion of mine should be known by the Queen and by the whole council of ministers."

That this thoughtful and patriotic advice was not favourably received by the government is shown by the following letter a few days afterwards :

"Yesterday I received your letter of the 28th, and I regret very much the painful impressions caused by my remarks ; but I am not surprised, because they are truly sad, and still, perhaps they fall beneath the mark, judging from everything one sees. Just now we have another proof of this in the fact that the difficulty of obtaining cartridge cases for the *Colon* arises from the want of means (money), and this on the eve, perhaps, of a war against the richest nation in the world. I do not wish to dwell too much on this point, for no practical result could be obtained. But every detail points out either our lack of means or our defective organization, and, above all, our utter lack of preparation.

"I have deemed it my duty to express my opinions to the proper authorities clearly and without beating around the bush. Now let orders be given to me ; I will carry them out with energy and decision. I am ready for the worst."

CERVERA WISHED TO EXPLAIN HIS OPINION TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Admiral Cervera's already expressed desire to inform personally the council of ministers was still more clearly expressed under date of March 16:

"Yesterday I received your favour of the day before, by which I see that our opinions agree concerning the conflict which threatens our unfortunate country. As both of us are animated by the best desires, such agreement was sure to come. It also appears that the whole government participates in this opinion, but I am afraid that there may be some minister who, while believing that we are not in favourable conditions, may have been dazzled by the names of the vessels appearing in the general statement and may not realize how crushing a disproportion really exists, especially if he is not thoroughly aware of our lack of everything that is necessary for a naval war, such as supplies, ammunition, coal, etc. We have nothing at all. If this fear of mine is well-founded, I think it is of the greatest importance that the whole council of ministers, without exception, be fully and clearly informed of our terrible position, so that there may not remain the least doubt that the war will simply lead us to a terrible disaster, followed by a humiliating peace and the most frightful ruin; for which reason it is necessary not only to avoid the war but to find some solution which will render it impossible in the future. If this is not done, the more time is spent the worse will be the final result, whether it is peace or war.

"From this reasoning, as clear as daylight to me, it appears that since we cannot go to war without meeting

with a certain and frightful disaster, and since we cannot treat directly with the United States, whose bad faith is notorious, perhaps there is nothing left for us to do but to settle the dispute through arbitration or mediation, provided the enemy accepts. However, this order of consideration does not come within my sphere of duty, which, as the chief of the squadron, is limited to reporting the state of military affairs and then carrying out the orders of the government. The latter, however, must be fully informed of the situation. Before dropping this subject I must insist that perhaps it would be well for me to verbally inform the members of the cabinet and to say that I am ready to start at the first intimation.

"Concerning the available forces and what may be expected of them, I will be very glad if Ansaldo carries out his promise about the 254-mm. guns of the *Colon*. The 14-cm. cartridge cases are absolutely necessary. This vessel has only thirty, and it is to be supposed that the stores of the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* are not better supplied. For the present the firm is supplying only one hundred per week, and supposing that the first ones have already arrived or will arrive in Cadiz one of these days, at this rate we won't have finished until October. Then they have to be charged; therefore they can never be ready in time for the present conflict. I thought I would have the first ones by January, and I will not have them until April. The engines of the *Pelayo* are ready and the vessel can sail, but how about the secondary battery and the armoured redoubt? These will not be ready. If the old battery could be mounted! But I doubt it; the ports will not permit it. I have heard it said that the crew which brought the *Pelayo* was taken from the

Victoria, which is another proof of our excessive poverty. It will be very well if the *Carlos V* is soon ready, but I understand that the 10-cm. battery has not yet been mounted, and then the trials are to be made.

"I never had great confidence in the purchasing of vessels. Too much fuss is made over every detail by ignorant people. It was through this that we lost the *Garibaldi*, and now we have lost the Brazilian cruisers. In fact we have only secured the *Colon*, an excellent ship, but which has not yet arrived, and the *Valdés*. And supposing that we had everything our own way, and that Providence should grant us a victory, which is highly improbable, we would then find ourselves in the condition explained in my last and which it is not necessary to repeat. It only rests for me now to be informed of the destination of the fleet. I believe the *Teresa* ought to be in Cadiz, where the cartridge cases are to be re-charged, and she could sail as soon as all her guns were mounted.

"I will insist no more, but the voice of my conscience, animated by my love for my country, tells me that in saying this I am fulfilling my unavoidable duty."

CONDITION OF THE FLEET IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE WAR

In the month of April, shortly before the war, Cervera wrote:

"My fears are realized. The conflict is coming fast upon us; and the *Colon* has not received her big guns; the *Carlos V* has not been delivered, and her 10-cm. artillery is not yet mounted; the *Pelayo* is not ready for

want of finishing her redoubt, and, I believe, her secondary battery; the *Victoria* has no artillery, and of the *Numancia* we had better not speak.

"But after all I am glad the end is coming. The country can stand this state of affairs no longer, and any arrangement will be a good one, however bad it looks, if it comes without our having to lament a great disaster, as may happen if we go to war with a few half-armed vessels, and with want of means and excess of incumbrances."

APPENDIX P

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 20, 1903.

GENERAL ORDERS,
No. 107.

By direction of the Secretary of War, the following order is published to the army for the information and guidance of all concerned:

July 17, 1903.

The Department of War and the Department of the Navy have agreed upon the formation of a joint board to be composed of four officers of the army and four officers of the navy, to hold stated sessions and such extraordinary sessions as shall appear advisable for the purpose of conferring upon, discussing, and reaching common conclusions regarding all matters calling for the coöperation of the two services. Any matters which seem to either department to call for such consideration may be referred by that department to the board thus formed. All reports of the board shall be made in duplicate, one for each department. All reports and proceedings of the board shall be confidential. The senior member of the board present will preside at its meetings and the junior member of the board present will act as its recorder.

On the recommendation of the provisional General Staff of the Army the following officers are detailed by the Secretary of War to serve upon the board:

Major-General S. B. M. Young.
Major-General Henry C. Corbin.
Brigadier-General Tasker H. Bliss.
Brigadier-General Wallace F. Randolph.

On the recommendation of the General Board of the Navy the following officers are detailed by the Secretary of the Navy to serve upon the board:

Admiral of the Navy George Dewey.
Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor.
Captain John E. Pillsbury.
Commander William J. Barnette.

ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.
WILLIAM H. MOODY,
Secretary of the Navy.

By command of Lieutenant-General Miles:

W. P. HALL,
Acting Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX Q

TABLE OF DISTANCES.

	Nautical miles.	Statute miles.
From San Juan, Porto Rico, to Porto Grande, St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands	2354	2710
From San Juan, Porto Rico, to Havana, Cuba	984	1133
From San Juan, Porto Rico, to Key West . .	960	1105
From San Juan, Porto Rico, to Hampton Roads, Va.	1245	1434
From San Juan, Porto Rico, to Tampa, Fla. .	1187	1366
From San Juan, Porto Rico, to Cienfuegos, Cuba	899	1035
From Fort de France, Martinique, to San Juan, Porto Rico	385	443
From Fort de France, Martinique, to Cienfuegos, Cuba	1240	1428
From Fort de France, Martinique, to Santiago de Cuba	951	1095
From Fort de France, Martinique, to Havana via Yucatan Channel	1655	1806
From Fort de France, Martinique, to Santa Ana Harbour, Curacao	500	576
From Santa Ana Harbour, Curacao, to Cienfuegos, Cuba	900	1036
From Santa Ana Harbour, Curacao, to Santiago de Cuba	628	723
From Santa Ana Harbour, Curacao, to San Juan, Porto Rico	482	555
From Cienfuegos, Cuba, to Santiago de Cuba .	323	372
From Santiago Bay to Guantanamo Bay . . .	37	43
From Havana to Tampa, Fla.	306	352
From Key West to Tampa, Fla.	270	311
From Havana to Cienfuegos	482	555
From Havana to Key West	90	104
From Havana to Santiago de Cuba by way of the Windward Passage	639	736

APPEN-

Casualties in the Fifth Corps in the Opera-

COMMAND.	Las Guasimas, June 24.				El Caney, July 1.			
	Killed.		W'nded.		Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Maj.-Gen. W. R. Shafter, headquarters and staff	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Signal Corps	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Hospital Corps	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
C. and. E. Engineer Battalion	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Second U. S. Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
First Division, Brig.-Gen. J. F. Kent	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. H. S. Hawkins	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Sixteenth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Sixth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Seventy-first New York Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Second Brigade, Col. E. P. Pearson, 5th Inf.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Second U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Tenth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Twenty-first U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Third Brigade, Col. C. A. Wikoff, 22d Inf.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Ninth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Thirteenth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Second Division, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Lawton	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. Ludlow	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Eighth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	6	1	45
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	7	6	36
Second Massachusetts Infantry	..	..	..	..	1	4	3	37
Second Brigade, Col. Evan Miles, 1st Inf.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
First U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1

DIX R

TIONS AGAINST SANTIAGO, JUNE 22 TO JULY 17, 1898.

San Juan, July 1-3.				Aguadores, July 1-2.				Around Santiago, July 10-12.				Total.				Aggregate.	Present for duty equipped June 30.	
Killed.		W'nded.		Killed.		W'nded.		Killed.		W'nded.		Killed.		Wounded.				
Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		Officers.	Enlisted men.
..	...	..	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	...	....	....	17	.....
..	...	..	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	...	1	1	7	81
..	...	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	...	3	3	...	275
..	...	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	...	1	1	8	192
..	...	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	...	1	1	9	257
..	...	..	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	...	....	....	11	.....
2	...	1	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	...	1	....	3	6	6
1	13	6	109	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	13	6	109	129	24	655
2	10	8	106	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	2	10	8	107	127	31	461
..	12	1	67	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	12	1	67	80	47	922
..	...	..	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	...	....	....	6	8
..	6	4	49	..	..	..	..	1	1	1	3	1	7	5	52	65	20	618
1	4	5	35	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	4	5	35	45	23	432
..	6	1	30	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	6	1	31	38	26	441
1	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	...	...	....	1	5	.....
1	4	..	27	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	4	...	27	32	21	445
1	17	6	85	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	17	6	85	109	24	441
1	6	7	76	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	6	7	76	90	23	516
..	...	..	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	...	....	....	8	.....
..	...	..	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	...	....	....	4	7
..	...	..	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	1	45	52	19	487
..	2	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9	6	39	54	29	467
..	...	..	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	4	3	41	49	44	863
..	...	..	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	...	....	....	5	8
..	...	..	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	...	...	2	2	14	438

COMMAND.	Las Guasimas, June 24.				El Caney, July 1.			
	Killed.		W'nded.		Killed.		W'nded.	
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Fourth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	1	6	2	33
Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	1	7	3	22
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. R. Chaffee	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Seventh U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	1	32	4	95
Twelfth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	8	2	29
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	4	3	24
Independent Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. C. Bates	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Third U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	3
Twentieth U. S. Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	7
Cavalry Division, Maj.-Gen. J. Wheeler	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. S. S. Sumner	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Third U. S. Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Sixth U. S. Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Ninth U. S. Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. S. B. M. Young	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
First U. S. Cavalry	..	7	3	5	..	..	..	...
Tenth U. S. Cavalry	..	1	..	10	..	..	..	...
First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry	1	7	3	28	..	..	..	...
Artillery Battalion, Maj. J. W. Dillenback	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
E, 1st Artillery	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
K, 1st Artillery	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
A, 2d Artillery	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
F, 2d Artillery	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
G, 4th Artillery	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
H, 4th Artillery	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Brig.-Gen. H. M. Duffield's Brigade	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Ninth Massachusetts Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Thirty-third Michigan Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Thirty-fourth Michigan Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	...
Total	1	15	6	43	4	77	25	335

* Estimated —

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, *April* 23, 1900.

R (*continued*)

San Juan, July 1-3.				Aguadores, July 1-2.				Around Santiago, July 10-12.				Total.				Aggregate.	Present for duty equipped June 30.	
Killed.		W'nded.		Killed.		W'nded.		Killed.		W'nded.		Killed.		Wounded.				
Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		Officers.	Enlisted men.
..	1	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	7	2	36	46	21	444
..	....	..	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	7	3	27	38	18	509
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	....	....	4	16
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	32	4	95	132	25	891
..	....	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	2	35	45	20	564
.	4	..	13	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	3	37	48	24	482
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	....	....	5	6
..	1	..	12	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	....	15	18	21	464
..	....	1	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	1	2	13	16	23	573
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	....	....	13	....
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	....	....	3	6
..	3	6	46	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	6	46	55	23	433
..	2	4	53	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	4	53	59	16	435
1	2	2	16	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	1	2	2	18	23	12	207
..	....	3	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	3	....	3	7	3
1	12	..	47	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	19	3	52	75	20	503
2	5	9	65	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	6	9	75	92	27	453
1	14	4	69	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	21	7	97	127	26	557
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	....	....	1	....
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	....	....	3	79
..	1	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	....	....	1	2	78
..	2	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	2	....	8	10	3	79
..	....	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	1	2	3	2	77
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	....	....	2	53
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	....	....	1	65
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	....	....	4	....
..	....	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	3	3	40	*800
..	....	..	....	..	2	..	10	..	..	..	..	..	2	....	10	12	43	958
..	....	..	....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	....	....	....	....	29	612
15	127	69	945	..	2	..	10	1	1	1	11	21	222	101	1,344	1,688	869	17,349

no return.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General, U. S. A.

APPENDIX S

General Rubin's entire forces comprised six Talavera companies, three Porto Rico companies, three San Fernando companies, three mobilized companies, one company of railroad troops (engineers), one mounted battery (two guns), and one hundred and ten guerillas. Taking the average strength of the companies at 137 each (see Appendix F) and adding the mountain battery, 50 men, and the guerillas, 110, we have a total force of 2352. Of these forces 2078 formed the three lines, extending from Las Guasimas to Redonda, the remainder, 274 men — one mobilized company and one Talavera company — were at Aguadores, the two Talavera companies, and thirty guerillas in the third line and a few of the troops of the second line, took no part in the engagement at Las Guasimas.

APPENDIX T

"Pozo 23 Junio 1898.

"Me entregaron los paisanos el papel que me escribió y hemos estado oyendo el fuego desde las cinco menos cuarto y después el disparo de cañón.

"Encargue al coronel Borry[1] que cuide bien de la vereda ó camino de la Redonda, donde está acampado, pues los de la línea al encontrarse ocupado Sardinero, pueden tomar dicho camino de la Redonda.

"He pedido á Cuba todas las acémilas de transportes, y diez carretillas que estarán en ese campamento de siete y media á ocho. Tenga V. preparados los enfermos y las municiones para que marchen en seguida á Cuba con la misma escolta que llevará las acémilas.

"Disponga V. que se coma ahí el primer rancho de mañana, y después recibirá V. órdenes.— *Linares.*

"*Sr. General D. Antero Rubín.*"

Las instrucciones eran:

"Después de comer el primer rancho marchará usted con toda la columna á Cuba, efectuando la retirada de ese punto por escalones con las debidas precauciones y lentitud necesaria para rechazar en buenas condiciones cualquier agresión de enemigo.

[1] El Coronel Borry murió, de casi repentina dolencia, al día siguiente.

"El batallón de Talavera se dirigirá al Sueño y allí encontrará un jefe de la plaza que le indicará los puntos que ha de ocupar.

"El batallón de Puerto-Rico con las dos compañías movilizadas de la zona minera se dirigirá a Cañadas y allí recibirá órdenes respecto á los puntos que ha de ocupar, y el batallón de San Fernando se dirigirá al Centro Benéfico, é igualmente recibirá instrucciones. La sección de Artillería al cuartel de Dolores. La sección de Ingenieros irá á Cruces, alojándose en las oficinas de la Empresa minera. — *Linares.*"

"Pozo 24 de Junio 1898.

"NOTA. El Capitán de Ingenieros que regrese á Cuba con el convoy de enfermos, que se presente al Sr. Coronel Caula.

"Ya tiene V. S. orden de retirarse y le prevengo que lo efectúe una hora después de haberlo verificado el convoy de enfermos, con escolta de dos compañías movilizadas y una de Talavera. Retire en primer término toda la impedimenta y que al llegar á Cuba vayan á los puntos designados; con los tres escalones Puerto-Rico, San Fernando y Talavera, haga V. S. retirada alternada por escalones, en forma que, al abandonar posiciones el escalón avanzado, estén en posición los otros dos, hasta llegar á Cuba. Aquí esperaré yo. — *Linares.*

"*Sr. General Rubín.*"

APPENDIX U

THE organizations of the Spanish forces that were surrendered by General Toral on July 17, exclusive of the garrisons of Guantanamo, Baracoa, and Sagua de Tanamo, contained on June 22, 15,756 officers and men. (See table of Spanish troops in province of Santiago, Appendix F.) Of this number about 200 were killed in battle or died of disease between June 22 and July 17. Making the subtraction, we have 15,556, and adding to this number the 7142 that were transported to Spain from Guantanamo, Baracoa, and Sagua de Tanamo (see Appendix H), we have a total of 22,698 officers and men that were surrendered on July 17, or in round numbers 22,700.

It should, perhaps, be noted that this number, which for the most part is based on Spanish government's statement, does not differ very materially from the figures given by General Shafter in his telegram of July 30 to the Adjutant-General (see page 41). He says: "The count of prisoners

has not yet been accurately made, but so far about 21,500 have surrendered, and there should be 3000 or 4000 at Sagua and Baracoa." Adding to 21,500 the 1322 that surrendered at Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo, we obtain a total of 22,822.

APPENDIX V

ACCORDING to the Spanish government's statement, the losses in the battles of El Caney and San Juan were fifty officers and more than five hundred men killed and wounded. (See Appendix A.)

Major Núñez in "La Guerra Hispano-Americana, Santiago de Cuba," page 151, says: "En los dos combates de El Caney y San Juan hubo 500 bajas de tropa entre muertos y heridos, y 50 de Generales, jefes y oficiales."

Lieutenant Müller in "Combates y Capitulación de Santiago de Cuba," page 157, gives the total casualties in the battles of El Caney and San Juan as follows: 2 generals, 10 commanders, 48 officers, and 533 men; total, 593.

From the above statements and from other facts which have come to my knowledge in a careful study of this campaign I am led to believe that, exclusive of the Spaniards who were captured, the total loss in killed and wounded at El Caney and San Juan on the first, second, and third of July was about six hundred officers and men.

Not including the killed and wounded in the company of guerillas at El Caney, Major Núñez

on pages 132 and 133 of his work gives the loss as 68 killed and 121 wounded. Assuming that there was practically the same proportion of loss in the company of guerillas as there was in the three companies of the Constitución regiment, which according to Núñez numbered 419 men, we have in the guerilla company a loss of 46 men, which gives, all told, a total loss at El Caney of 235 officers and men.

Not including the 60 volunteers and the 125 sailors who took an active part in the fighting at San Juan, Major Núñez, on pages 148, 149, and 150 of his work, gives the loss as 57 killed, 213 wounded, and 34 missing; total, 304. Assuming that the 60 volunteers on San Juan Hill had the same percentage of loss as had the artillery men who fought there, and that the sailors sustained a loss of about twenty-five per cent of their number, and adding these losses to the above, we have a total loss at San Juan of 360 officers and men.

The losses in the different organizations as given by Major Núñez, with the estimated losses of the volunteers and sailors added, are: Linares, headquarters and staff, 6 wounded and 1 missing; Talavera regiment, 22 killed and 85 wounded; Porto Rico regiment, 20 killed, 61 wounded, and 33 missing; Asia regiment, 10 killed and 2 wounded; San Fernando regiment, 2 wounded; artillerymen, 5 killed and 16 wounded; guerillas and mobilized companies, 40 killed and wounded; sailors, 31

killed and wounded; volunteers, 25 killed and wounded; engineers, 1 wounded; total, 360.

As there were but few, if any, Spaniards of the Porto Rico regiment captured who were not wounded, it is reasonable to suppose that the 33 men reported as missing in that regiment were mostly either killed or wounded. Most of the engineers were at Las Cruces during the battle; but a few of them were employed in the forts along the north side of the city.

SUMMARY

Spanish losses.	Killed and wounded.
At El Caney, July 1st	235
At San Juan, July 1st, 2d, and 3d	360
Total	595

APPENDIX W

ORDER OF BATTLE

U. S. Flagship New York, First Rate,
Off Santiago de Cuba, June 2, 1898.

The fleet off Santiago de Cuba will be organized during the operations against that port and the Spanish squadron as follows:

First squadron (under the personal command of the Commander-in-chief): *New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter.*

Second squadron (Commodore Schley): *Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen.*

Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the Commander-in-chief. The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about six miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well in shore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port, and the second squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel. It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battleships.

In smooth weather the vessels will coal on station. If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle thus left vacant.

DAY AND NIGHT FORMATION

(To accompany order of battle, dated June 2, 1898)

U. S. Flagship New York, First Rate,
Off Santiago de Cuba, June 2, 1898.



APPEN

THE following tables and comments are taken
the United States Prepared for War?" in the "North

War.	Regulars.	Militia, etc.
Revolution	231,771 [1]	164,087 [2]
1812	56,032 [6]	471,622 [6]
Creek	600 [10]	43,921 [11]
Seminole	5,911 [13]	1,600 [13]
Black Hawk	1,341 [16]	4,638 [16]
Florida [18]	20,632 [19]	48,152 [20]
Mexican	31,024 [23]	73,532 [24]
Civil	67,000 [27]	2,605,341 [28]
Spanish	58,688 [32]	223,235 [33]
Philippine	76,416 [36]	50,052 [36]

[1] General Emory Upton, "The Military Policy of the United States," p. 58. This was published by the War Department in 1904, and is the most trustworthy work on the subject ever written. Owing to lack of appropriation, it is now out of print.

[2] Returns and estimates of the Secretary of War; American State Papers, I, pp. 14–19.

[3] Original returns in the British Record Office, quoted by H. B. Carrington, "Battles of the American Revolution," pp. 93, 301, 321, 462, 483, 502, and 646.

[4] Upton, p. 66; Ingersoll, "The Second War," I, p. 14.

[5] Annual Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, Aug. 1, 1904.

[6] Records of the Adjutant-General's Office. Also Upton, p. 137.

[7] Brannan's "Letters" and Gleig's "British Campaigns," quoted by Upton, p. 138. To the above number must be added 1810 militia and 9825 Indians.

[8] Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, June 30, 1905. Also Upton, p. 141.

[9] Annual Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30, 1905, p. 10.

[10] Thirty-ninth U. S. Infantry.

[11] According to the records of the Adjutant-General's Office, Georgia, Tennessee, and Mississippi furnished 25,779 and North and South Carolina 18,142 militia. Of these only 15,000 were actually put into the field.

[12] Upton, p 119.

[13] Upton, p. 149. The figures in the first column represent Regulars, Militia, and Volunteers; those in the second column represent subsidized Indians.

[14] Report of the Senate Investigating Committee; American State Papers, II, pp. 739–741.

[15] Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1905, p. 96.

[16] Records of the Adjutant-General's Office.

[17] Report of Major-General Macomb, commanding the army. American State Papers, V, p. 29

[18] Including the Florida War, 1835 to 1842; the Creek War, 1836 to 1838; and the Cherokee War, 1836 to 1838.

[19] Upton, p. 190.

[20] Records of the Adjutant-General's Office.

[21] General Call's Report to the President, dated January 9, 1836. American State Papers, VII, p. 218.

[22] Annual Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30, 1905, p. 10, gives the total pensions paid out for the Indian Wars as amounting to $7,637,268.53.

[23] Upton, p 221.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 216.

DIX X

from Mr. Frederic Louis Huidekoper's article, " Is American Review " of February, 1906.

Opponents.	Cost.	Pensions.
About 150,605 [3]	$370,000,000 [4]	$70,000,000 [5]
About 55,000 [7]	82,627,009 [8]	45,440,790 [9]
1,500–2,000 [12]	Unestimated	See below
About 1,000 [14]	8,004,236 [15]	See below
800–1,000 [17]	5,446,034 [15]	See below
1,200–2,000 [21]	69.751,611 [15]	Foot-note [22]
About 46,000 [25]	88,500,208 [15]	36,682.848 [26]
1,000,000 [29]	5,371,079,748 [30]	3,149,537,669 [31]
200,000 [34]	321,833,254 [35]	11,996,198 [31]
Unestimated	171,326,572 [37]	

[25] Alphabetical List of Battles, 1754–1900, pp. 236–237. Compiled from official records by Newton A. Strait.

[26] Annual Report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30, 1905, pp. 10, 11.

[27] Phisterer, Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States (Campaigns of the Civil War Series), p. 11.

[28] Official records in the office of the Military Secretary; Memorandum relative to the probable number and ages of Army and Navy survivors of the Civil War, p. 4 (published by the Military Secretary's office, May 15, 1905); Reply of the Military Secretary, dated Aug. 28, 1905, to the writer's letter of inquiry. The total number of soldiers, both regular and volunteer, was 2,672,341.

[29] "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," IV, p. 768. The numbers employed by the Confederacy have been variously estimated from 700,000 to 1,500,000. Livermore, "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War of America," p. 63, reckons the numbers as between 1,227,890 and 1,406,180. These calculations are at best conjectural, since, as the Military Secretary wrote, on Aug. 28, 1905, to the author of this article: "No compilation has ever been prepared by this [the War] Department from which even an approximately accurate statement can be made concerning the number of troops in the Confederate Army, and it is impracticable to make such a compilation because of the incompleteness of the collection of Confederate records in possession of the Department."

[30] Senate Executive Document No. 206. Forty-sixth Congress, Second Session. Letter of John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury, to Hon. William A. Wheeler, President of the Senate, 1880, transmitting the statement of "Expenditures necessarily growing out of the War of the Rebellion, July 1, 1816, to June 30, 1879," a total of not less than $6,189,929,908.58.

[31] Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1905, pp. 10 and 11.

[32] Report of the Adjutant-General, Nov. 1, 1898, in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, pp. 145, 147, and 260.

[33] Statistical Exhibit of Strength of Volunteer Forces called into service during the War with Spain, issued by the Adjutant-General, Dec. 13, 1899. Also Strait, pp. 208, 209.

[34] International Year Book for 1898, p. 722; Lodge, "History of the War with Spain," p. 18.

[35] Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1905, p. 98.

[36] Report of the Adjutant-General, Nov. 1, 1898.

[37] From May, 1898, to April, 1902, both inclusive, according to the statement sent to the Senate by the Secretary of War, June 19, 1902.

Probably not one American in a hundred thousand has any conception of the outrageous extravagance in men and money that has characterized every war in which

COST OF U. S. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BY PERIODS.

Period.	Condition.	Cost.
1791–1811[1]	Peace	$35,669,930.65
1812–1816	Including the War of 1812 .	82,627,009.14
1817–1835	Minor Indian Wars. Army av'-ging under 6000 officers, etc.	90,411,068.59
1836–1843	Florida War	69,751,611.50
1843–1845	Peace. Army reduced . . .	13,873,146.89
1846–1849	Including the Mexican War .	88,500,208.38
1850–1860	Peace. Army reduced . . .	168,079,707.57
1861–1865	Including the Civil War . .	2,736,570,923.50
1866–1869	Forces large, because of French occupation of Mexico . .	583,749,510.99[2]
1870–1897	Peace. Army reduced . . .	1,211,321,300.94
1898–1899	Including Spanish-American War	321,833,254.76
1900–1902	Including Philippine War . .	391,662,681.06
1903–1905	Peace	355,830,004.97
	Total cost since 1790 . . .	$6,149,880,358.94[3]
	Total cost of pensions since 1790	$3,359,185,901.02[3]

[1] Throughout this table the dates given are "both inclusive" in each instance.

[2] Including outstanding warrants amounting to $3,621,780.07.

[3] Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1906, pp. 96 and 98.

we have been involved. From a purely business standpoint, the above figures are indicative of puerile shortsightedness and criminal blundering, such as would not be tolerated for a moment in any properly managed company or corporation in the United States.

The lamentable policy of retrenchment in time of peace to which our legislators have invariably adhered, is nothing less than the "penny wise, pound foolish" policy which every sane business man heartily condemns. The results entailed by this false economy furnish a further corroboration of the fact that our military policy has always been unsound from a financial as well as a numerical standpoint, as will appear from the preceding table.

What do American taxpayers who have had to foot some of these bills think of these figures? How long do they suppose that the stockholders in any bank or railway company would tolerate any such mismanagement? How long would the officials or directors be permitted to remain in power if they could produce no better results in return for such enormous expenditures?

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